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   SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA(U) ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS CORP
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UNCLASSIFIED   AAC-TR-26601/83 MDA908-82-C-0226   F/G 5/4   NL

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THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY RULE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

W. Andrew Terrill
Raymond J. Picquet
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PREFACE

This report was prepared as part of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP). As such it is part of an overall program to provide DIA with the analysis and opinions of interested individuals outside of the government. In this connection it was a great pleasure for the authors to make this kind of an in-depth study on the often neglected continent of Africa.

A number of individuals have been of immense help to the authors in writing this work. In particular this study has benefited from the scholarly and professional conduct of DIA. At no time during the preparation of this report were the authors made to feel that they were expected to support certain opinions or values. The open encouragement of varied and dissenting opinions by DIA was both refreshing and encouraging to the authors. Major Peter Kosmo, USMC, who served as the Contracting Officers Technical Representative, was especially supportive in this regard.

Within our own organization, the authors would also like to thank a number of individuals whose guidance and support was of considerable use to us in completing this document. Employees of Analytical Assessments Corporation whose critical analysis and support were particularly useful include Drs. Abraham R. Wagner, Carol K. Wagner, Avigdor Haselkorn, Jeffrey Simon; and Messrs. Fredric S. Feer and Thomas Dries.

While the authors of this work have many differing opinions on Africa, we are all proud of this study which has attempted to incorporate and explain our own differences of opinions rather than supress or ignore them. Under these circumstances, it should be clear that the opinions expressed are solely the opinions of the authors and should not be construed as reflecting the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study has sought to shed some light on several of the most sig-
nificant after-effects of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing
this, the authors have examined both the governing military's relations
with its own subordinate elements and the governing military's relation-
ship with the society itself as a whole. The first priority here has been
to examine the military consequences of military rule in terms of such
things as resource allocation, fostering of professionalism and morale, as
well as the provision of adequate military training. Another important
aspect of military rule addressed by this study is a determination regard-
ing the effects of military rule on the propensity for a nation to use
both external and internal force. The foreign and domestic policies of
military juntas are, therefore, addressed. Finally, this study is con-
cluded with an analysis of those instances where the military has returned
power to civilian authorities with some speculation regarding the condi-
tions which are most favorable to such a transition.

In order to establish a starting point for a more in-depth analysis
of the specific questions of interest to this study, Section I presents a
broad overview of African militaries in general. The basic conclusion of
this overview is that, to varying degrees, African militaries are afflic-
ted with a variety of internal divisions and cleavages. These cleavages
can be ethnic, tribal, linguistic generational, political and/or ideologi-
cal. If these cleavages are exacerbated by changing patterns of power
within the government, they threaten the cohesiveness and even the func-
tioning of the military.

After establishing the general nature of African militaries, Section
II discusses some basic generalizations that apply to a wide variety of
military regimes in Africa. Here it is pointed out that one of the first
actions of coupmakers is almost always to raise military salaries and pos-
sibly improve fringe benefits. Additional weapons acquisition is usually
a peripheral third priority if it is a priority at all. It seems that a
high level of regional tensions is a much more useful indicator of arms

acquisitions than type of regimes. This is especially clear when one considers the escalations of Kenyan, Tanzanian and Zambian defense spending which occurred in the 1970's.

The next aspect of military governments explored is the drawbacks of military rule. Here the problem of legitimacy is briefly discussed. The basic problem here is that one set of coupmakers provides a precedent legitimizing any future coups. Distrust between rival groups of officers (which is often quite high in any event) tends to escalate in these types of circumstances. Another problem emerges when officers in government become involved in corruption. This hurts the self-image of the army and sets the stage for revenge coups against senior officers.

After exploring some of these basic trends, a number of different types of conditions of military rule are examined in Section III. These conditions represent the ways in which the governing militaries relate to their subordinate units within the armed forces. While the outlining of these conditions (as categories) is done to present the modes in which military governments relate to military forces, the conditions are (with only one exception) not mutually exclusive. This is because it is assumed that the relationship between the regime and the military may be multidimensional and incorporate more than one of the conditions outlined in this report.

The first condition being examined has been designated as the uneasy regime condition. Here, African leadership would maintain tight control of the officer coups through non-ideological purges and manipulation of potential rivals. The best examples of this can be seen with regard to Sudan and Zaire where the need for regime maintenance has overridden the need for national security and the military is deliberately kept divided.

Another condition examined in this study is the ideological leadership condition. This occurs when the leadership attempts to inculcate ideological (for all practical purposes Marxist) ideals into the military. The most important example here is Ethiopia, although other notable cases would include Congo and Benin. In these situations it has been found that the militaries can continue to function despite the severe effect this can initially have on morale.

A third condition examined is debilitating factionalism. This con-
dition occurs when a coup or some other shift in government leads various
ethnic, tribal, or religious groups within the military to feel so
threatened that they are rendered incapable of dealing with members of the
group perceived as the threat. The most important example of this condi-
tion occurred in Nigeria immediately prior to the Civil War (1967-1970).

The Junior Officer/NCO controlled military is a fourth condition
examined in this study. This condition is characterized by junior offi-
cers and/or NCOs rising against their superiors and thereby assuming con-
trol of the government and the military. Under these conditions, the
chain of command can be so totally shattered that officers lose all autho-
rity. In this situation, it is usually better to appoint new officers (no
matter how inexperienced) than to allow the old officers to stay on after
their credibility has been destroyed. Cases examined within this context
include Sierra Leone (1967), Ghana (under Rawling), and Liberia (under
Doe).

A fifth condition analyzed in this study is that of the uncontrolled
military. Here the armed forces are given free reign to loot and victi-
mize the country's population. While this would almost always destroy the
economy, it nevertheless ties the army and the regime together by virtue
of their shared crimes. Any new regime would be more likely to punish
members of the armed forces for such crimes. A good example of a nation
which incorporated the uncontrolled army condition into its system of
government/military interaction is Uganda under Amin.

A final condition analyzed in this report is the Praetorian Guard
condition. This occurs when the regime commands the loyalty of a portion
rather than all of the armed forces and, therefore, affords special treat-
ment to this portion of the armed forces. While this is found to have a
negative effect on morale, it is not totally debilitating and can be very
effective in insuring the survivability of the regime. The prime example
here is Togo.

Section V examines the use of external force by African military
regimes. The first aspect relates to external constraints on African
military regimes seeking to wage war. It is pointed out in the study that

African military regimes who have a deep commitment to winning what they perceive as a vital war can, in some cases, rise above the disapproval of their major arms suppliers and obtain new weapons from other sources.

It is also noted in this section that participation in an interventionist foreign policy is by no means the exclusive realm of the military regimes. Civilian governments are often equally interested in influencing events in neighboring countries. An example of this can be seen in the cases of Tanzania and South Africa. Again, regional tensions seem to be a much more important indicator of war than regime type.

Section V examines the use of internal force and repression with regard to a variety of military regimes. This portion of the work is meant to present a cross-section examination of militaries illustrating the various modes of internal force and repression common in Africa. In this section, a study of Nigeria indicates a reluctance to use force that is explored in a more in-depth manner in Section VI on civilian rule. Congo (Brazzaville) is then examined to show the nature of repression under a Marxist/Leninist regime. The case of Uganda shows how a civilian government began constructing the instruments of repression which came into full force during the dictatorship of Field Marshal Amin. Liberia, examined next, shows how erratically repressive measures can be applied in a regime where the chain of command has been shattered. Finally, the case of Zaire illustrates the types of repressions that occur under a regime where the army tends to be both corrupt and mistreated.

Section VI concludes the study with an examination of those situations in which the military has returned power to the civilian governments. The purpose here is to examine the conditions which precede a military relinquishing of power. Key factors analyzed include professional ideology of the military, the political-associational infrastructure of the society, the existence of economic and political crisis, and the military's receptiveness to the use of repression. The basic conclusion of this section is that a military inability to deal with economic and political problems over time places the military at a crossroad. It can either crush dissent through the use of increased force or it can make an arrangement to return the power and problems of running the government to civilian authorities.

In cases where the military has reached this type of crossroad, the question of repression becomes extremely important. It is at this point that the military government must decide whether or not its own armed forces are capable of coming to terms with large-scale escalations of repression. The alternatives to this are fragmentation of the armed forces along those cleavages already noted, or a new coup.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1   Overview

The purpose of this study is to examine how African military regimes relate to their own militaries, and how these relationships affect the military capabilities of the African armed forces. The study will also assess how African military governments tend to view the potential of their armed forces for either foreign adventures or internal repression. In particular, the report will attempt to isolate any pertinent differences between civilian and military modes of relating to the overall military structure and conducting foreign and internal security policies

With regard to the above, it is worth noting that while many coup leaders assume the title of President upon seizing power, they have continued to rule as military leaders. They often tend to live on or very near military bases, wear uniforms, and surround themselves with military associates. Rule by these individuals, therefore, cannot be considered a return to civilian government unless free elections are held. Indeed, in most cases their own populations and other African leaders continue to think of them and refer to them in terms of their military positions.[1]

A final aspect of this study will be an analysis of those instances where the military has returned power to the civilian authorities. Although a large number of military regimes claim to be willing to return their countries to civilian rule, the number of cases where this actually occurred are very few; hence, the analysis is somewhat limited by this

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[1]See Victor A. Olorunsola and Gary Wasko "The Dynamics of Legitimacy Engineering in Africa Military Regimes" Journal of African Studies, Vol. 5 (1978), pp. 309-323.

armies. They tend to be most visible when a government is trying to
implement major military reform or when the ousting of some particular
ruler requires the purging of officers who may be loyal to the former
leader. Spanish and Moroccan officers and NCO's, for example, played a
major role in helping to reorganize the military of Equatorial Guinea
after the army coup against the psychotic dictator Francisco Macias
Nguema.[22]   Notable exceptions to this rule are places like Angola,
Ethiopia and Djibouti which have invited what amounts to a foreign army in
order to help them with regional or internal security problems. It is
also possible that as more sophisticated weapons enter Africa, more
advisors and instructors will become a necessity.[23]

The net result of these types of problems is the existence of se-
verely fragmented armies. Eastern-trained officers are divided against
Western-trained officers; junior officers are divided against senior offi-
cers; and members of one tribe or ethnic background are divided against
other tribal or ethnic backgrounds. To compound this situation, almost
everyone knows poverty and is quick to point a finger at rival camps with-
in the military who engage in corruption.

These represent some of the basic problems of Africa which inter-
ject themselves into the affairs of a wide variety of African militaries
on a recurring basis. It should, however, be thoroughly understood that
beneath the generalizations noted here, there is a great deal of variety
with regard to African militaries and elite attitudes toward the mili-
tary. These differences will be explored in later chapters.

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[22]Cited in Le Monde (September 29, 1981), p. 4; and West Africa
(November 12, 1979), pp. 2117-2118. For a good description of the Macias
regime itself, see Africa Report (May-June 1980), pp. 10-14.

[23]In the cases of Angola and Ethiopia, the foreign presence is pre-
dominantly Cuban and Eastern Bloc. In Djibouti the presence is French.
For an indication of expatriate officers who remained with African armies
for as long as ten years after the beginning of large-scale decoloniza-
tion, see J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New York: Praeger,
1969).

have command of very large elements within the African military, or at least display disproportionate influence over the indigenous African military elites. In the former situation, foreign white officers command black African troops.[18]

Additionally, the generally low level of military sophistication in Africa has led to a situation where almost any European or other moderately developed army can render meaningful training and aid to at least some African polity. Hence, Spain, Israel, Belgium, Morocco, and other nations with rather modest resource bases are able to play fairly important roles in the training of African armies. This is especially true with regard to smaller African states with only battalion/brigade sized armies. Belgium is even playing a major role in Zaire which is, of course, one of Africa's most important countries.[19] Israel also appears to be interested in playing a major military role in Zaire.[20] The more important powers which have helped Zaire militarily include the U.S., France and China.[21]

The above situation tends to impose additional cleavages on the military even though the support of the foreign advisors may be indispensable for keeping the military functioning. It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned foreign involvement in the actual day-to-day conduct of military operations and training is on the decline. Expatriate officers (and especially NCO's) are found in fewer and fewer

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[18]Interestingly enough, Cuba seems sensitive to this situation to the point that black Cuban soldiers have become especially well represented within the Cuban forces in Africa.

[19]Belgium trained the 2,500-man 21st Infantry Brigade and is reported to have officers supervising a large number of troops in Shaba province. See West Africa (July 9, 1979), p. 1244; and The Economist (September 19, 1981), p. 44.

[20]On the apparent beginnings of a military relationship between Israel and Zaire, see the Los Angeles Times (January 20, 1983) Pt. 1, p. 2. On Israel's earlier role in Africa see Michael Curtis and Susan A. Gitelson, Israel in the Third World (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976).

[21]See African Recorder (February 26-March 10, 1980), p. 5307.

to impress most junior officers   The senior officers usually consider
their climb up the military ladder to have been more merit oriented than
that of their younger counterparts, who never had to bother with service
as an ordinary soldier.

Another related problem involves the fact that many senior offi-
cers have had very little formal education in their early years. This is
partially because soldiers from colonial armies were often recruited from
"martial" tribes which were considered less nationalistic and often more
brutal than those majority tribes that had the most to gain from indepen-
dence. A tribal problem was, therefore, imposed upon an educational prob-
lem.[16] This creates severe difficulty when a university educated lieu-
tenant or captain attempts to relate to a colonel who can barely read or
write. (Idi Amin, for example, had a second grade education.) As a con-
sequence, this can also create a problem of contempt for senior officers.
The problem is further complicated in places such as Benin or the Congo
(Brazzaville) where many of the younger officers have been trained by
Eastern Europeans, and most of the older officers have been trained by the
French. Moreover, if the government is basically leftist (as it is under
Col. Mathieu Kerekou in Benin), the junior officers cannot help but notice
that many of their superiors are viewed with suspicion (and contempt) by a
government that they may identify with. This serves as another complica-
tion since the President is setting an example which is not conducive to
good discipline.[17]

Other problems in the leadership of African armies arise with regard
to the large-scale presence of foreign advisors, troops and cadres within
or beside these armies. Occasionally, foreign officers and even NCO's

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[16]See David Killingray, "Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold
Coast During the Second World War," Journal of African History 23 (1982),
pp. 83-95.

[17]See Colin Legum, et al., Africa Contemporary Record (New York:
Africana Publications, 1981), p. B465. Note that Kerekou was a Major who
made his 1972 coup with support from captains, lieutenants and NCO's.

always function together in a harmonious manner. At times, tribalism be-
comes such a severe problem that an army degenerates into nothing more
than a series of hostile factions. The problem of tribalism rampant to
this extent is analyzed later in this work. The important point to note
here is that in many armies where tribalism seems to be a dormant or minor
problem, there exists potential problems should the balance of power among
tribes be altered either in the military or in the society at large.
Tribal issues consistently emerge over such concerns as how to divide
economic resources found in one tribe's territory with the rest of the
society.[14]

Tribalism contributes to other subtle ways in which an army can
become divided.. Incompetent officers may be promoted because the head of
state knows that as members of certain minority tribes these leaders would
be unable to generate a mass following among the ranks of the military.
In Kenya, for example, President Danial Arap Moi has elevated an ethnic
Somali to be head of the Kenyan Army. While this officer (Major General
Mohammed) appears to be competent, the dominant reason he was chosen for
his post is his inability to act as a powerful, independent representative
of corporate military interests.

A further problem with African armies is that structural character-
istics often tend to inhibit good communication or even good working rela-
tionships between junior and senior officers. This is because the type of
training senior officers received prior to commissioning has usually been
different from that received by junior officers. Their careers in the
military, after all, usually began prior to independence where their back-
ground was often only enlisted service in the colonial army.[15] Although
the senior officers are quite proud of this service, this does not appear

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[14]See for example, "Nigeria: Put to the Test," The Economist (Novem-
ber 15, 1980), p. 47; and with regard to Malawi the Nairobi, Daily Nation
(May 8, 1980), p. 1.

[15]See Claude E. Welch, "Soldier and State in Africa," Governing in
Black Africa, ed. Marion E. Doro and Newell M. Stultz (New Jersey: Pren-
tice Hall Inc., 1970), p. 150.

Uganda following the reign of Idi Amin, the army is expected to pitch in to help save a faltering or shattered economy.[11] All this detracts generally from the army's ability to train and deal with military concerns.

There are, however, some cases where the army performs non-military labor as a civil affairs aspect of a larger military campaign. Thus, in the war between Portugal and Mozambique's Frelimo, the guerrillas dug wells, aided peasants in farming, and engaged in other similar activities. This function was dropped once Frelimo took over the government. It was, however, quickly resurrected following the rapid rise of the South African supported Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) which effectively wooed a number of Mozambique's southern citizens away from support of the government by providing them with food and money. The absence of well-developed nationalism in some parts of Africa (as opposed to tribal and religious identification) can make civil affairs functions an important part of any military campaign. Even South African supported guerrillas can win friends quickly by helping struggling peasants who have in the past identified a South African controlled radio station as "Radio Hyena."[12] In other parts of Africa, such as Eritrea (where nationalisms are well developed) performance of civil affairs work by an army perceived as hostile does not seem to have much effect.[13]

Another problem relates to the fact that strong tribal identities continue to persist in Africa. Often various tribes view each other as political and economic threats. Their membership, therefore, cannot

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[11]On agricultural labor for the post-Amin Ugandan Army see Maputo Tempo, "Defense Minister: Army to be Demobilized, Reorganized" JPRS Sub-Saharan African Report (October 19, 1979), p. 113. On agricultural production by the army in the Seychelles, see Victoria, Nation (September 7, 1979), pp. 1-2.

[12]This was the popular Mozambican description of the Rhodesian and later South African, "Voice of Free Africa." See Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 70.

[13]See The Economist (October 6, 1979), p. 72.

While the above states are important, they still constitute a minority within Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, supplying even these countries with weapons is often a secondary political consideration for the superpowers whose first priorities for foreign military sales are often outside of Africa. Only Ethiopia seems to receive large amounts of first class weaponry on a regular basis. This is clearly due to the fact that Ethiopia is very high on the Soviet hierarchy of useful allies because of its links to the Middle East and to strategic waterways.[8] Additionally, the Soviet Union clearly expected to be paid for at least some of these weapons by currency earned through Ethiopia's exports of such products as coffee. Moreover, Africa's inability to manufacture any of its own weapons systems (with very few exceptions) tends to put the majority of non-aid receiving nations in a position where they either have to do without new weapons or expend limited capital outside of the country.[9]

African poverty has also led to a requirement that some African armies replace agricultural or other types of labor at the expense of training. In some cases this is to help establish the army's self-sufficiency in food production for the army. This is particularly important in places like the Horn of Africa where food is scarce. It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the Ethiopian Derg's slogans is "fight while producing and vice versa."[10] In other countries, such as

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[8]Soviet supplies of weapons to Ethiopia in the three-year period 1977 to 1979 surpassed the American supplies to Ethiopia in the 25 years between 1952 and 1976. Furthermore, Ethiopia has about 12,000 to 17,000 Cuban troops supporting the present government.

[9]As already noted, the only major arms manufacturer in Sub-Saharan Africa is South Africa, although Nigeria has indicated an interest in undertaking domestic production. On this question, see the interview with Nigerian Minister of Defense, Professor Iya Abubakar in New Nigerian (April 19, 1980), p. 12.

[10]On civic activities by Ethiopian troops of the 2D Liberation Army, see The Ethiopian Herald (March 6, 1979), p. 5.

past, level of development and other aspects of the African heritage. These problems will be described briefly in order to present the reader with the general nature of African military problems, which will then serve as a background for the study of the military consequences of military regimes. It is also important that the general nature of structural problems within the African militaries be isolated prior to examining any military government's impact on the capabilities of the military itself.

One of the first and most obvious problems with the majority of African militaries involves the poverty of their countries. It is, of course, clear that some African countries are more hard-pressed economically than their neighbors, but in general Africa is poor. This often causes governments to have only marginal resources which they can devote to the military. Even very pro-military governments often find themselves in a position where they are unable to increase military funds beyond a certain point.

Some regimes have been able to circumvent the above factor by obtaining military aid from interested arms suppliers. Zaire and Sudan have both been able to obtain limited numbers of modern weapons from the U.S. in terms of foreign aid. Prior to the anti-monarchist revolution, Ethiopia was also able to obtain modern weapons from the U.S. Following Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu's consolidation of power, the new government was able to use Ethiopia's strategic location to obtain weapons from the USSR. Angola's MPLA has also been able to obtain Soviet weapons, while Jonas Savimbi's UNITA receives supplies from the South Africans. While the latter state is clearly not a superpower, it is a regional military power with the ability to enhance significantly the capabilities of regional military forces.[7]

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[7]Despite the 1963, and more sweeping 1977 U.N. arms embargoes, South Africa has been able to obtain current generation weapons including warplanes from France, while Krygkor (the South African Armaments Corporation) manufactures smaller weapons including field artillery. See Die Burger, "Krygkor Given Wide Power in Arms Import, Manufacture," JPRS Sub-Saharan Africa Report (April 14, 1982), p. 41; and "Progress in Krygkor's Arms Self-Sufficiency Drive Reported," JPRS (May 3, 1982), p. 31; and especially Johannesburg Sunday Times, "Botha Announces New Weapons," JPRS, pp. 48-54.

Mozambique has had to contend with large numbers of former pro-Portuguese elements and renegade Frelimo troops who call themselves the Mozambique Resistance Movement.   These troops are not mere armed bandits; they are a large organized group supported by South Africa.[5]

Both of the above types of regimes are considered important and are clearly within the scope of this study, although the first type tends to be more important since the military is in direct control rather than engaged in behind-the-scenes manipulation. Additionally, identification of behind-the-scenes military influence can become difficult. For that reason this report will concentrate on regimes which are under direct military control or those in which behind-the-scenes manipulation is virtually unquestionable. Regimes such as Zimbabwe, which have freely elected military leaders, are not considered military regimes in the same sense as those which establish themselves by coup, although certain similarities do exist and will at times be noted in the text. Indeed, it is doubtful that President Robert Mugabe would have been enthusiastic about civilian elections had he not known that his tribal affiliation (as a Shona) virtually assured him of being elected.[6]

1.3   Background and Relevant Characteristics of Most African

Militaries

Cleavages and problems exist in the majority of African armies for a variety of reasons relating to Africa's cultural background, colonial

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[5]Prime Minister Botha continues to deny that South Africa is supporting the MNR although the circumstantial evidence is quite strong and not seriously doubted even within South Africa itself. Additionally, the U.S. State Department solidly maintains that the MNR receives the bulk of its support from Pretoria. See the Christian Science Monitor (February 3, 1983), p. 12, Arab News (February 8, 1983), p. 5 and especially Africa Report (November-December 1982), pp. 4-8.

[6]In this connection, Robert Mugabe relies on the North Korean trained 5th Brigade to act as a Praetorian force to protect his regime. His decision to create such a force had a great deal to do with a February 1981 tribal clash that he was able to supress only with the help of the white dominated air force and the "Rhodesian Africa Rifles" paratrooper and commando unit which was formed by the former white minority regime. See The Economist (February 21, 1981), pp. 37-38.

TABLE 1.1
MILITARY COUPS SINCE AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (Cont'd)

May 1969. A "Free Officers Movement" seized power headed by Col. Jafaar Nimeri.

Togo

January 1963. The military seized power briefly by killing President Sylvanus Olympio.

January 1967. Major Etienna Eyadema seized power by ousting Nicolas Grunitzky. Eyadema has remained in power.

Uganda

January 1971. General Idi Amin seized power from President Milton Obote. Amin was ousted in 1978 by a Tanzanian/Ugandan exile invasion force.

Upper Volta

January 1966. Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizana ousted civilian President Maurice Yameogo. Lamizana returned the government to civilian control on February 15, 1971.

February 1974. General Lamizana again seized control of the government to prevent ex-President Yameogo from re-entering politics.

November 1980. Col. Saye Zerbo led a successful army coup against the government of President Lamizana.

November 1982. Disgruntled officers and soldiers overthrew the government of Col. Zerbo.

Zaire (formerly Congo Kinshasa)

September 1960. General Mobutu seized power briefly.

November 1965. General Mobutu again seized power. This time he retains control of the government.

TABLE 1.1
MILITARY COUPS SINCE AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (Cont'd)

<u>Niger</u>

April 1974. Col. Seyni Kountche led a coup which ousted President Diori for his failure in coping with the six-year drought.

<u>Nigeria</u>

January 1966. The "Coup of the Young Majors" seized power. Control of the government was eventually consolidated by General Ironsi.

July 1966. A countercoup took place against alleged Ibo dominance in the army and the government. General Gowen took power.

July 1975. Brig. Burtala Ramat Muhammad seized power while Gen. Gowon was attending an OAU meeting at Kampala, Uganda. Muhammad was assassinated in February 1976 and was succeeded as head of the Supreme Military Council by Lt. Gen. Obasanjo. Power was returned to the civilian government in 1979.

<u>Rwanda</u>

July 1973. In the aftermath of severe tribal conflict, Maj. Gen. Juvenal Habyarimana seized power possibly to avert a new bloodbath.

<u>Seychelles</u>

June 1977. Party militia members ousted President James Mancham. Albert Rene then took power as President.

<u>Sierra Leone</u>

March 1967. Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith led a coup against civilian President, Sir Albert Margai.

April 1968. The government of LTC Juxon-Smith was overthrown by a group of non-commissioned officers. They promptly restored civilian government.

<u>Somalia</u>

21 October 1969. General Siad Barre seized power in what he called "the October Revolution."

<u>Sudan</u>

November 1958. General Ibrahim Abboud seized power. A military junta ruled until 1964.

TABLE 1.1

MILITARY COUPS SINCE AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (Cont'd)

July 1978. Acheampong was removed by middle range officers led by General Fred Akuffo.

Ghana

June 1979. Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings seized power in the aftermath of a revenge mutiny against the army. Upon executing a number of senior officers, Rawlings returned power to a civilian government under Dr. Hilla Limann.

December 1981. Dissatisfied with Limann's policies, Rawlings again seized power.

Guinea-Bissau

November 1980. The military ousted President Luiz Cabral and replaced him with Cdr. Joao Bernardo Vieira.

Liberia

12 April 1980. Master Sergeant Samuel Kenyon Doe led a number of soldiers and NCO's in a coup which led to the overthrow of President William Tolbert. The stated purpose of the coup was to provide equal opportunity and wider participation for indigenous Africans in Liberia (as opposed to the descendents of American slaves).

Madagascar (Malagasy)

May 1972. Unable to maintain control of the country in the face of peasant and student rebellions, pro-French President Tsiranana turned power over to Maj. Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Ramanantsoa resigned in favor of Col. Richard Ratsimandrava who was assassinated six days later. Brig. Andriamahazo then became head of the Military Directorate and was succeeded on June 15 by Cdr. Didier Ratsiraka. Ratsiraka remains head of state.

Mali

November 1968. Young officers led by Lieutenant (later General) Moussa Traore ousted Mali's first head of State, Mr. Modibo Keita.

Mauritania

July 1978. The civilian regime of Ould Daddah was ousted by Lt. Cols. Moustapha Ould Mohammed Salek, Khouna Ould-Heydallah and other conspirators. Internal manueverings within the junta left Ould-Heydallah dominant by 1980.

TABLE 1.1
MILITARY COUPS SINCE AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (Cont'd)

led by Brig Felix Malloum. This led to a brief lull in the intensity of Chad's civil war.

Comoro Islands

August 1975. A coup twenty-eight days after the French withdrawal installed President Ali Solih whose psychotic behavior later earned him the title "Madman of Moroni."

April 1978. French mercenaries ousted Ali Solih and installed their employer Ahmed Abdallah.

Congo-Brazzaville

August 1963. The military installed Alphonse Massamba-Debat in the aftermath of the toppling of the government of President Fulbert Youlou. Massamba-Debat was subsequently reelected for a five-year term.

August 1968. Major Marien N'gouabi led a coup against Massamba-Debat and then established a national council of the revolution under his control. President N'Gouabi was assassinated by a four-man "suicide squad" on March 18, 1977, but the military remained in power.

Equatorial Guinea

August 1979. The psychotic dictator Francisco Macius Nguama was overthrown by his cousin who was chief of staff of the army. Macias was later executed for genocide and corruption.

Ethiopia

September 1974. Widespread political agitation pushed the military into action whereby it deposed the Emperor and replaced him with an officers council which eventually came under the leadership of LTC Mengistu.

Ghana

February 1966. A group of army officers led by General J. A. Ankrah overthrew the government of President Nkrumah with possible police assistance. Ankrah himself resigned in April 1969 and was replaced by Brig Akwasi Afrifa. The military returned partial power to the civil authorities in 1969.

January 1972. General I. K. Acheampong led a coup against elected Prime Minister Kofi A. Busia.

TABLE 1.1
MILITARY COUPS SINCE AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION

Benin (formerly Dahomey)

October 1963. Army officers led by Col. Christophe Soglo overthrew President Bago. Soglo served as interim head of state until January 1964 when elections were held.

November/December 1965. Soglo again assumed power in the aftermath of political crisis relating to the civilian government.

December 1967. Another group of army officers led by Major Maurice Kouandete overthrew Soglo and established an interim government under the leadership of Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley. The regime ruled until May 1968 when it appointed former Foreign Minister Zinsou as President.

December 1969. Major Kouandete overthrew the Zinsou government. Military rule was resumed until March 1970 when a collective civilian leadership was installed.

October 1972. The collective leadership was overthrown by army officers under the leadership of Major Mathieu Kerekou. Kerekou has remained in power since that time.

Burundi

October 1965. Army officers overthrew the monarchy.

November 1966. Captain Micombero and a group of fellow army officers took power.

November 1976. Another coup occurred in which Micombero was overthrown by Lt. Col. Jean Baptisti Bagaza.

Central African Republic

January 1966. Col. Jean Bedel Bokassa deposed President David Dacko. He remained in power until the French ousted him and reinstalled Dacko in 1979.

September 1981. Dacko was ousted in an army coup which was led by General Andre Kolingba. Kolingba has remained in power.

Chad

April 1975. A military and police uprising resulted in the murder of President Tombalbaye and his replacement with Supreme Military Council

problem.[2]   Nevertheless, even some basic trends with regard to this situation will be worth exploring.

1.2   Scope of The Study

Since the beginning of large-scale decolonization in Africa during the late 1950's, the world has witnessed an ever increasing prominence of the military in African politics.   These military leaders are almost always installed by coups and usually justify themselves by pointing to the corruption of previous regimes.   Table 1.1 depicts all military coups which have occurred in Africa since decolonization.   In addition, some African regimes exist which, while not actually under the direct control of the military, are nevertheless very heavily influenced by the military.   Angola and Mozambique have had these types of governments since independence in the early 1970's.   This is partially because both regimes developed strong patterns of military influence during their wars of independence, and partially because both regimes continued to face military challenges in the post-independence period.[3]   In this context, the MPLA government in Angola has to contend with periodic threats from Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and the remnants of the FNLA, now reformed as COMIRA. South African troops also strike at SWAPO guerrillas inside Angola.[4]

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[2]Claims of a military interest in returning civilians to power are often supported only by pious rhetoric and very feeble steps in that direction. They include the establishment of committees to draw up legal studies of options relating to the return of civilian government, the establishment of target dates, study of possible constitutions, etc.

[3]Mozambique's President Samora Moises Machel was, for instance, one of the original 250 guerrillas to begin operations against the Portuguese in 1964. He later became Commander-in-Chief of FRELIMO and assumed the presidency of the country upon the Portuguese withdrawal.

[4]For the text of a speech by Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos reacting to the 1981 South African invasion of Angola, see Africa Report (November-December 1981), p. 9.

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II. THE TREATMENT OF AFRICAN MILITARIES BY
THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY RULERS

2.1 Some Basic Generalizations About Military Rule That Transcend Regime Types

It will be pointed out later in this report that many of the subtypes of military regimes have unique problems that are not necessarily associated with other subtypes of military regimes. These problems often assume a central role in inhibiting a military's ability to function effectively in the field. It would, however, be negligent for the authors not to point out that there are certain typical advantages and problems that often exist for all militaries in military governments.

The most obvious advantage is the fact that military leaders have almost always spent their professional lives dealing with matters of military concern. They enter office with a background of concern over military problems. Even if they do not execute their coup for military or entirely military reasons, they remain much more unlikely than their civilian counterparts to dismiss or minimize military concerns. This is true with regard to both fringe benefits and the monetary need of the officers and troops, and with regard to the need for specific items of equipment (especially weapons systems). Furthermore, since the coup leaders rise from the ranks of the military, there is a natural tendency to attempt to consolidate this as a base of power. This is true even for military leaders who are able to draw support from a wider constituency.

A coup leader such as Liberian Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, who had the strong support of much of his country's poor, nevertheless saw fit to provide the military with very significant pay raises. Doe more than doubled military pay. He also consolidated his popularity with the nation's poor by abolishing the hut tax and reducing fees for primary education to almost nothing.[1] In so doing, Doe engaged in a standard

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[1]See *The Economist* (March 7, 1981), p. 44; and *African Recorder* (May 20-June 2, 1980), p. 5364.

(one could almost say traditional) practice of successful coup leaders. To date, however, Doe has obtained no new weapons systems and has not significantly expanded the size of the armed forces.[2]

In the above connection, it must be remembered that troops often expect more from military leaders than they would from civilian leaders in terms of fringe benefits and equipment. Furthermore, the coup leaders have only a limited amount of legitimacy because they have set an example of how to rationalize the overthrow of the government. These factors are also important in pushing coup leaders in the direction of greater concessions to the military. It is, therefore, not surprising that the majority of all coup leaders raise the salaries of their troops upon a successful military takeover. It is also not surprising that in some cases military regimes tend to purchase new weapons and equipment. Members of the ruling junta which ousted Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, for instance, increased defense expenditures by an average of 22 percent annually during the years they were in power. Some of this increase was used to obtain new equipment, including trucks, jeeps, APCs and half-tracks.[3] A great deal of the budget was also used to give Ghanaian troops the fringe benefits normally associated with the European and especially the British armies.[4] These fringe benefits included the provision of well-stocked commissaries which helped the army to obtain a higher standard of living than most Ghanaians.

Coup after coup in Africa illustrates that as important as both these factors may appear, the provision of pay raises and fringe benefits to troops is most important to coup leaders. In some cases (such as Upper

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[2]From 1980 to 1983, Liberia has expanded its total armed forces from 5,130 to 5,400. During the same period, the Liberian population increased by over 150,000. There is, therefore, no significant expansion of the military in Liberia. See IISS datum provided in copies of The Military Balance, (London IISS) from 1980 to the present.

[3]See Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case," World Politics (April 1971), pp. 425-426.

[4]See ibid for Price's analysis of the British reference group.

Volta under General Lamizana) when the economy requires the imposition of austerity measures to prevent collapse, pay raises are not always possible. It should be noted, however, that in this case Lamizana exempted the officers from pay cuts that permeated the rest of the society.[5]

The acquisition of additional weapons systems and equipment is usually a poor second on the priorities list to improving the standard of living of the officers and troops. Neglect of the troops' standard of living, not an unwillingness to buy new weapons systems, is the easiest way to ensure a countercoup. There is clearly some spillover from improvement of the military standard of living to enhancement of military capabilities, once things such as new vehicles are provided to the troops. While such vehicles may be provided to enhance prestige and reduce the inconvenience of working with older, less reliable equipment, there is a corresponding rise in what the military can do. There is also a tendency to expand the army in order to create new promotion possibilities and to bolster an important pillar of support for the regime. These expansions have, however, usually remained fairly undramatic except where the expansion is from a token force, as occurred in the aftermath of the 1963 coup in Togo.[6]

The most notable exceptions to this trend appear to have occurred with regard to the Horn of Africa. When the Ethiopian monarchy was overthrown in 1974, Ethiopia's total armed forces consisted of about 44,800 troops. By 1977, this number had expanded to 53,500 and by 1979, an incredible 221,000 troops. Presently, the number is 250,000.[7] Equipment for these troops has been provided through a massive military grant from the USSR and other Eastern Bloc nations. This massive military

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[5]It should also be noted that this is not a trend that continued for long. See Richard Vengroff, "Soldiers and Civilians in the Third Republic," Africa Report (January-February 1980), pp. 4-8.

[6]See Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 105-121.

[7]All figures are taken from the yearly editions of IISS, The Military Balance, (London IISS) for the years 1974 to the present.

expansion undoubtedly played an important role in the military's interest in an embellished regional position for Ethiopia. There was, however, a need to respond to forces set into motion by the overthrow of the Emperor. The Somalis in the East and the Eritreans in the North both saw the Ethiopian revolution as a chance to realize nationalist aspirations at the expense of Ethiopian territory. The military takeover, therefore, coincided with a period of increased tension and the outbreak of actual war.

During this timeframe, Somalia, which has been under military rule since 1969, also undertook a massive expansion by almost tripling its total military forces from approximately 23,000 to nearly 62,500.[8] Here again, military rule was not the decisive factor in the expansion. The decisive factor was the increase in regional tension. These regional tensions may have increased just as dramatically if Haile Salassie was overthrown by a collection of civilian rather than a group of military officers. Similar regional tensions have also caused escalations in the defense spending of the civilian regimes in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in recent years.[9]

Another interesting aspect of the above situation involves large-scale military spending by civilian regimes not facing powerful regional enemies. This often occurs because many civilian governments are very anxious to consolidate the military as a base of support, or at least are interested in addressing military corporate interests to the point that a coup is averted. This is especially true with regard to regimes that have only a tenuous hold on the reins of power to begin with. In Nigeria, for example, the end of military rule in 1979 saw no decrease in the amount of

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[8]Ibid.

[9]Kenya, which has traditionally considered a sizeable military unnecessary, may be especially important in this regard. Recent Kenyan purchases of F-5E Tiger warplanes, Hughes 500 MD helicopter gunships, as well as 60 Vickers MK3 Main Battle Tanks, represent a marked change in Kenyan behavior due to regional tensions. See Daniel Volman, A Continent Besieged Foreign Military Activities in Africa Since 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, n.d.), p. 12.

military expenditures. Indeed, the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari has taken care to keep military expenditures in the neighborhood of a billion dollars a year despite the criticism that this policy has drawn from other Nigerian politicians.[10]

It is, therefore, erroneous to say that military regimes as a whole are more interested in expanding the size and equipment of the military than their civilian counterparts. Indeed, data based studies show no difference in military spending between military and non-military regimes.[11] The tendency for regimes that are involved in regional conflicts or internal consolidation of power to pamper the military seems to occur with regard to both civilian and military regimes. Those who need the military take care of it, regardless of whether or not they themselves wear a uniform. The trends are not conclusive, since some governments (like that of Ghana after the 1966 coup) do embark on significant military spending sprees after a coup. This phenomenon is known to exist despite the fact that it may be statistically balanced by the military spending sprees of civilian regimes. In a case such as Ghana, the spending spree would not have been embarked upon in the absence of a military coup. While these cases are important, they do not suggest that an increase in military expenditures is frequently the most important military consequence of military rule. Indeed, the standard military escalations in defense spending that involve salary and fringe benefit increases may help to preclude the acquisition of new weapons systems in a continent where resources are so clearly finite.

The most obvious drawback of military rule for the military involves the establishment or reinforcement of politicization in the military. One

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[10]See The Economist (July 25, 1981), p. 48.

[11]For data based comparisons of military spending, see Marc Howard Ross and Elizabeth Homer, "Galton's Problem in Cross National Research," World Politics (October 1976), pp. 1-29. Note that in African nations, the chief predictor of military spending seems to be the size of a neighbor's defense budget rather than regime type.

successful military coup waged to end certain types of problems (the most common complaint is corruption and economic bungling) tends to implicitly suggest that another coup is legitimate if these problems are not addressed properly. Distrust among officers often increases, especially in situations where officers kill other officers in new coups or attempted coups.[12] This distrust undermines the ability of officers to work together, because what was previously an uneasy relationship between civilian government and military has evolved into an uneasy relationship between the part of military that governs and the part of the military that does not. Previously noted cleavages can therefore be strengthened. Additionally, newly reinforced trends in Africa suggest that senior officers who allow themselves to become involved in corruption, or cannot manage the economy after they take power, have a great deal to fear from the junior officers and NCO's who trusted them to clean up the government. The large-scale violence that followed Lt. Jerry Rawlings' first coup in Ghana is a good, recent example of this phenomenon.[13]

While other coups by middle level and junior officers have occurred in Africa, the coups by Lt. Rawlings (and to a lesser extent Samuel Doe) have tended to be especially frightening because of the unrestrained punishment inflicted on the senior officers.[14] Rawling may in fact have left such an impression on other African leaders as to place the majority of African junior officers under suspicion. This would especially be the

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[12]This became a real problem in Nigeria, which experienced continued military rule from 1960 to 1979. See Jon Kraus, "The Return of Civilian Rule in Nigeria and Ghana," Current History (March 1980).

[13]The primary motivation for the first Rawlings' coup was a fear that corrupt senior officers would not be punished by a civilian administration which would be grateful to the army for relinquishing power. See The Economist (June 9, 1979), p. 64.

[14]Doe, who is incredibly frank about what he perceives as the need for executions, may be a little less frightening to other African leaders because many of the problems he responded to were uniquely Liberian. On the Rawlings' regime executions see Le Monde (January 24, 1982), p. 1.

case with regard to regimes led by senior military officers.[15]   It is
therefore not surprising that junior officers and NCO's have come under an
increasing degree of surveillance in places such as Cameroon. This report
has already indicated problems that exist between junior and senior offi-
cers in many parts of Africa.

Another problem which seems to recur in a variety of military re-
gimes involves the placement of military officers in top positions
throughout the government bureaucracy.[16]   This can have two negative
effects. The first is to draw officers away from their military duties
and, therefore, serves as a drain on manpower. A potentially more serious
problem results from the corruption in which senior officers may become
involved in once they pass from strictly military duties. The existence
of large-scale or sensational corruption among officers tends to undermine
morale among the junior ranks who are ridiculed for the actions of their
superiors. Again, the army's pride and self-image is damaged by these
types of incidents. A good example of this can be seen in the Sudan under
General Abboud where corruption was absolutely rampant. While the
government tried to defuse the situation with a number of prosecutions for
morality and embezzlement crimes, the army's image became very tarnished
and there was general public belief that men in high places were being
protected.[17]   This definitely hurt the army's morale. Another example
of this problem can be seen in Ghana after the 1966 coup. Corruption here
eventually reached such a scale that it became a significant consideration

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[15]For the reactions of other African leaders to the Rawlings' revo-
lution, see "Ghana Life Under Rawlings," Africa Report (May-June 1982), p.
15. See also Lagos International Service, "Radio Comments on Rawlings'
Takeover in Ghana" JPRS, pp. 59-60; and The Punch, "Reaction to Ghana Coup
Executions," JPRS (July 24, 1979), p. 52. Also note that the Nigerians
briefly embargoed oil to Ghana following Rawlings' first coup.

[16]See Price, op. cit.

[17]Ruth First, Power in Africa (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p.
251. Also see P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, The History of the Sudan (Boul-
der: Westview Press, 1979).

in the decision to return power to a civilian government. The image of the army was becoming so unsavory as a result of corruption that its withdrawal from power may have been partially motivated by a desire to clean up the army's image.

The above point is important because it has been suggested in some cross-sectional literature that the African officer corps would have an inclination toward an austere and puritan lifestyle brought on by harsh army living. In fact, the officer corps, like almost all African elites, are characterized by an intense interest in material goods and a comfortable life style. People born and raised in or around intense poverty are usually materialistic no matter what their cultural background. This is especially true in Africa where the knowledge of what it is like to be poor prompts both officers and enlisted troops to want to gain as much as they can materially.[18] In this regard, most African officers are very familiar with poverty. While in some parts of the world the sons of the ruling elite are willing to serve as officers in the armed forces, this is generally not the case in Africa. Here such individuals inevitably opt for the less strenuous path of the civil servant. Officers often come from middle and lower middle class backgrounds, while enlisted troops often come from a background of impoverishment.[19] It is not surprising, therefore, that African military leaders who become government officials under a military regime often engage in blatant and offensive corruption. Many military rulers (Bokassa and Mobutu, for example) even tend to consider state funds as their own personal spending money.[20] As mentioned

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[18]Exceptions to this trend would include Samora Machel of Mozambique and Col. Seyni Kountche of Niger. See David Lamb, The Africans (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 71-73 and The Washington Post (March 16, 1981), A9.

[19]See Edward A. Shils, "The Military and Political Development of the New States" in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962) for more on the social backgrounds of Third World officers.

[20]Mobutu, for example, has built 11 palaces for himself and is one of the richest men in the world. On military corruption in a variety of African states, see Decalo, op. cit., pp. 27-30.

previously, the morale of the military often suffers in the aftermath of this type of activity.

The Sudan case under General Abboud illustrates the problem that occurs when corrupt generals and colonels ask lower ranking officers and enlisted men to fight in a military campaign. Officers in the south fighting against secessionist rebels were often made to overstay their tours in combat, while younger officers with important connections were never posted to the south at all. In addition, the combat officers and troops in the south were asked to endure their hardships at the same time the army's top leadership was ostentatiously enriching itself. This severely hurt morale.[21]

Another negative military side-effect of military coups involves promotion policies. Conspirators naturally tend to favor promotion of those individuals who were involved with the coup they waged against the previous government. Low ranking officers or NCO's who were involved in a coup may within several years become majors and colonels merely because they are considered politically trustworthy. This clearly was the case with Togo's 1963 coup which was the first coup to occur in West Africa, and continues to be a major theme of post-coup militaries today. A key problem here is that merit becomes only a marginal criterion for promotion. Officers will, therefore, tend to focus on improving their political standing rather than their leadership skills and knowledge of military matters.

The other key problem is that some conspirators receive such wildly inflated promotions that their past experience often has little relevance for their new positions. In the aftermath of the 1980 Liberian coup, for instance, Staff Sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa was made a Brigadier General and placed in charge of the army. It is fairly safe to assume that very little of his past experience was relevant to his new position.[22]

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[21]First, op. cit.

[22]See West Africa (June 9, 1980), pp. 1005-1009.

2.2   Conditions that Affect African Militaries Under Military Rule

In order to effectively examine military regimes in Africa in more detail, it must be understood that a number of different types of regimes exist. The concept of military regimes in Africa is, therefore, subject to the methodological problem of stratification. In order to overcome this problem, the conditions affecting these regimes must be broken down into subcategories. This does not suggest that these regimes will consistently be examined through the paradigm of subcategories throughout the analysis. In some cases this will be unnecessary. In other cases, however, it will be imperative. For that reason the following conditions are worth analyzing. It must be understood that dominant concern in formulating these models is not how the regimes relate to the societies at large but rather how the regimes relate to their own militaries. A rather unlikely assortment of countries may be identified under the same regime conditions.

(1)   The Uneasy Regime Condition. The condition is characterized by a strong leader(s) who maintains power through tight control of the officer corps including the possible use of occasional purges involving promising potential rivals. The dominant feature here is that the military government imposes its will on the armed forces rather than attempting to manage it.

(2)   The Ideological Leadership Condition. This condition is characteristic of an attempt to inculcate certain ideological values into the military in order to cause them to structure or restructure their belief system in a way that would favor the retention of the regime under which they serve. The loyalty being fostered in this case is not loyalty to a country; rather, it is loyalty to a specific government of individuals.

(3)   The Debilitating Factionalism Condition. This condition is characterized by a leader or clique

emerging from a faction-ridden military in which the leader/clique represents only one segment of that military in terms of ethnic origins, tribal loyalties, economic status or linguistic background.

(4) The Junior Officer/NCO Controlled Military Condition. This condition is characterized by junior officers or NCO's rising against their superiors because of alleged crimes these superiors inflicted upon either the society or the lower ranks of the military. The junior officers or NCO's then assume control of the military.[23]

(5) The Uncontrolled Military Condition. This type of regime is characterized by a military ruler who gives his armed forces free reign to loot and victimize the country's population in exchange for continued military support for the regime. This model can sometimes involve warlordism.[24]

(6) The Praetorean Guard Condition. This type of regime is a variation of category 2. It is characterized by a regime which, while not commanding the complete loyalty of the entire armed forces, nevertheless maintains the unquestioned loyalty of some significant units within the military. These units do not

[23]While there has never been a successful coup in Africa led by anyone lower than a non-commissioned officer, Kenya's recent coup attempt against Daniel Arap Moi was led by senior private Hezekiah Ochuka. See The Economist (August 7, 1982), p. 31; and Newsweek (August 16, 1982), p. 37.

[24]It should be noted that some regimes (such as the present one in Ghana) are unable to prevent their soldiers from terrorizing the country in the aftermath of a coup. The victimizing of civilians usually ends once a central government establishes control over the country as a whole.

necessarily have to consist of citizens of the coun-

try involved. They could, in some cases, be made up

of foreign troops or even mercenaries.[25]

It should be emphasized that the above categories represent styles
or modes of regime/military interaction. They are not necessarily de-
signed to illustrate the exact nature of any specific regime (although in
some cases they may). Many of the above categories incorporate features
that are not mutually exclusive. There exists, therefore, the possibility
of regimes which incorporate the important aspects of several different
conditions. The purpose of these categories is to illustrate the variety
of ways in which African military regimes relate to their own militaries.
This does not suggest, however, that a military government cannot have a
multi-dimensional approach to its military which incorporates the most
important characteristics of several of the conditions.

It is also possible that the previously identified categories could
relate to either a collective military leadership or a single military
dictator. The pattern of government/military relations may often be the
same despite the intrigue that occurs at the highest levels of government.

In examining the above categories, it should be mentioned that with
the clear exceptions of the first and fourth conditions, civilian govern-
ments could relate to their own militaries in a similar manner. In some
cases a military government may have more in common with some of the civ-
ilian governments in Africa than with other military governments. The
centralized leadership condition, for example, could be very useful in
analyzing the actions of Emperor Haile Selassie. His rule is in many ways
very much like that of Generals Mobutu or Nimeiri. It is not particularly
surprising that an Emperor or other non-elected leader would behave in a
manner similar to a military officer who had seized power in a coup.
There is, however, often enough of a distinction in the ways they treat

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[25]Mercenary involvement in Africa has tended to be quite extensive
when compared to other parts of the Third World. See Mohammed Omer Beshir
"The African View of Mercenaries," _Africa Currents_ (Summer 1976), pp. 1-7.

their militaries to legitimately warrant looking at the two as separate types of rules despite the fact they have similar subcategories.

The above type of distinction is often a matter of degree. Once one set of army officers has overthrown a civilian government (for corruption, foreign policy, etc.) they, as already noted, imply that their own over-throw is legitimate by other officers if they engage in similar practices as the civilian government. Even in the absence of serious corruption or other problems, which is rarely if ever the case, their legitimacy rests on their actions, policies and personalities. They do not possess any institutional legitimacy and they have already established or reinforced the wrong kind of precedent for the rise of the military. For the senior officers' coup, one of the first orders of business, therefore, must be to prevent a junior officers' coup by repression or concession.

This situation imposes an additional dimension on the above categories when military rule is involved. The military government has this additional problem in relating to its own military structure. Additionally, many within the military itself often expect more of military rulers than they would of civilians with regard to corporate concessions such as fringe benefits and additional equipment. Military attitudes may also be different. Thus, while the civilian and military governments might employ similar modes of relating to their militaries, the potential for individual variation within the context of the above models (e.g., more repression, more money to the military) suggests the need for a thorough exploration of the military consequences of military rule in Sub-Saharan Africa. Each of the above types of military regimes will, therefore, be explored in depth in the next chapter.

confined to the provision of advice or advisors. Weapons supplies to Ethiopia from the Soviet Bloc were massive in scope.[38]   (It should also be noted that Somalis failed to obtain significant military aid from the United States.) Finally, the presence of large numbers of Cuban troops in actual combat in the Ogaden desert had a tremendous impact on the outcome of the Ethiopian-Somali fighting. Castro refused to allow the same thing to occur in Eritrea, however, and the Ethiopians were much less successful in Eritrea than they were in the Ogaden.[39]

Two other ideological armies which are worthy of mention are those of Angola and Mozambique. These cases are quite different from the earlier ones since these armies grew out of a successful national liberation movement. The armies and governments existed before the two countries became independent of Portugal. Furthermore, these armies had a head start to becoming politicized since they were formed around anti-colonial leaders who were already favorably disposed toward Marxism and for the most part hostile to the West because of Western military sales to Portugal.[40] The MPLA of Angola also had the additional distinction of having had their leaders' public overtures to the U.S. rebuffed during the war with Portugal.[41]

Since the armies of Mozambique and Angola were involved in prolonged guerrilla struggles, the luxury of purging officers was not a frequent

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[38]Ethiopia, under Colonel Mengistu, receives approximately $3.5 billion a year in aid from the Soviet Union, most of which is military aid. Cited in The Economist (June 6, 1981), p. 43.

[39]Castro has stated that he considers the conflict with Eritrea to be an internal manner that must be settled by political rather than military means. Nelson, op. cit., p. 264.

[40]The U.S. and NATO generally confined anti-colonial sentiments to rhetoric and quiet diplomacy. The U.S. even made some militarily significant sales to Portugal. This paid off in some ways since the Azores became a key base in the 1973 effort to resupply Israel. The cost, however, was the alienation of many nationalists in Angola and Mozambique. See Michael A. Samuels and Stephen M. Haykin, "The Anderson Plan: An American Attempt to Seduce Portugal Out of Africa," Orbis (Fall 1979) p. 648.

[41]See Lamb, op. cit.

involved demands by rebel officers and NCO's for the resignation of Men-
gistu.[33]   The rapid expansion of the army, the defection of a number of
Eritrean officers and the large-scale purge caused a major restructuring
of the army. NCO's were given very dramatic promotions (up to and includ-
ing promotions to field grade officers) without any training.[34]   It
should, therefore, be emphasized that Ethiopia almost completely remade
its officer corps.

If one attempts to judge the performance of an ideological army by
the performance of the Ethiopian army in the 1978 actions against Somalia
and Eritrea, one would have to conclude that the performance of the army
was not unacceptable, even under conditions where the loss of purged offi-
cers by the army would still be expected to have an effect. A more syste-
matic investigation of the situation in 1978 would suggest that the Ethio-
pians managed to defeat the Somalis in spite of, rather than because of,
the nature of the Ethiopian regime. The Ethiopians were not the aggres-
sors in the war against Somalia. They were attacked by opportunistic
Somali forces who hoped to take advantage of the chaos Ethiopia experienc-
ed following the overthrow of the Emperor.[35]   Under these circumstances,
the people and the army wanted to fight for Ethiopia regardless of who was
running the Ethiopian regime.

Additionally, the purging of large numbers of officers was apparent-
ly more than compensated for by the presence of large numbers of Eastern
Bloc advisors who filled the gap left by early purges.[36]   The successful
February 1978 offensive into the Ogaden was probably planned by Soviet
advisors, including General Petrov.[37]   Moreover, Soviet support was not

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[33]Nelson, op. cit.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Somalia claimed that the attackers were not the regular Somali
army, but ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden who had "borrowed" some weapons
from the Somali army. Cited in Lamb, op. cit., p. 206.

[36]Paris Le Point as cited in JPRS (July 3, 1980), p. 29.

[37]Cited in Nelson, op. cit, p. 270.

The Ethiopian army that existed after Haile Selassie's overthrow consisted of a variety of individuals with a wide array of political views ranging from hard core monarchism to various amorphous types of radicalism. This was not good raw material on which to impose a Marxist ideology or, more specifically, a personality cult. The way the Derg chose to deal with this situation was through massive purges and education of new officers emphasizing the importance of an acceptable political orientation.[30]

Purges started almost immediately after the revolution. They occurred even before Colonel Mengistu took full power in 1977. The massacre of senior officers loyal to the Emperor (including his grandson who was an Admiral in the Navy) occurred only a little over one month after the September dethronement.[31] In addition, the first head of the post-mutiny revolutionary government (General Andon) and the first chairman of the Armed Forces committee (Col. Zewd Alem Tessema) were killed along with an undisclosed number of their followers. These incidents represented just the beginning of a series of purges which continued throughout the post-revolutionary period.

A charge frequently brought against officers was "undiscipline and lack of military judgement resulting in the death of soldiers in battle."[32] Most executions were linked to political differences and fears by the Derg of an overthrow. Indeed, these fears do not appear to have been unfounded since several anti-Derg mutinies occurred in the aftermath of the revolution. One mutiny at Jijiga in 1977 was extremely serious and

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[30]The Tatek Military Training Center, for example, provides three-month courses in Marxism-Leninism; while other schools, emphasizing more practical military skills, continue to make political courses an important part of their curriculum. Cited in The Ethiopian Herald (October 30, 1981), p. 1.

[31]On this event which was known as Bloody Saturday, see Merriam, op. cit, p. 170. Also see Getachew Mekasha, "An Inside View of the Ethiopia Revolution," Munger African Notes, No. 39 (July 1977).

[32]Harold Nelson, Ethiopia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1980).

The royalist army was highly divided and reflected a "divide and rule" philosophy on the part of the Emperor. Senior officers were placed in jobs in which they were expected to clash with their superiors or subordinates. Like Mobutu and Nimeiri, the Ethiopian Emperor was concerned about a strong, well-led officer corp having too much coup potential. As a result, he encouraged the always divisive rivalries.[26]

Within this system, the Ethiopian generals viewed each other with intense rivalry and at times were known to hate one another.[27] Further- more, many of the more important generals developed personal followings of subordinate officers. These officers were tied together by virtue of common backgrounds, experience or opportunism. One of the most important groups, "The Exiles," consisted of those officers who went into exile with the Emperor after the Italians seized Ethiopia in 1936.[28] Most of these officers were extremely conservative. Some favored military rule, but only in the event of the Emperer's death. There were, however, some radi- cals among the air force and the graduates of the less prestigious Holeta military academy. Some of the younger and better educated individuals from the elitist Harrar Academy also developed a radical social conscious- ness which led them to identify with the ideals of radical transformation of the society. These sentiments became more pronounced in the aftermath of the Wollo drought and famine, the seriousness of which the government refused to acknowledge.[29]

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[26]Colen Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75* (New York: Afri- cana Publications, 1975), p. B161.

[27]The Minister of Defense at the time of the 1974 Army Mutiny for example, was not on speaking terms with the Chief of Staff. *Ibid*, pp. B161-B162.

[28]*Ibid*, p. B162.

[29]Rather than admit the extent of the problem, the Ethiopian Emperor actually turned down international aid. Here, it is a sad note that Haile Selassie began ignoring the advice of his most important advisors during the last portion of his rule. See John G. Merriam, "Military Rule in Ethiopia," *Current History* (November 1976).

The quick and drastic way to change the army is through the use of purges. This can be done only when a ruler or leadership has consolidated enough power to move against powerful cliques of officers which may have their own followings within the military.

Ethiopia represents the most important example of a military regime which has purged the military of a predecessor regime and then attempted to replace that leadership with loyal officers supportive of the official ideology of scientific socialism. This is not to suggest that the Ethiopian leadership (called the Derg) has a Marxist system. Indeed, the Marxism of Ethiopia is characterized by radical rhetoric, links to the Eastern Bloc and very little else. Nevertheless, the creation of an official Marxist ideology (however superficially applied to the society) provides a vehicle for inculcating loyalty of the Derg and its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile Maram. It also is meant to create a new standard of justice whereby unleashing terror against certain segments of the society can be justified.[24] In this connection, it is not surprising that one of the main features of Ethiopian Marxism has become the glorification of the leader. This process is aided by the abundance of praise heaped upon Mengistu by the Soviets and their allies. Fidel Castro, for instance, has called Mengistu "the only man who could advance the Ethiopian revolution on the only path a revolution can take: socialism."[25]

In this kind of system it is obvious that certain types of officers loyal to the old regime would be of some concern to the Derg. To fully understand this concern, a brief description of the monarchist army of Haile Selassie is necessary.

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[24]The calls for vigilance and unleashing of terror frequently involved assertions such as the one by the chief administration of the Gojjam region that: "Ethiopia will never again be a victim of the conspiracies of imperialism and reactionary anti-people forces." Cited in The Ethiopian Herald, p. 3.

[25]Interview with Le Monde (April 25, 1978).

intensely dislikes Colonel Qaddafi.[21]   He has also delayed signing the
regional non-aggression pact proposed by Senegal to avoid upsetting
Algeria or Libya.[22]

3.3   The Ideological Leadership Condition

Another category of military government/military forces interaction
involves the attempt to impose an ideology on the army. This is done to
foster a situation under which the army is taught to be loyal to a partic-
ular leader or set of elites for ideological reasons. In this type of
situation, a coup-leader can attempt to elevate himself from the role of a
coup leader to that of "father of the revolution." As such he tends (to
the extent he is successful at projecting this image) to distance himself
from charges of opportunism. He may also, however, alienate other offi-
cers within the military who may not identify with the revolutionary
ideology. This is particularly true where "scientific socialism" (i.e.,
Marxism) is foisted upon pro-Western officers. This is particularly true
with respect to officers who have spent lengthy training periods in the
West.[23]

If a leadership attempts to imbue the army with ideology, they are
then faced with some hard choices regarding those officers whose careers
were linked to the old regime and who would in all likelihood disapprove
of any attempt to impose an ideology on the nation. The regime can either
attempt to work with these officers or it can purge them from the ranks of
the military and replace them with other officers who would be more ideol-
ogically suitable. Either course of action involves potential problems.

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[21] Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1980-1982, op. cit., p. B540.

[22] Ibid.

[23] This cannot always be considered an important criteria, however,
since several officers of the Ethiopian Derg, including LTC. Mengistu,
have attended training courses in the United States. Cited in John Marka-
kis "Garrison Socialism: The Case of Ethiopia," MERIP Reports, No. 79, p.
15.

experience since Nimeiri was able to put an end to the Sudanese Civil War with the support of Haile Selassie who helped to mediate the conflict.[15]

Another less significant country which has a non-ideological leadership and employs purges is Mali. What happened here is that a non-ideological military leadership took over a society that had large segments committed to Marxism.[16] Since the army found it necessary to confront these elements, it is not surprising that "purification" of the army became a priority.[17] General Traore of Mali has, on occasion, found it useful to purge unpopular officers who have offended large segments of the society as a result of widespread and visible corruption. This process has been taken several steps further by the military leaders of neighboring Niger, who, from all appearances, simply do not tolerate corruption either in the military or among civilian elite.[19] The military effects of such actions on these regimes are much more difficult to judge, however, since they scrupulously avoid combat. This is particularly true with Mali which remains very low key about the conflict between Morocco on the one hand and Libya and Algeria on the other. Indeed, Traore has turned a blind eye to the fact that Libyan planes overfly Mali without permission on their way to airdrop supplies to the Polisario guerrillas.[20] Traore has done this despite the fact he

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[15]Nimeiri has managed to gain the support of the Black tribes in the South who consider him far superior to previous Arab presidents. This has prevented the outbreak of new rounds of civil war. See John Waterbury and Ragaei El Mallakh, The Middle East in the Coming Decade (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), pp. 66-67.

[16]These elements included students and labor union leaders.

[17]See Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, 1980-81, op. cit.

[18]See African Recorder (November 4-17, 1980), pp. 5494-5495.

[19]See Washington Post (March 16, 1981), A9.

[20]Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana, 1981).

both nations are cultivating reputations as peacemakers. Sudan has attempted to work out its differences with Libya and Ethiopia, while Zaire has improved its relations with the Congo and Angola.[11] This diplomacy may be more reflective of apprehension about potential shortcomings than any inherent quest for peace.

Mobutu, in particular, has had his army defeated in clashes with both Angola's MPLA and the Cuban trained troops from the Congo.[12] The embarrassing retreat of large numbers of Zairean troops, following their defeat by Congolese troops in Boke and Mundouli, was a particularly pathetic display of the military incompetence of Mobutu's troops.[13] Even more humiliating were the two invasions of Zaire's Shaba province by the Angola-based FNLC in 1977 and 1978. Again, the incompetence of Mobutu's well-armed but poorly led troops was so evident that French and Moroccan troops had to be airlifted into Zaire by U.S. planes to prevent the loss of the Shaba province itself. Most recently, Mobutu has obliquely testified to the value of his own leaders by bringing expatriate Belgians into Zaire to take over the functions of a number of Zaire's officers.[14] Combat experience has proven that leadership, morale and professionalism are all in a deplorable state in Zaire. Such is the case in Sudan, although this has not been attested to by actual combat

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[11] On Sudan's improved relations with its neighbors, see The Economist (December 6, 1980), p. 41. Also note that in 1979, Mobutu chose to expel his friend, former FNLA leader Holden Roberto, from Zaire in order to improve relations with Angola. Cited in Africa Contemporary Record 1979-1980 (New York: Africana Publications, 1981), p. B451.

[12] Alexander Mboukou "An African Triangle," Africa Report (September-October 1982), p. 43.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See West Africa (July 9, 1979), p. 1244.

Of those countries incorporating the non-ideological purging and manipulation of the military into their military system, Zaire is the most important for examining the effects of the model itself. Zaire, as previously noted, is by no means a pure type. It has other features which must be explained outside the context of this condition. Of greatest importance are those features of the military system in Zaire which correspond to the uncontrolled army condition. Despite this lack of purity, it is appropriate to note the performance of Zaire's army and the leadership of that army.

The troops in Zaire are poorly disciplined, largely illiterate and badly paid. The latter two factors have little to do with the leadership decimated by purges and manipulation, except to suggest that the individuals the officers and NCO's must forge into a fighting unit have definite shortcomings. The first factor suggests that officers and NCO's tend to lose control of their troops. This is partially because troops that are not paid on time tend to go on the rampage and loot nearby civilians.[9] It is also because senior officers tolerate systems of corruption in which money to be paid to the troops is siphoned off to corrupt officers on the route between the treasury and the individual soldiers. A stronger and more professional officer corps undecimated by purges would have a better chance of rising above the corruption and protecting their troops from such abuse.

In both Sudan and Zaire, there have been significant infusions of U.S. weaponry. Yet the ultimate guarantors of the security of these nations are foreign. Egyptian troops are presently stationed in the Sudan, while Belgium and French troops are in Zaire.[10] At the present time,

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[9]This happens in Zaire with relative frequency although it is always an open question as to whether the Zairean troops will loot Zairean citizens or cross borders and loot foreigners. For incidents involving Zambia, see Times of Zambia .tober 8, 1980), p. 7.

[10]On the Egyptian/Sudanese military alliance, see Los Angeles Times (October 13, 1982), Pt. 1, p. 6.

It is significant that in a recent case where Nimeiri dismissed large numbers of officers en masse, he nevertheless saw fit to refrain from jailing them. This decision appears to have been made despite the fact that Nimeiri considered the officers unsupportive (although not necessarily disloyal). The incident itself occurred in the first weeks of January 1982, when a total of 22 senior officers were dismissed. In explaining the incident to a journalist, Nimeiri stated:

> First, the leadership of the army was not according to my liking. Second, a number of senior officers and others had completed their term... All of them have very good pensions. There was no "coup"; that's a rumor.[5]

Another country which embodies many of the features of the system of non-ideological purges is Zaire. When General Mobutu seized power for the second time in 1965, he (in a style very much like that of Nimeiri) retired virtually all of the Colonels and Generals on huge pensions.[6] It has been suggested that one of the reasons he chose this course was to eliminate officers who continued to think of him as an opportunistic sergeant who manuevered himself into power.[7] Since that time, Mobutu has continued to be wary of the officer corps as a potential breeding ground for rivals and has purged the officer corps with some regularity. Here, as well as in the Sudan, retired officers are treated decently, and on occasion are called back into the service in a continuous circulation of elites designed insure that no one becomes a potential rival for the presidency.[8]

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[5]"Nimeiri: Why I Sacked My Army Officers," op. cit., p. 15.

[6]Cited in New Nigerian (March 15, 1982), p. 5.

[7]Ibid.

[8]This is also a practice which occurs with regard to some of Mobutu's civilian associates. See The Economist (October 17, 1981). For a discussion of only military purges, see African Recorder (February 26–March 10, 1980), pp. 5307-5308 and Afrique Defense, No. 42, (September 1981), p. 21.

Two of the most important regimes which have incorporated the system of non-ideological purges as a key part of their systems are Zaire under General Mobutu and Sudan under Field Marshal Nimeiri. In each of these countries the top military leadership is kept under the ironclad control of the military dictator. The process of insuring control usually involves purges, but not executions or imprisonments. In some instances purges may even be too strong a word for the circulation of elites carried on in these regimes. Early retirement and frequent transfers of senior and middle range officers are actually as frequent in occurrence as removing untrustworthy individuals from the army.

In the Sudan, for example, the removal of officers has an institutionalized quality about it. Senior officers are given a very short time limit in which to be promoted or face retirement. A Major General has four years, a Lieutenant General three years, and a full General only two years. Nimeiri, who holds the rank of Field Marshal, is exempt from this system. Much of the sting, however, is taken out of this process because these retired generals are usually given prestigious positions such as ambassadors and directors of corporations.[2] Whatever effect this might have on Sudan's foreign relations or economic planning, it does tend to reduce discontent among those officers who are forced to leave the army prematurely.[3] This is important, because it helps to preserve morale among those career officers below the rank of General. It also helps to insure that no retired officers get a chance to stir up unrest in the army in response to what they might consider unfair or humiliating treatment.[4]

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[2] "Nimeiri: Why I Sacked My Army Officers," The Middle East, (April 1982), pp. 15-16.

[3] The appointment of a potential rival as an ambassador can also backfire since this can lead to defections or denouncements by ones own officials as occurred when Egypt's General Shazli denounced Anwar Sadat from his ambassadorial post in Portugal. On the whole, however, this is less dangerous than having rivals within the military.

[4] This has not always been effective, however, since Nimeiri is believed to have had to put down an attempted coup by retired Brigadier Saad Bahar in April 1981. Africa Report (May-June 1981).

the military. The system of non-ideological purge and manipulation is not
an analytical tool useful only in the context of Africa. Rather, it is a
useful concept for dealing with a wide variety of Third World leaders and
leaderships. In Africa it is applicable to some of the most important
countries of the continent. It represents a form of government where
power remains in the hands of a single military leader or leadership that
assures that no rivals emerge from the ranks of the military. It has
already been noted that one of the main concerns of military leaders who
come to power by means of a coup must, by necessity, insure that rivals do
not emerge from the ranks of the military with their own justifications in
mind for a new coup.

The justifications for one coup, as already noted, can serve new
coup-makers equally well. Thus, the necessity to control these potential
coup-makers becomes a very prominent feature of this condition. A second
feature is an intense concern over the lack of legitimacy possessed by a
regime based on a military coup. Under these circumstances there emerges
a serious problem in the formation of a military with a strong and dynamic
leadership. That is, the opposing goals--of having a strong military
leadership for national defense while at the same time insuring a military
leadership too weak to overthrow the government--are not always compat-
ible and in some cases may be mutually exclusive. Most governments in
Africa experience this problem, but it is generally more serious with
military regimes because of the legitimacy factor.

This situation does not necessarily suggest that the army is treated
in the harsh manner of Stalin-type purges. While this can occur within
the context of the situation, there are less violent methods of preventing
a powerful rival leadership from arising within the military. Addition-
ally, the more sweeping purges have generally occured in those regimes
that profess to be guided by Marxism. Jerry Rawlings or hinted at the
possibility of applying "Ethiopian Style" purges to Ghana, but his
restructuring of the army took a different direction as will be seen later
in this chapter.[1]

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[1]On this remark by Rawlings, see The Economist (June 9, 1979), p. 64.

III. THE EFFECTS OF MILITARY RULE ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES

3.1   Indices of Military Power

This chapter will examine the actual effects that different types of military conditions have on the military capabilities of the countries involved. This will be undertaken by an analysis of the ways in which countries with the characteristics of each of the categories previously noted tend to relate to their militaries in light of a number of military factors. In this connection, it is fully expected that certain conditions would cause the military to relate positively to certain indices of military power while relating negatively to others. Factors which are considered important in this context include:

(1)   The fostering of professionalism, discipline and (in some cases) initiative within the officer and NCO corps.

(2)   The fostering of adequate morale through decent treatment of enlisted men and especially field troops. This would include the provision of adequate pay, food, shelter and clothing. This should also be combined with the fostering of some kind of military spirit or esprit among the troops.

(3)   The conduct of military training and education that fosters modern military skills, including the abilities to lead, use modern weapons, and plan tactical encounters.

(4)   The provision of a level of weaponry equal to, or superior to, that provided to a potential or actual rival.

(5)   Any increase or decrease in the size of the military.

3.2   The Uneasy Regime Condition

The uneasy regime condition is characterized by a system of non-ideological purges and manipulations of officers in key positions within

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indulgence allowed FRELIMO or the MPLA.. The ability to lead troops in the field was simply too important. Purges appear to have been held to a minimum and when post-civil war Angola's leading officer became an annoyance, he was sent to the Soviet Union for training rather than purged.[42]

A more low key approach to the imposition of ideology on the army can be seen with regard to the case of Benin. Here, the young leftist officers who overthrew the government in 1973 decided they could live with an army that had some Western-oriented officers. A purge is a risky prospect, since officers being purged may defend themselves by mounting a countercoup. Furthermore, a healthy international image is not aided by a bloodbath. Major (later Colonel) Kerekov, therefore, contented himself with bringing new leftist officers into the army and helping to undermine the ability of the old guard to mobilize troops willing to undertake a coup against the government.[43]

Reductions in rank can also constitute a means of reducing the influence of officers who are of dubious loyalty. This occurs in both ideological and non-ideological regimes. In its ideological context, some of the Congolese military officers who may have been loyal to the ideas of ultra-conservative ex-President Fulbert Youlou found that their services were not highly valued by the regime of Captain Marien N'Gouabi.[44] Mindful of the fact that the Congo was still quite dependent on French trade, N'Gouabi chose not to assassinate these people but rather to limit their power through demotions and dismissals. The head of the gendarmerie, Major Norbert Tsika, was, for example, demoted to private in the late 1960's.[45] Purges in the Congo could by no means be called massive,

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[42]This was Henrique "Iko" Carreira who spent three years in the Soviet Union. See *Africa Report* (September/October 1982), p. 34.

[43]See Colen Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record* (New York: Africana Publications, 1981).

[44]President N'Gouabi was assassinated by a four-man suicide squad on March 18, 1977.

[45]De Calo, *op. cit.*

however, and introduction of Cuban advisors helped to render the Congolese army a sufficiently effective force to outfight a larger number of Zaireian troops who crossed into their country.[46]

3.4   The Debilitating Factionalism Condition

The debilitating factionalism condition represents a situation where factionalism in the military is so widespread that it renders the army unable to act as a united force. While very few regimes have actually experienced factionalism to this degree, most have problems dealing with ethnic and tribal cleavages within the army.

Tribalism in the armies of Africa has always been a problem. The importance of this factor for both military and non-military regimes has already been addressed in the introductory portion of this report. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that the problem is more serious with regard to military regimes, due to the fact that military regimes almost always establish themselves by coup. By doing so, they set themselves above the Constitution and any legal protections that might exist for ethnic or tribal groups who fear persecution. The coup leaders, no matter how noble their motives, cannot always escape the stigma that they are a law onto themselves. Moreover, if the coup is ethnically or tribally based, both the motive for ethnic or tribal persecution and the ability to implement ethnic or tribal persecutions are seen to be present.

The worst example of this situation occurred in Nigeria in 1966 with regard to the events that preceded the Biafran War. In January 1966, a group of five officers of the Ibo tribe seized power in a coup d'etat and raised fears throughout Nigeria of a military and society dominated by Ibos.[47]   A countercoup was launched months later, and this countercoup

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[46]Mboukou, op. cit., p. 42.

[47]This coup was known as the "Major's Coup" or "The Coup of the Young Majors." See Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

provided the moment that many of the non-Ibos in the army had waited for.
Non-Ibos and Ibos openly clashed, with the Ibos generally losing ground.
Ibo officers were attacked by non-Ibo enlisted men, not only for revenge
but also to insure that there was no possiblity of a new coup.led by Ibo
officers. NCO's usually led these anti-Ibo actions but they were often
encouraged by non-Ibo officers. Additionally, torture often accompanied
arrest or preceded execution.[48] The Ibos began to fear genocide. The
army and the country broke up.in anticipation of the thirty-month civil
war. Tribalism rendered the army unable to function as a unit and nearly
destroyed the society in the process.[49]

Another country which is still feeling the impact of rampant fact-
ionalism is Chad. The many "governments" of Chad are not "military" in
the same sense as the military government of General Gowan's Nigeria, but
they are led by martial types of leaders and warlords. Chad has the in-
credible distinction of experiencing a 17-year civil war which only re-
cently quieted to a state of near peace.[50] Factionalism in this country
is based on both religious and tribal divisions. These divisions are most
profound between the Moslem North and the Christian and animist
South.[51] While it is impossible to evaluate Chad's army (since it has
been divided for 17 years), the Chad case illustrates the problem of a
military that has totally collapsed under the weight of its own factional-
ism. Various factions in Chad have had to call upon foreign powers for
help. Powers such as France, Egypt, Sudan and especially Libya were,

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[48]Lamb, op. cit.

[49]Ibid.

[50]The peace is the result of the apparent victory of northern leader
Hissein Habre. See The Christian Science Monitor (September 15, 1982), p.
5. Also see West Africa (April 6, 1982), pp. 909-910 for information on
Habre's support and background.

[51]In early 1982, Chad had nearly a dozen armed factions of military
significance which maintained separate identities and leadership. See
Africa (February 1982), p. 33.

therefore, playing militarily significant roles in the civil war.[52]
This foreign involvement helped to further separate warring factions ideo-
logically, politically, and militarily.

3.5   The Condition of Junior Officer/NCO Rule

Junior officer and NCO coups are not a new phenomenon in Africa.
They occurred in several places during the 1960's. The most interesting
case during this period occurred in 1967 in Sierra Leone, where NCO's who
were discontented with their treatment overthrew a government headed by
senior officers.[53] The actions of these coup-makers served as an inter-
esting precedent for other African junior officers and NCO's. The coun-
try's leadership was taken over by a council of enlisted men led by two
Sergeant-Majors.[54] All active duty officers in the army and police were
arrested and imprisoned. This was not a gentle change, and two officers
were killed in the process.[55] Additionally, some senior NCO's were
imprisoned, discharged or exiled. The army's leadership corps was thereby
shattered. This was in stark contrast to other similar coups where junior
officers tried to preserve the fiction that they were operating with the
support of the entire army.[56]

The Sierra Leone coup, which only led to a very brief period of NCO
rule, served as a precedent for the later "coups of conscience" or "re-
venge coups" that occurred later in Liberia and Ghana. These coups in-
volved junior officers and NCO's who overthrew the government as an act of

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[52]See _The Economist_ (November 14, 1981), p. 37 and especially _West
Africa_ (April 21, 1980), pp. 697-698.

[53]See Anton Bebler, _Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra
Leone, and Mali_ (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 64-80.

[54]_Ibid_, p. 68.

[55]_Ibid_.

[56]This occurred in Mali, for example, when a number of senior offi-
cers either refused to support the 1968 coup or actively resisted it des-
pite the junta's claim that they were supported by the entire military.
Ibid, pp. 87-88.

rebellion not only against a specific government but also against their own military leaders and governmental system. In the case of Ghana, two coups (punctuated by a brief period of civilian rule) were led by a young flight lieutenant crusading against corruption. While in Liberia a master sergeant led a coup_to end the dominance of the descendents of American slaves.

In Ghana there has also been one very relevant attempted coup_which is worthy of comment. This involves the 1967 attempted coup of Lieutenants Samuel Arthur and Moses Yeboah. The motivation was in part personal (Lt. Arthur had been passed over for promotion), but it was also partially fostered by a general disillusionment with the senior officers who had taken power. In the trial which followed the attempted coup (which claimed a number of lives and came very close to success), Arthur made it clear that he had grown to hate virtually all of Ghana's senior officers. He made it clear that he believed the senior officers had made the coup. only for themselves and rhetorically asked the court how long it would be before Ghana (with a 17,000-man army) had field marshals. He also made it clear that the only difference between him and the officers that overthrew Nkrumah was that he had failed and they had succeeded.

Lieutenants Arthur and Yeboah were executed for their coup attempt but not before they had made their disillusionment with their senior officers clear. This alienation between the junior and senior ranks in the military never really diminished as steps were never taken to overcome the problem. It is of some interest, therefore, that twelve years after the Lieutenant Arthur's attempted coup, another lieutenant led a successful coup in which many of the corrupt officers that Arthur had hated were executed.

Since these revenge coups are not initiated by individuals who are already rich and important (as is often the case with senior officers) there is none of the circulation of elites atmosphere involved with them. Instead junior military personnel who have previously been forced to endure the excesses of corrupt superiors are suddenly placed in a situation

where they can retaliate against their superiors.[57]   The 1979 coup in
Ghana, for example, involved large-scale executions of top military
leaders for such acts as "illegal enrichment" and "economic sabotage."
Generals and colonels were threatened with execution or imprisonment while
middle-range officers (i.e., captains and majors) were subjected to such
humiliations as punishment for corruption.   Three former military heads of
state were executed.[58]

It is also significant that the aftermath of these coups can often
involve disagreement over the levels of punishment that should be imposed
upon the old regime's officers.   These disagreements can in turn generate
new cleavages and grudges in the army.[59]

Coups by junior officers and NCO's by no means eliminate the possi-
bility of countercoups.   Other lower ranking officers and NCO's tend to
judge many of their equals in rank with the same harshness with which they
judge their superiors.   This creates a situation where junior officers or
NCO's cannot always control the forces they set in motion at the beginning
of a coup and have to remain wary even after they have begun to consoli-
date power.   It is, therefore, not really surprising that populist leaders
such as Samual Doe and Jerry Rawlings still have to contend with would-be
coup leaders.   Doe, for example, faced a coup attempt in the summer of
1981.   The planners of the coup were all junior NCO's and soldiers with
little formal education who planned to kill Doe by directing heavy gunfire
at his plane upon his return from Freetown to Spriggs Airfield in Monro-
via.[60]   Rawlings too has found his own military to be restless.   As late

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[57]The initial causes of the 1979 junior officers' mutiny in Ghana
involved a belief that the Constituent Assembly had decided against future
prosecution of senior military officers for corruption and the govern-
ment's decision to release former head of state, Acheampong from prison.
See Jon Kraus, "The Return of Civilian Rule in Nigeria and Ghana," Current
History (March 1980), p. 138.

[58]Cited in Le Monde (June 28, 1979), p. 1

[59]See Alan Cowell, "Africa's Angry Young Men," New York Times Maga-
zine (December 19, 1982).

[60]See "A Season of Crises," Africa (August 1981), pp. 35-37.

as November 1982, a major countercoup attempt occurred. This involved
large-scale fighting in a Burma Camp in which Ghanian troops fought each
other with weapons up to and including mortars.[61]

The military consequences of these types of coups are devastating to
discipline, and the chain of command is badly strained if it survives at
all. After the coups in Ghana and Liberia, troops went on looting ram-
pages because they had ceased to function as organized army units and
degenerated into disorganized mobs. Additionally, the punishment of
middle-range officers often included head shaving but not relief from
command. This meant that lower-ranking enlisted men remained formally
under the command of officers whom they had seen publicly humiliated for
various forms of corruption. This, of course, helped to undermine the
credibility of the officers involved. Most of the officers were confident
of the inability of the government to see things their way if the troops
became upset with them. Many officers were compelled to behave as if they
were "on probation." Their top priority was to avoid antagonizing the
troops. They would, therefore, cease to be real leaders.[62] The picture
is further complicated in Ghana because of the existence of revolutionary
committees both inside and outside of the military. These committees are
quite powerful and could, if defied, instigate new mutinies in the armed
forces. In this context, Jerry Rawlings called the leaders of the last
attempted countercoup "disgruntled anarchists."[63] This description
might well fit the majority of the Ghanaian army. It is perhaps only
Rawlings' exceptional charisma that is holding the army together as any

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[61]See West Africa (November 29, 1982), p. 3065 for a description of
the attempted countercoup.

[62]Jerry Rawlings is in many ways much more moderate than the major-
ity of his followers. In this connection some of the more radical members
of his first government have become bitter opponents of his second govern-
ment. See The Economist (July 10, 1982), p. 36 and West Africa (July 12,
1982), p. 1797.

[63]West Africa (November 29, 1982), p. 3065.

kind of a single (although totally disorganized) unit. As this charisma fades, new problems are bound to erupt and the army and the society are threatened with a break up.[64] This is especially the case since Rawlings has very unreliable troops from which to construct internal security forces and since disillusionment with Ghana's sorry economic situation is bound to center more and more on Jerry Rawlings as time goes on.

3.6 The Uncontrolled Army Condition

The uncontrolled army condition involves a government which allows the army to victimize the population in terms of looting. This serves as a substitute or supplement for military pay raises and privileges. The loyalty of the population is, therefore, undermined to help insure the loyalty of the army. In this type of situation, certain tribal or ethnic groups (usually the opponents of the government) are often singled out for some or all of the persecution and in this way, the army becomes a party to the crimes of the regime. The end of the regime could mean trial and imprisonment or execution for those members of the armed forces who engaged in criminal acts supported by the government permitting or encouraging their actions. The regime permitting their actions becomes an object of loyalty for the soldiers unless they can be fairly certain that a successor regime will leave the system of institutionalized looting intact.

The most obvious example of the uncontrolled army condition undoubtedly occurred in Uganda under the regime of Idi Amin. Under Amin's regime the army behaved as a malevolent occupation force within its own country. Cars were taken from citizens at gunpoint to be turned over to army officers or members of the state research bureau (Amin's secret police). Any smaller goods in the possession of Uganda citizenry were

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[64]On Rawlings' charisma it is interesting to note that his followers have a slogan suggesting that his first two initials "J.J." stand for "Junior Jesus." He is also known as "Jerry the Savior" and his second coup is sometimes called the "second coming." See West Africa (May 31, 1982), p. 1451.

[65]Lamb, op. cit., p. 55.

also considered fair game for the soldiers engaged in pervasive looting and corruption. This occurred despite the fact that the army, as a rule, was fairly well paid due to grants of foreign aid (chiefly from Libya and Saudi Arabia). This pay for Amin's army continued even after the Ugandan economy collapsed.[66]

The military drawbacks of the uncontrolled army in Uganda were extremely severe. In the case of Uganda, the economy upon which the military was based was destroyed. Looting became less lucrative because there was not much left to loot, and very few individuals within the society chose to expend any effort doing anything but living for the moment. In addition, there was very little incentive to accumulate much in the way of material goods since these goods would be confiscated the instant they became known to the authorities. Furthermore, in such a system it would not be wise to irritate the authorities by attempting to conceal possessions unless this concealment became a matter of survival. In this situation the armed forces too would have probably fallen apart had it not been for the foreign aid.

Furthermore, since participation in the army is based almost solely on opportunism (although tribal consideration may also have some role) the army could not be expected to function as a courageous and self-sacrificing force under actual combat conditions.[67] As noted earlier, the primary bond between army and society in Uganda under Amin was the army's fear of criminal prosecution by any new regime. This is a useful bond to some extent, but in the final days of the Amin army it collapsed. Troops found it more advantageous to flee to the more remote parts of Uganda or the Sudan rather than stay in Kampala and fight for Idi Amin.[68] The prominent role that Libyan intervention forces played in

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[66]Ibid, p. 91.

[67]Members of Amin's Kakwa tribe as well as Muslims in general were favored in the Ugandan Army.

[68]Many of Amin's former troops have remained in Uganda and function as bandits and warlord armies.

the final defense of Kampala partially testifies to the lack of anything but an opportunist loyalty to Amin.[69]

A variation of the uncontrolled army model involves those armies that are so rift with corruption that money sent from the capital to pay the troops is often sidetracked and absorbed by corrupt officials. The criminal acts are, therefore, not encouraged by the regime and do not constitute planned policy but the neglect of the army's needs are so blatant that the end result is the same. The army feels the need to become involved in some kind of crime or looting. The already noted example here is Zaire. In Zaire, under the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, troops are poorly paid to begin with. The sidetracking of money can become a major issue. Additionally, for reasons that may be related to corruption, payroll is often very late.[70] At times, troops even go without pay for a number of months. The strain of trying to live without any money can become quite severe, especially as it relates to troops with families. Troops become restive over time as payroll becomes subject to more and more delays. Eventually an explosion may become inevitable. Nearby villages which may have already been subjected to extortion would then face looting.[71] If a Zairean village is not close at hand then the villages of neighboring countries may be looted or hostages may be taken and ransom demanded.[72] International repercussions are possible under this scenario and encounters with defending armies cannot be ruled out. In general, however, President Mobutu tends to remain unruffled by such

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[69]The Libyans stood by Amin when most of his own troops had fled.

[70]It is not clear why money that does get through to the troops is often late. This may be partially because schedules are much less important to most Africans than Westerners or it may involve follow-up shipments of pay in the aftermath of a first shipment being sequestered. West Berlin Tagesspiegel as quoted in JPRS (April 17, 1979), pp. 87-89.

[71]Ibid.

[72]See Times of Zambia (March 30, 1980), p. 1 and (October 8, 1980), p. 7.

occurrences. He simply states that undisciplined elements exist within
the military and he cannot be held accountable for their actions.[73]

The Zairean variation of the uncontrolled army does have some spec-
ial problems that are not found in the more pure type condition of the
uncontrolled army found in Amin's Uganda. This is because the army in
Zaire does not have the same kind of implicit green light to go ahead with
crime and looting as was found under Amin. Troops who decide to engage in
these activities, therefore, do not do so with the assurance that they
will be immune from prosecution at some future time. They also may face
the opposition of their own officers and NCO's. For this reason, looting
often occurs in sporadic incidents rather than as a general course of
policy. In such outbreaks, the officers and sometimes the senior NCO's
are often killed.[74] This is because they are often viewed as part of
the system of restraint rather than partners in crime (as was the case in
Uganda).

Problems were also evident with the uncontrolled army condition in
Liberia even after Master Sergeant Doe had been in power for a significant
period of time. This can be seen in a November 1981 statement by Defense
Minister Karpeh in which soldiers were warned not to harass citizens and
foreign residents.[75] In the same statement, Karpeh told the soldiers
that the government would continue to provide adequate living quarters for
them.[76] Clearly undisciplined troops without much money but with guns
remain capable of solving their own shortage problems in Liberia. This
may partially be the result of the fact that these troops know that the
present government rules by the grace of the army.

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[73]Mboukou, op. cit, p. 42.

[74]Cited in West Berlin Tagesspiegel, op. cit., p. 87.

[75]Cited in New Liberian (2 November 1981), p. 1.

[76]$15 million in aid was requested from the United States for this
purpose in late 1982. Cited in Africa Report (November-December 1982).
Doe has also travelled to the PRC, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to
solicit aid. See Africa Report (July-August 1982), p. 30.

3.7   The Praetorean Guard Condition

The Praetorean Guard condition occurs when the government trusts some but not all of the army. The reasons for this usually involve some special linkage between the leader of the regime and certain units within the army. These linkages may be tribal, personal, religious, regional or family. These special units can be used as presidential bodyguard and/or as special combat troops used to crush less loyal units who may revolt.

A very good example of a Praetorean regime can be seen in Togo under General Eyadema. Eyadema is known to feel a great deal of distrust for his 6,000-man army and has made a variety of efforts to keep it politically weak. The numbers of officers are very limited and carefully chosen for either their loyalty to Eyadema or their inability to command a mass following. This, however, is not enough to deal with Eyadema's insecurities, so he has constructed a Praetorean Guard system.

Eyadema's Praetorean Guard consists of a 1,200-man North Korean trained unit drawn from the northern part of Togo. These individuals have been carefully hand-picked and placed under the command of Eyadema's half-brother, Lt. Donou. Donou has a reputation for ruthlessness, and there is no serious doubt that this Presidential guard would be a very formidable force for any potential coup. leader to face. Additionally, Eyadema's personal bodyguards are all from Pya village and have been expertly armed and trained by the Israelis. The success of this system in maintaining Eyadema in power is noteworthy. He is one of Africa's most successful military dictators having ruled since 1967.

The chief drawback of the Praetorean Guard regime is that its existence tends to serve as an aggravation to the regular military. The army's role is called into question and its importance to the society at large is partially undermined. This tends to lower morale throughout the regular army. Morale is often further lowered if the Praetorean force is better armed (as is generally the case) or better treated.

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IV.   EXTERNAL USE OF FORCE BY AFRICAN MILITARIES

4.1   Overview

In evaluating the external use of force in Africa, must look essentially at three ingredients:

(1)   The internal situation unique to the country under examination;

(2)   Its interaction with neighbors; and

(3)   Its foreign relations with significant extraregional powers.

In Africa, as elsewhere, groups abound which have strong military traditions with a reputation for fierceness and bravado. Zulu, Kikuyu, Matabele, Masai Ashanti, Fulani, Somali and Amhara, to mention only a few, are all names which evoke warlike memories, based on their great warrior traditions. Epic stories tell of legendary heroes who excelled in the art of war and who successfully led their people to victory by vanquishing enemies seen as a common threat in their history. Even today, these past victories are enacted in skits, war songs, and dances at great tribal gatherings. Warfare and aggressive behavior are glorified, along with personal courage, pluck and dash.

Among these groups, the rite of passage for boys is marked by the most treasured gift a father or uncle can bestow on a growing boy; namely, a rifle. For what can better demonstrate a boy's passage to manhood than the possession of a firearm. This is particularly true of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan.

In many parts of Africa it can be said without fear of contradiction that the drive and motivation for the external use of force is not at all lacking. The existence of hundreds of ethnic and religious groups living in economically and socially unstable political entities, within what are essentially artificial boundaries, creates an environment in which friction and tensions abound, often resulting in clashes within and across borders.

intervention, the outcome would have been different in both cases, it would seem appropriate to take a very brief look at great power rivalries in Africa in order to establish which opportunities exist for potentially adventurous military regimes in search of an arms supplier.

Superpower rivalry in Africa generally shows itself in the form of the perceived interest of one or the other trying to advance its own objectives in any given area. So far, while the Soviet Union continues its steady drive to break new ground and consolidate its position, the main preoccupation of the U.S. in the post-Vietnam era seems to be confined only to protecting the oilfields of the Middle East and to safeguarding the oil supply routes and the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Strategic minerals like chronium, manganese, bauxite, cobalt, copper, gold and uranium, which abound in central and sout': : Africa, also arouse some interest in the U.S. It is mostly in the ext of these twin areas of interest that we see the U.S. taking diplomatic steps that will lead hopefully to its acquiring permanent ground facilities in such countries as Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Oman. These steps were taken at the height of the Iranian crisis following the downfall of the Shah when U.S. vulnerability became suddenly self-evident.[20] In exchange for economic and military aid, those countries made their respective ports and other facilities readily available to the U.S. for use by the Rapid Deployment Force as and when the need arose.

However, with the situation in Iran now appearing to be calming down and the present oil glut in the world in the wake of the apparent disarray among members of the OPEC cartel, the U.S. no longer seems eager to pursue those aims as diligently as it did in the past. This apparent slackening of pace on the part of the U.S. in its pursuit of those objectives, coupled with the alleged delay in the delivery of promised assistance (be it military or economic), seems to have created some bewilderment, if not outright disillusionment, in the region. Somalia's leader, Siad Barre, in

[20]See Feraidoom Shams, "American Policy: Arms and Aid in Africa," Current History (July-August 1979).

threat of being overrun by its big feuding neighbors.   Its defense arran-
gement with France and the presence on its soil of the small contingent of
French Foreign Legionaires seems to be largely symbolic and thus very in-
adequate to deter a serious confrontation or invasion by either of its
neighbors.   Moreover, neither French interests nor the resources of that
barren patch of desert land can reasonably justify the shedding of French
blood in its defense.   Thus far, France's commitment to the defense of
Djibouti is yet to be tested.   French diplomacy at the present seems to
focus on placating both Ethiopia and Somalia by maintaining a low profile
in Djibouti, while at the same time giving wide publicity in the French
media to the territory's independent status and membership_in the United
Nations Organization.   The implication here is that in case of aggression,
the U.N. itself would come to the territory's defense.   Whether this will
be the case also remains to be seen.   But what makes this assumption some-
what dubious is that due to the territory's small size and the very deli-
cate balance in the ethnic composition of the population of a hundred
thousand, both Ethiopia and Somalia, if they choose to invade Djibouti,
possess enough power and the necessary human resources to change almost
overnight the demographic composition of the territory.   The volatile and
nomadic nature of the population facilitates such an operation by either
side.   Both countries also harbor and provide a haven for exiled political
groups from Djibouti who will be ready at a moments notice at the appro-
priate time to enter Djibouti and establish a puppet government there.
For such an eventuality, what the French or the U.N. can or cannot do is
highly debatable.   But in the case of Djibouti the potential for the ex-
ternal use of force seems to be made to order.

A survey of the actual external use of force in Africa, however,
must make mention, albeit in a cursory manner, of recent events elsewhere
in Africa.   Also in this context a brief look at involvement in Africa
will not be out of place.

4.3   The Role of Extra Regional Powers

One interesting aspect about both the Ethiopian and Nigerian cases
involves the role of the Soviet Union.   Given the fact that without this

that these dissentions have even permeated the rank and file of the military in both countries, making the overthrow of these leaders a clear possibility. At the same time, given the existing intense rivalry in the region and the delicate military balance, their obviously weakened image and feeble military posture are bound to invite aggression from without as well.

While the Ansar revival in the Sudan and the formidable challenge that this poses to Nimeiri is a case in point, in Somalia the emergence of a group dedicated to the overthrow of Siad Barre known as "the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia," which is openly supported by Ethiopia, brings an entirely new dimension to the existing situation.[19] The many known defections from the Somali army to join with this group make the DFSS a very credible force with which to contend. This is also a demonstration of Siad Barre's rapidly diminishing popularity in his country.

The various raids into Somalia conducted by the DFSS from their relatively secure base in Ethiopia are further indications of Mogadishu's utter vulnerability. They are also demonstrations of the much emboldened attitude of the Derg in Addis Ababa in its eagerness to teach Somalia a lesson by administering a dose of its own medicine; namely, supporting subversive elements to mount raids across the border, a practice hitherto indulged in mostly by Somalia.

In the same vicinity, the tiny enclave of Djibouti also faces an uncertain future. The territory has always been a bone of contention between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ever since its independence from France in 1981, even though it has been making an effort to stay clear of the Ethio-Somalia dispute and steer a strictly neutral course in its relations with the two countries, it nevertheless continues to live under constant

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[19]On the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia see The Economist (July 11, 1981), p. 50; and especially Africa Report (January-February 1982), p. 28. On the Ansar see Holt and Daly, op. cit., and an interview with Sadiq al Mahdi in The Middle East (February 1980), pp. 38-39.

else to offer as _quid pro quo_ except perhaps manpower as cannon fodder, it is widely believed that Mengistu has undertaken to provide troops for some as yet unspecified Libyan mission. If so, one can easily understand President Nimeiri's uneasiness about Mengistu's possible motives.

The ramification of all these moves and countermoves by the various actors in the area, if it is to be taken seriously, can be far reaching.

In view of the fact that Sudan and Egypt have a defense pact of their own principally aimed at Libya and possibly Ethiopia (Egypt's historical preoccupation with the security of the Nile Valley and its often expressed desire to protect its southern flank being a well-known national obsession), one can envision a scenario of some Libyan instigated attack on Sudan or Egypt setting off a conflagration in the region involving all the countries linked by defense pacts--namely, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and possibly Kenya and South Yemen.[18]

While it may be true to say that the superpowers would not allow the situation to assume such a dangerous proportion, the point must still be made that all the ingredients that can make such a conflagration a distinct possibility do indeed exist. As recent events in the Middle East have clearly demonstrated, the ability of regional small powers to cause international conflicts, often to the embarrassment of the superpowers, is something that cannot be underestimated.

As far as Sudan and Somalia are concerned, recent developments in the area seem to indicate that both now find themselves increasingly exposed to the danger of external aggression and internal subversion more than at any other time in the past. While the desperate economic situation existing in both countries lays at the root of the problem, internal dissention and factionalism have become so endemic as to pose acute danger to the regimes of Nimeiri and Siad Barre. There is increasing evidence

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[18]This was more likely when Chadian forces under Hissene Habre were striking at Libyan and Libyan-supported troops in Chad from the Sudan. It should be noted, however, that the present improvement in relations between Egypt and Sudan from their already good state is highly offensive to Libya.

To underscore this point and to demonstrate to Somalia that he indeed meant business, Mengistu made a highly publicized state visit to Kenya and signed with President Daniel Arab Moi an updated version of a 20-year old defense pact between the two countries which is directly aimed at countering Somalia's territorial ambitions in the region. Even though Mengistu's ideology and Soviet and Cuban friends are abhorrent to President Moi and his government, the Kenyans showed more than eagerness to come under the protective umbrella of Mengistu's newly acquired military might in case of an attack from Somalia.[16] This clearly shows that the Kenyans consider Somalia more of a threat to them than Mengistu's Soviet-sponsored Socialist Ethiopia. Predictably Somalia's response to this move was one of anger and resentment and Somalia's president described the event as a declaration of war on Somalia by the two signatories.

There are also indications that Sudan too is feeling somewhat uneasy about Mengistu's newly acquired strength in the region. Apart from the influx of refugees fleeing the interminable fighting in Eritrea, which has been a running sore in the relations between the two countries, President *Nimeiri has always been wary of the warm friendship between Mengistu and his neighbor to the north, Libya's Moamar Qaddafi.* It did not help matters when Mengistu went ahead and signed a tripartite treaty of friendship and cooperation with Libya and South Yemen on August 19, 1981.[17] Apart from linking the three radical countries in economic cooperation, the treaty also contains clauses binding the three countries to a joint defense effort in case of attack. Relations between the Sudan and Libya being what they are, this could only be interpreted by Nimeiri as an unfriendly act on the part of Mengistu.

While it is not exactly clear how Libya will benefit from this treaty, it is known that Mengistu has already received some financial aid from Qaddafi under the terms of the treaty. Since Mengistu has nothing

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[16]See The Economist (July 11, 1981), pp. 49-50.

[17]Cited in The Economist (September 5, 1981), p. 33.

meant the annihilation of his erstwhile close associates and co-conspirators not to mention the tens of thousands of innocent people that perished in the civil war-like situation created in the wake of those purges and the struggle for power among Derg members.

On the whole, however, Mengistu has come a long way in achieving his objective both internally and externally. In both, he has managed to strengthen his position considerably. Thanks to Soviet and Cuban help, he now carries a big stick which none of his African neighbors can afford to ignore. With over 225,000 men under arms he can now boast to have what is probably the largest fully equipped army south of the Sahara. The Soviets have virtually turned Ethiopia into a dumping ground for their old (and sometimes not so old) weapons--weapons which are nevertheless quite effective for the type of bush wars frequently fought in Africa. His Air Force now bristles with more than 200 MiG 21's and MiG 23's as well as MiG 24 helicopter gun ships which more than compensate for the F-5's which had been denied him by the U.S. a few years ago. (But he still has some F-5A's, remnants of past deliveries for which the Israelis provided spare parts.)[15] By African and Third World standards, Mengistu's arsenal is quite formidable.

Perhaps it is a measure of the weakened state of Somalia today that the Ethiopian Air Force almost routinely violates Somalia's airspace and bombs and strikes border villages at will without any fear of retaliation by the other side. The vulnerability of Somalia is such that Mengistu and his spokesmen now boast that in the future, "If Somalia attacks the Ogaden again, the war will not be fought in Ethiopian territory as before, we will see to it that it will be fought in Somalia itself. If necessary, we will carry the war to Mogashishu." This threat makes it clear that in the future Ethiopian soldiers will not stop at the border as they did in 1977, but will go ahead and strike deep into Somalia.

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[15]Cited by Jerusalem Domestic Service as quoted by FBIS (Middle East and North Africa) (February 7, 1978), N1 and Riyadh Domestic Service as quoted by FBIS (Middle East and North Africa) (February 6, 1978), C2 for a more contemporary look at Israeli-Ethiopia relations. See Arab News (February 11, 1983), p. 3.

It was, therefore, Mengistu's embrace of Ethiopian nationalism through war that helped to save his regime. The military itself was not particularly committed to Mengistu or Marxism at this time. It was committed to fighting Somalia and Eritrea and was willing to go along with Mengistu as long as he supported these goals. The extent of this early lack of concern with ideological matter can be seen in the fact that the military in Ethiopia was neither the initiator nor the prime mover in the uprising against the late emperor. The students, intellectuals, and the trade unions had the sole claim to that distinction. The military were relative late comers, and when they did join the band wagon in the end, they did so somewhat reluctantly. In fact, most of them were quite content to continue to play their old role of suppressing and stamping out rebellions against the Emperor's rule. Of course, this is not to say that there were no malcontents among them. Nor is it to say that there were no mutinies and rebellions. But these were scattered and far between, and when they did occur, they did so for localized and specific grievances such as demands for more rations, pay raises or better living conditions in the barracks.

The politicization of the armed forces in Ethiopia came at a much later stage, and it only came about as a result of the complete collapse of the civilian authority and the breakdown of law and order due to the anti-government activities of the student intellectuals and trade unions. The military literally filled a power vacuum created by the political and economic chaos that accompanied the demise of the civilian authority. Being the only credible organized force in the country, they assumed the unlikely mantle of government with the full realization of their short-comings and inadequacies in order to fill such a position. It is mainly for this reason that to this very day—eight years after assuming power—LTC Mengistu's regime is still known as "the Provisional Military Administrative Council" or the "Derg."

This amorphous group of soldiers called the Derg had to go through the usual agonizing ritual of purge after purge in its still ongoing effort to consolidate its power. The emergence of LTC Mengistu as the head of the group may be proof of his uncanny ability to survive, but it also

government that was, like Nigeria, able to wage what it perceived as a vital war by reorienting its foreign policy. The case of Ethiopia was, however, much more drastic. Again this is not to suggest that a civilian government would have done things any differently. Indeed, the reaction of the Ethiopian population suggested that virtually any government would have been well advised to have responded assertively to the Somali and Eritrean challenges.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the fighting in Eritrea and the war with Somalia helped Mengistu's image, at least internally. With his recent triumph over Somalia and the successionists in Eritrea, he could now pose as a patriotic figure who defended the nation both from internal enemies and foreign invaders. It was a triumph which helped him gain some stature in the eyes of the Ethiopian people, and thereby helped his regime gain a new lease on life. For until this time, all the opposition in Addis Ababa and elsewhere was against him. Mengistu's days seemed to have been numbered. Then, quite inadvertently, Somali irridentists and Eritrea secessionists, in an ironical twist of fate, helped Mengistu to consolidate his grip on power.

However temporary or ephemeral it might be, the victory over Somalia and the Eritreans had the immediate effect of making Mengistu a heroic figure cast in the mold of past emperors who led their people to victory in wars. By the same token, Mengistu could accuse the opposition of stabbing the country in the back as the nation's fate hung in the balance, engaged in a life and death struggle with internal and external enemies.

It is also interesting to note that in these bloody skirmishes and military confrontations, in which all the antagonists claimed to be Marxist and Socialists, the battle cries were always made in the name of patriotism and nationalism and never in the name of Marxist or Socialist internationalism. Both the regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the main successionist guerrilla armies in Eritrea (ELF and EPLF), all claimed to be dedicated Marxists and Socialists.[14]

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[14]See interview with EPLF Vice-Secretary-General Issayas Afewerki in The Middle East (July 1980), pp. 34-35.

Such a situation would suggest that Mengistu manufactured the war for his own longevity but this is not the case. As noted earlier, the wars with Somalia and Eritrea were foisted upon the Ethiopians as the result of opportunistic Somali and Eritrean interpretations of the fall of the Emperor. What is interesting is the length to which the Derg was willing to go in order to defeat its enemies. The Ethiopians switched supporters and then managed to place themselves deeply in debt to the Russians solely in order to defeat their enemies in the field.[11]

In order to do this, the Ethiopians had to convince the Soviets that they would be better allies than the Somalis. This was not easy since the Somalis had been supported by the Soviets since 1969 and had granted the Soviets base rights within their country.[12] It was also significant considering that the Soviets did not want the Somalis and the Ethiopians fighting. It is assumed that it was the seemingly unbearable embarrassment of seeing the spectacle of Marxists fighting fellow Marxists that sent Fidel Castro scurrying to Africa to try his hand at mediation between Siad Barre of Somalia and Mengistu only weeks before hostilities broke out in earnest between the two countries. His proposed solution of political union encompassing the Marxist states of South Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia was a move which only demonstrated Castro's woeful lack of understanding of the deep-seated antagonisms prevalent among the parties involved. No wonder all turned deaf ears to Castro's suggestions.[13]

Thus, while Mengistu did not manufacture the wars, he clearly went to great lengths to see that it terminated on Ethiopian terms. He did so by cutting Ethiopia off from the West and establishing a dependency-type relationship with the Soviets. Ethiopia, therefore, represents a military

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[11]The Ethiopians, in fact, became so dependent on the Russians that their Cuban advisor reportedly warned them about the dangers of such a relationship. See The Economist (September 22, 1979), pp. 63-64.

[12]On the Soviet-Somali relations see The Christian Science Monitor (February 15, 1978), p. 3 and especially Steven David, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage," International Security (Fall 1979), pp. 69-90.

[13]See Nelson, op. cit., p. 264 and Lamb, op. cit., p. 205.

meant the loss of the area called Biafra; it would have also have set a precedent for other subdivisions of Nigeria interested in independence. The military thus elected to wage and control a major war. In this connection it is very significant that both Nigeria and Biafra were ruled by the military during this time period.[10] Neither government wished to trust civilians with something as important as the conduct of a major war. Had they chosen to do so, however, there is no evidence to suggest that a civilian government would not have done the same.

By contrast, the case of Ethiopia appears to be much more extreme. Up to a point, there is a parallel with Nigeria in that the immediate cause for the final break with the West, particularly with the U.S., was the refusal by the U.S. to continue the military aid promised to the military regime after the overthrow of the late Emperor. In particular, the Ethiopians were offended by the Congressional move to stop military supplies already in the pipeline at the height of the civil war in Eritrea, and later the war with Somalia in the Ogaden desert. Even though the break was long coming, this provided LTC Mengistu the necessary pretext—indeed if any pretext was ever needed—to *hasten to Moscow and sign a 20-year treaty of friendship* with the Soviet Union in May of 1977. Ethiopia had switched superpower sponsors in order to gain the types and quantities of weapons it would need to smash its regional enemies.

After that event, the story of the massive shipment by sea and air of Soviet arms and equipment accompanied by thousands of Soviet, Cuban, East German and other Eastern European military and civilian personnel is too well known to warrant any repetition. So too is the devastating effect these newly acquired weapons had on the Eritrean secessionists and the Somali invaders. No doubt this ready response by the Soviets and their Cuban and other allies to come to the assistance of the Ethiopians at a time of their greatest need has earned Moscow and Havana the undying gratitude of the beleagured Ethiopians.

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[10]It may also be significant that it was the civilian government of Shehu Shagari who pardoned Col. Ojukwa and let him return to Nigeria from his place of exile in the Ivory Coast. See Africa Report (September-October 1982), p. 27 and especially Africa (June 1982), pp. 11-14.

openly that "if need be, we will go to the devil himself to obtain the arms we need to defeat the secessionists."[6]

Thus, the Biafran civil war strained Nigeria's relations with the West to the limit; and when it was all over and Nigeria triumphed over Biafra, the military rulers made their indebtedness to the Soviet Union amply clear to the world. At one stroke, the Soviets acquired access to the lucrative arms market which they have successfully expanded since.[7] By the same token, the Nigerians were left bitter by what they considered to be abandonment or worse by their traditional allies like Britain, France and the U.S. It is a measure of the trauma left by that war that even today, a decade later, Nigerian politicians and diplomats still voice deep-suspicion and disenchantment with the West's policies and attitudes towards Africa and the Third World in general. It has also strengthened Nigeria's resolve to remain non-aligned and to shun a closer embrace by the West, even though Nigeria's history, system of goverment, and society must be considered part of the Western world.[8] This latter fact, however, makes the Nigerian case quite benign and redeemable for the West.

In Nigeria, the world saw a military government that would not allow itself to be detered from what it considered its mission. Neither Western nor respected African voices had any effect on Nigeria's determination to recover its territory.[9] To have failed to do so would not only have

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[6]Cited in John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 79. Also see Norman Uphoff, "The Rise and Persistence of Nigeria's General Gowon," Pan African Journal (Fall 1972).

[7]Ibid.

[8]Nigeria has also led the effort to disengage the U.S. from South Africa. This has added a new dimension to U.S.-Nigerian relations. See Radio Lagos Commentary cited in Africa Currents (July-August 1980), p. 6.

[9]Julius Nyerere, for example, stated that as much as he believed in African unity, he could not condone the attempt to unify Nigeria by force. Tanzania correspondingly recognized the independence of Biafra on April 13, 1968. See Jon Woronoff, Organizing African Unity (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970), pp. 413-414.

4.2   Military Regimes That Are Assertive

While the above-mentioned obstacles may be placed in the path of a military interested in an assertive foreign policy, it should be understood that these obstacles are by no means insurmountable in every case. Two cases of militaries which have shown themselves determined to wage war despite the efforts of outside powers to prevent them from doing so are Nigeria and Ethiopia.

In Nigeria, the problems connected with the Biafran civil war and the enormity and complexity of the task of administering a huge multi-ethnic and multi-religious country convinced the military from the outset that it would be impossible for them to continue to rule from their ever shrinking, narrow political base. Internally all the ugly features of military takeovers--the summary executions, the bloodbaths and massacres--accompanied these coups as the deadly musical chair game of officers was played. This inevitably led to one of them who seemed to have lost the struggle for power at the center to attempt to lead a secession of a big and valuable part of the country whose population was distrustful of the central government. Colonel Ojukwu almost succeeded in the attempt, but he seemed to have underestimated the will of present day Africans to hold on to territory inherited from former colonial masters, come what may.

It appears Colonel Ojukwu was not alone in this. The West, too, grossly underestimated Nigeria's determination to defend what it perceived to be a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The denial of military assistance and virtual embargo on arms and other military equipment by the Western powers drove the military rulers of Nigeria to break with tradition and rush headlong into the open arms of the Soviet camp.[5] When an arms embargo was imposed on Nigeria, the military ruler of Nigeria at the time, General Gowon, who was well known for his moderation and pro-Western views, ironically went to the extent of declaring

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[5]Cited in Raph Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971), p. 92.

perhaps some highly visible instances where a civilian government had to restrain its own militaries from taking action against some offending neighbor (usually of considerably less military prowess).

A good illustration of this occurred in Nigeria in 1981 when five Nigerian soldiers were killed in a border incident with Cameroon. In the aftermath of this incident the military was reported to be eager to teach Cameroon a very bloody lesson. President Shagari's decision to seek (and then obtain) reparations and an apology were, therefore, considered lacking by some military leaders.[3]

Shagari defended his policy at the Army Staff College at Kaduna and assured the army that the civilian system of government was capable of defending the country and assuring its stability. Shagari and his colleges also stressed that Nigeria as a regional leader would have its image tarnished by attacking a smaller, weaker neighbor. Nigeria, they maintained, should be able to rise above certain low-level differences rather than become embroiled in them. This may have had some effect since military tempers did cool and a feared coup never materialized.[4] It should, however, be realized that the military would have probably been much less interested in intervention over such a trivial matter had not the target been hopelessly outclassed by Nigerian military might.

In other instances the military regimes of Africa have been constrained from going to war by economic considerations. War, after all, requires large amounts of expensive weaponry that no Sub-Saharan African country (except South Africa) produces indigeniously. Furthermore, even when money is available to purchase weapons, political questions often come into play. If a nation's outside sources of weaponry do not support a conflict, they are, of course, free to embargo weapons should they decide to incur the political costs with the recipient nation. This can spell military disaster for the recipient country if alternative arms suppliers are not found.

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[3]The Economist (June 6, 1981), p. 44 and (July 25, 1981), p. 48.

[4]Ibid and Africa Report (September-October 1981), p. 32.

Very often, all that is needed is a supply source for weapons and munitions of war to fuel these tensions into full-scale conflict. Since no Sub-Saharan African country, with the exception of South Africa, can boast of manufacturing arms, it is in this particular domain that foreign suppliers play a crucial role. Poor as they are, to the extent their wits and meagre resources allow, all the African states are constantly shopping for arms wherever they can find them. This fact alone makes the African continent the dreamland for arms manufacturers, gun-runners, smugglers and traffickers of all sorts.[1] As a result, the volume of arms transfers to Africa in the last decade has increased more than ten-fold. This makes Africa easily the largest arms market in the Third World after the Middle East.[2]

The rapid pace of change and the great diversity among African states often combine to invalidate generalizations and projections almost as soon as they are made. Perhaps the most important exception to this rule is that there is little prospect of a lasting peace, and international conflicts involving African states can be expected to erupt occasionally at least to the extent of undeclared border flareups. As long as this situation remains, the occurrences of and prospects for the external use of force will always be present, at least for the foreseeable future. This will undoubtedly remain true for both military and civilian regimes.

Upon seizing power, a military becomes involved in a whole set of concerns which were previously left to the civilian government. One of the most important of these concerns involves the continuation or establishment of a foreign policy. In formulating a foreign policy, an important question is whether or not the military is more inclined to use military force than a civilian government. It is often assumed, in this connection, that militaries are more nationalistic and more inclined to use force than their civilian counterparts. The basis for such an assumption involves guesswork about the corporate values of the military and

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[1]Volman, op. cit., p. 4.

[2]Ibid.

particular, has been vocal in expressing complaints about the insufficency of the aid offered, or the delay in delivery of equipment promised by the U.S.[21] No doubt Sudan and Kenya would also like the U.S. to be more forthcoming in its economic and military assistance.

In contrast to the position of the U.S., we see the Soviet Union making its presence felt in the region in a strong and systematic manner. This is the factor that enabled Ethiopia and Nigeria to obtain weapons. In this connection the Soviet Union has made Ethiopia and South Yemen totally dependent on its largesse and, on account of that fact, has turned these two strategically placed countries into its strong allies. This has made the strategic ports and offshore islands belonging to these countries automatically available to Soviet ships and personnel. Today the ports of Aden and the islands of Perm and Socotra belonging to South Yemen, as well as the ports of Massawa and Assab, and the Dhalak Islands of the Red Sea belonging to Ethiopia are being fully utilized by the Soviet Navy.[22] This virtually places the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden at the disposal of the Soviets, which greatly strengthens their position and the position of their friends and allies in the region.

Viewed in this light, the recent Soviet overtures to the government of Seychelles assumes an added significance. Ever since the abortive invasion by some adventurers from South Africa, led by the notorious mercenary Colonel Mike Hoare, the present government of Seychelles has become even more radicalized, assuming hostile overtones in its pronouncements to the West.[23] Situated as they are, half-way between India and Africa in the middle of the Indian Ocean, right in the path of the international

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[21]See The Washington Post (January 17, 1981), p. A24.

[22]South Yemen is actually an honorary member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

[23]On Hoare's attempt to overthrow the government of the Seychelles, see Time (August 9, 1982), p. 30. Also see Johannesburg Domestic Service, "Comments on Release of Seychelles Group," as quoted in JPRS (December 15, 1981), p. 104.

travel and oil shipping routes, the Seychelles Islands constitute an important link in what could well be the Soviet strategy of girdling the globe. If they succeed in gaining a foothold there, which may well be with the present leftist oriented government, their capability for interfering with shipping destined for the West can be greatly increased. In any event, it would undoubtedly offset any advantage which the U.S. might have in owning and operating its newly acquired base at Diego Garcia.

The same pattern is also observed in the existing warm and friendly relations the Soviets enjoy with the present government of Madagascar. Whether this friendship would lead to some sort of concession in the form of port facilities for Moscow in that big island state also remains to be seen.[24]

Zanzibar and Pemba have long been the Eastern Bloc's stronghold, and in their partnership in the Tanzanian Union, they have always enjoyed the role, at least ideologically, of that of the tail wagging the head. It is public knowledge that the mainland government of President Nyerere based at Dar-es-Salaam in deference to its island partner's attitude has often been obliged to assume a more radical stance in its pronouncements and relations with the West than it would normally like to assume.

In this relentless Soviet effort to spread their power and influence in the area, even Mauritius and the Comoro Islands have not escaped their attention. Their courtship of these island states through increased trade, aid, and other blandishments is well known. Compared to this Soviet effort, what the U.S. is now trying to achieve in the Indian Ocean clearly falls far short.

In the meantime, the role of protecting Western interests in the Indian Ocean and Africa generally seems to have been assumed by France. Whether this is by design or accident, it is not exactly clear, because there are still some Frenchmen who still believe in maintaining past glory and prestige. But the perceived self interest of France and the "strong" ties

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[24]See Le Monde (April 14, 1982), p. 6, for speculation about possible links between Madagascar and the USSR.

that still bind that country with her former colonial territories have
made it "necessary" for France to take a leading military role in Africa.
Ostensibly for this reason France maintains permanent military bases in
Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti and Reunion Island.[25] Apart
from the French Foreign Legion which has its main base on Reunion Island,
a division of French Marines and a regiment of the Overseas Combat Unit is
kept in readiness in Metropolitan France for combat missions "in the
Mediterranean or Africa." These forces have been used several times in
the past to intervene directly in such countries as Gabon, Zaire, the
Central African Empire (Republic) Mauritania and Chad. The most dramatic
of these interventions have, of course, been Shaba I and Shaba II when
Zairean insurgents operating from bases in Angola threatened to overrun
the mineral-rich province of Shaba; thereby posing a threat to the flow of
copper, cobalt and uranium to the West. The overthrow of Emperor Bokassa
was also spearheaded by these same French interventionist forces.

In what seems like at attempt on the part of France at countering
the massive Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, Paris is busy strengthen-
ing its military bases on a string of small French islands in the Strait
of Mozambique. The question remains whether a brave but feeble French
effort by itself would be sufficient to face up to the Soviets. It should
be remembered that the Soviets already have well established land and sea
bases on the mainland overlooking the entire region, in Mozambique and
Angola. At most what the French can do from their bases on those islands,
given their modest resources, is to monitor Soviet activities in the area
and act as a listening post for the West. The large naval base at Simons-
town in South Africa can be a beneficiary of this French effort.[26]

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[25]See Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, "French Policy in
Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization," International Security
(Spring 1979) pp. 108-133.

[26]On this base, see Los Angeles Times (January 28, 1983), Part 1, p.
5.

4.4   Military Regimes That Are Not Assertive

While the military can show a great deal of interest in using war as a problem-solving device, it can also look upon war as a deeper tragedy than some civilian governments would tend to. This is particularly the case when the war is fought for ambigous reasons, or the war being contemplated or waged is against a formidable adversary capable of inflicting severe casualties. Thus, while the Nigerian military was willing to press for warfare against Cameroon over a trivial incident, it might have been less anxious to start problems with a more formidable enemy unless it had better reasons.

One early incident of a military regime which was less inclined to fight than its civilian predecessor can be seen with regard to Ghana. The Nkrumah regime, despite its civilian character, was very interested in playing an active role in regional politics, especially with regard to questions relating to decolonization. This interest led to a military intervention in the Congo and a threatened military intervention against the newly established white minority regime in Rhodesia. In the first instance Ghanaian troops were placed in a situation in which they did not fully understand the significance of their mission.[27] Many Congolese whom the Ghanians were trying to help saw Ghana as projecting an unnecessary involvement in the internal affairs of the Congo. Ghanaian troops were actually booed and hissed at by Congolese citizens.[28] Furthemore, the Ghanaian army was definitely bloodied during the war. One battalion suffered very heavy casualties while another mutinied. General Afrifa summed up the situation by stating, "We lost lives in a struggle which was not ours."[29]

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[27]For Nkrumah's version of the events in the Congo and the necessity of his actions there, see Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967).

[28]Akwast A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 66.

[29]Ibid, pp. 70-71.

Nkrumah's next focus for military intervention was Rhodesia whose white minority unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. Nkrumah's announced policy of liberating Rhodesia from the white minority regime, therefore, raised the possibility of a new and equally, if not more bloody confrontation. In this context the bloody clash in the Congo was too fresh a memory for the Ghanaian military hierarchy to dismiss Nkrumah's words as mere rhetoric. Furthermore, many of the higher ranking officers in Ghana had graduated from Sandhurst and saw themselves as soldiers of the British Commonwealth. They were uncomfortable with Ghana, taking a position on Rhodesia which was so clearly in contrast to Britain's position.

It is of some interest to note that Nkrumah was overthrown only about a year after the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). When he was overthrown, the military government quickly announced its interest in a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian situation. Thus, while Nkrumah was overthrown for a variety of reasons, it appears that a reluctance to enter a new and potentially more bloody military confrontation played an important role in causing this overthrow. This was later borne out by the statements of the officers involved in the coup. These people stressed that they either believed in a peaceful solution or that they felt that the blacks in Rhodesia should liberate themselves.

A more clearcut example of an anti-war military can be seen with regard to the leaders of the July 1978 coup in Mauritania. The leaders of this coup were predominently interested in overthrowing the government so that they could make peace with the Polisario guerrilla front on terms that did not invite Moroccan intervention against Mauritania. This was done when a separate peace treaty was concluded with the Polisario in August 1979.[30]

The 1978 coup itself was led by Lt. Col. Mohamed Ould Heydalla who had served as the previous government's army chief of staff. Despite the

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[30]Mauritania called this a decision to "withdraw definitely from an unjust war" cited in The Daily Telegraph (August 7, 1979), p. 5.

fact that he had distinguished himself in battle against the Polisario, it rapidly became clear that unlike his predecessor, pro-Moroccan President Ahmed Ould Bouceib, he and his Military Committee of National Salvation had no interest in continuing the war.

The reason for the relatively long delay between the coup itself and the actual peace treaty appears to relate to a long process of negotiations and a need for the coup makers to consolidate power internally. With regard to the first point, the Mauritanians were particularly interested in insuring that their own country did not become a base from which the Polisario could attack their former Moroccan ally. Furthermore, in pursuit of this general policy of neutrality, the Mauritanians improved a previously poor relationship with Algeria and invited France to station troops in Mauritania as a hedge against Moroccan countermeasures. Finally the Mauritanians did continue to station their own troops in strategic areas of their own country in order to prevent Polisario from establishing bases there. In justifying these types of policies, one Mauritanian leader stated: "We did not come out of one war to get involved in a new one."[31]

4.5   Assertive Civilian Regimes

In those cases of military assertiveness already noted in this study, military regimes were commented upon with the examples of Ethiopia and Nigeria being considered particularly relevant. It was, however, suggested that these regimes did not behave differently from what a civilian government might be expected to do in similar circumstances. In this context it was deemed useful to examine briefly the use of external force by civilian regimes in Africa.

Perhaps a typical case of the external use of force in Africa came from what looks like a very unlikely source. Tanzania has only known a civilian administration since its independence from the British in 1961.

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[31] Cited in The Middle East (January 1980), p. 14.

There has been no other confirmed threat of a military takeover of President Julius Nyerere's one party civilian government since December 1964, when an army mutiny was crushed with the help of the British. Nyerere has led Tanzania since independence and, both as a leader and African statesman, has gained a wide reputation for his moderate and pragmatic policies.[32] He is also one of the very few founding fathers of the O.A.U. who is still alive and in power. Yet it was this respected African leader, known for his scruples for international law and the principles of the U.N. and the O.A.U. who, seemingly without any regard for such niceties, sent his armed forces into Uganda to topple the regime of Idi Amin and ultimately install an old friend, Milton Obote, to power.[33]

No doubt the excesses of Idi Amin and the brutality of his regime helped to mute criticism of Nyerere's brazen action in invading Uganda. Also, the fact that all opposition groups within and outside Uganda supported the Tanzanian invasion helped save that east African country from widespread censure and general opprobrium. However, no matter how obnoxious or hated the regime of Idi Amin was, few could find justification in international law for a foreign army to invade another country with the express purpose of unseating a government. It was clearly a violation of the principles of the U.N., the O.A.U. and other international organizations which all call for the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and forbid any interference in the internal affairs of nations. It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that even those who secretly applauded Nyerere's action voiced public criticism of the move. This was particularly true in Africa among the many small and militarily weak countries who legitimately feared the dangerous precedent that

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[32]Nyerere's immense prestige is probably the most important reason for the fact that Tanzania annually receives more aid than any other African country. See The Washington Post (April 2, 1981), A21.

[33]During his first tenure in power, Obote looked to Nyerere for intellectual guidance with great frequency. See Decalo, op. cit., pp. 173-230.

Tanzania's action would set for the future with the prevailing an-
tagonism and the on-going inter-state rivalries all over the continent.
Once such a precedent is set, no country would be immune from the openly
hostile activities of neighboring states.   This is particularly the case
since Nyerere helped to oust two post-Amin Presidents who were not respon-
sive to Nyerere's plans to build a socialist Uganda based on the Tanzania
model.[34]   Hence, a shock wave was felt in Africa and other third world
regions at the time of Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, even though admit-
tedly the end result of that invasion was to relieve the conscience of a
weary world from the heavy burden of being exposed daily to the widely
publicized brutalities of a blood-thirsty tyrant.[35]

It is also significant that prior to the action against Uganda,
Nyerere helped to topple two other governments.   This involved a 1975
action against the Comoro Islands and a 1979 action against the Sey-
chelles.   He also is known to have sent large numbers of troops into
independent Mozambique to help fight the Rhodesians.[36]   While his
motives in the last action are again hard to fault, the actions with re-
gard to Mozambique illustrate another instance where Nyerere felt comfor-
table in exercising Tanzania's military muscles in an instance which can
only indirectly be considered self-defense.

Another country with a penchant for the external use of force almost
on a routine basis is the Republic of South Africa.   This is done in terms
of direct intervention by South African troops and with surrogates such as
the Mozambique National Resistance.   Even though the intricate problems

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[34]These Presidents were Yusufu L. Lule and Godfrey Binaisa.   See
Lamb, op. cit., pp. 77-94.

[35]It is interesting that Francisco Macias of Equatorial Guinea re-
mained in power for eleven years, partially because of the fact that the
larger and more powerful countries of Gabon and Cameroon adamantly refused
to allow anti-Macias guerrillas to operate from their territories.   Macias
may have been even more brutal than Amin, although he was less flamboyant
and had a smaller country to brutalize.

[36]For Rhodesian comments on this issue, see The Herald (12 January
1980), p. 7, as quoted by JPRS (25 January 1980), p. 10.

associated with that country are outside the scope of this paper, a mention of the recent activities of South Africa which have a direct bearing on the external use of force would be germane to the topic under discussion. With the "fortress South Africa" mentality that governs the thinking of many of its policymakers, it comes as no surprise that South Africa keeps sending its armed forces into neighboring countries on search and destroy missions.[37] In the last five years military commanders of the Republic of South Africa have systematically conducted well organized raids into Angola, Zambia and Lesotho at different times. Zimbabwe and Mozambique are also known to be targets of South African intervention through surrogate forces. These raids are, of course, predominently aimed at the various guerrilla movements which are operating against South Africa from their bases in these countries. SWAPO and ANC guerrillas have drawn the most fire from South Africa, being the principal targets of the raids.[38] In spite of the early optimism of the Reagan Administration about reaching a solution to the Namibian crisis, there is still no remedy in sight and the guerrilla war there goes on unabated, thereby ensuring continued South African incursions into neighboring territories and other military activities in the whole of southern Africa. Needless to say, this has also contributed to the increasing militarization of the countries of the region. Yet South Africa is not ruled by its own military but rather a group of civilians elected by white voters. It, like Tanzania, represents a civilian regime willing to use military power as a way of preventing its interests from being threatened.

In summary it can be seen that in Africa military regimes are not necessarily more inclined to use force than their civilian counterparts.

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[37]See Robert S. Jaster, _South Africa's Narrowing Security Options_ (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980).

[38]The December 1982 raid into Lesotho was, for example, aimed at killing ANC members although a number of other people were killed as well. See _Los Angeles Times_ (December 10, 1982), Part 1, pg. 1.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL USE OF FORCE BY MILITARY REGIMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

5.1   Introduction

When a military seizes political power, a number of significant questions arise about how the military will deal with internal force and repression. The very act of seizing power often suggests a lack of regard for the legal and constitutional safeguards that may (at least formally) exist within a civilian regime. The implications a military coup has for civil and human rights are often, therefore, quite negative. The one exception may be when a coup takes place to oust a tyrant who has already dismembered all legal and constitutional safeguards for the population. A good example of a coup which took place along these lines occurred in Equatorial Guinea in 1979.[1]

In the earlier sections of this work it has been seen that different African military governments relate to their own militaries in different ways. It should, therefore, be no surprise that these same military governments tend to relate to their societies in different ways. It should also be noted that the ways in which military governments relate to their armies and societies are often closely linked. This is because the treatment of the military decided upon by the government often relates to the types of control measures they wish to impose on the society. Conversely, the repression imposed upon the society is often related to what the government thinks it can expect out of the rank and file military (as well as the police) in situations where it is pushed into a confrontation with the population.

Given the above situation, this portion of the study will focus on a cross-section of military regimes that have different attitudes and modes of addressing questions of internal force and repression. Throughout this section, internal force will be examined in terms of how it is used to

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[1]See _Africa Report_ (May-June 1980), pp. 10-14.

impose control on the population and conditions under which it recedes or becomes stronger.

An additional focus of this section will be the effects that the increased use of force has had on the military itself. When a military is asked to engage in repressive action which might be seen by segments of the military as distasteful or involving anti-military interests, what effect does this have on the cohesiveness of the military and its ability to function as a fighting force?

Five countries were chosen for the study of force in African military regimes: Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Liberia, and Zaire. In general, the rationale for this selection is that each country represents a type of regime or includes relevant characteristics of regimes in Africa.

Nigeria is the most populous nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in military terms it must be counted as one of the strongest. On the other hand, this uniquely democratic country has recently experienced a major civil war and thirteen years of military rule. Nigeria is chosen for the study primarily for the importance of the nation to the continent and the scale and relevance of military-oriented conflict in the country.

Congo-Brazzaville was chosen primarily because it represents a Marxist-Leninist country that is simultaneously a military regime. In addition, Congo has had over ten years of military rule from which to observe consequences.

Uganda is interesting primarily, but not entirely, as the result of the impact of the Amin regime on both the military and society. What is of equal relevance is the lasting quality of that devastation on Uganda's current struggle to establish civil order.

Liberia was selected because of the interesting character of the Doe regime, both in terms of the value orientations of the leadership and the relevance to other military regimes which appear to grow out of mutinies.

Finally, Zaire was selected because of the repressive nature of the Mobutu regime and the unique inclination of the regime to let the military live off society as a marauding parasite. Additionally, Zaire is a major regional power, at least in terms of size and unexploited resources, if not in current military capabilities. The question of whether Mobutu's

loose hold on the military is responsible for Zaire's poor military performance has, of course, already been dealt with in this context.

In general, the discussion of the use of force in specific countries is organized according to certain basic issues:

o   The history of civil/military relations, including the impact of the coup.d'etat;

o   The inclination of the regime to use force to consolidate political power;

o   The condition of civil order, including the level of political culture;

o   The inclination of the regime to use the military for purposes of internal security, including military/police relations;

o   The condition of political and military authority in civil institutions, including problems of alienation, corruption, and indiscipline;

o   Military use of force in acts of repression and anti-regime force in meeting anarchy.

5.2   Nigeria

The inability of the Nigerian military regime to employ military force to consolidate political power was evident in the succession of coups in Nigeria, which removed one general after another by force. Generally, the impression gleaned from available material is that the military grew increasingly inclined to avoid the use of force by compromising as civilian rule became increasingly near. The hypothesis here is that alternative organs of internal security, i.e., the police, would be used when coercive tactics were necessary. Indeed, the impression one gets from reading available documents is that the military regime was particularly sensitive to the effects of a demobilizing military on the socio-economic fabric of the nation, especially before election time.[2]

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[2]See The New Nigerian (22 December 1978), p. 58, Daily Times (28 August 1978), p. 40, and The New Nigerian (7 March 1980), p. 24.

The condition of political and military authority has obviously im-
proved as manifestly validated in the elections of a civilian President in
1979. An important legacy of the military regime in this area is the fear
a civilian ruler might have of requesting support from the military if he
perceives he is losing his grip on political power. The practical effect
could be to make the civilian ruler more dependent on police coercion and
intelligence.[3] Alternatively, and this has not developed to great ex-
tent in Nigeria, is the tendency to move towards alternative sources of
coercion in para-military groups and politicized military organizations.

The recent history of Nigeria constitutes an interesting case study
of the failure of political authority and military discipline. Nigeria
indicates clearly that the intra-organizational dimension of military in-
stitutions can play a key role in Africa. It was the linkage of internal
military strains caused by the expansion of the officer corps and Niger-
ianization with conflicts on ethnic and regional lines that created a cri-
sis for the military regime of Major General Ironsi. The outcome was an
army divided from within, usurping the right to decide regional disputes
but ultimately only further fracturing the weak fabric of authority, both
in the military and, consequently, in the state.

A study of the Nigerian military during the crises of the mid-
sixties reveals that perceptions of legitimacy (i.e., the proper role of
the military in the political process) tend to differ not only according
to the orientations of the individual "perceivers" but equally important,
according to the historical period and the contingencies and uncertainties
of crisis. Although certain political orientations, such as loyalty to-
wards political aspirants may remain relatively constant, the perception
of what constitutes the primary political task can tend to shift radically
in a crisis. In the case of Nigeria, one sees a value shift by relevant
parts of the military, from an ideological orientation, the Major's coup
of January 1966, to a focus on redressing military grievances, the subse-
quent coup of July 1966. The shift from a politically motivated coup to a

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[3]This occurred in Uganda under civilian President Milton Obote as
the next subsection will describe.

concern with internal military affairs constitutes a change of values that
is extremely significant to the propensity for military mutiny and for
subsequent political stability. A sense of the chaos and initial legiti-
macy that greeted the Ironsi regime is obvious in journalistic commments
of the period.

> For a long time instead of settling down to minister
> unto the people's needs, the politicians were busy
> performing a series of seven day wonders as if the
> art of government was some circus show. John Citi-
> zen was not amused, but he was powerless; he was
> helpless. Indeed at one period it seemed as if the
> country had reached the famous last days about which
> Paul wrote to Timothus--the days when men became
> lovers of selves; covetous, proud without natural
> affection, trucebreakers, false accusers, fierce,
> despisers of all that are good, heady, high-
> minded... Today there is a new regime in the Feder-
> al Republic of Nigeria, a military regime, about
> time too![4]

It is clear from the above quote that influential editors and the
public were disillusioned with the former regime. This leadership. was
given what appears to have been a mandate to make necessary changes in the
political system. The question here is how did the military lose the con-
fidence of the people and what role did internal military factors play in
the political failure of military leadership.

The answer to the first question is that the military lost the con-
fidence of the people, primarily because it could not provide the neces-
sary leadership required of a political role. Military values and beliefs
did not merge effectively with the political tasks at hand. What was re-
quired was a leadership that could offer some compromise solutions to the
issues of regional separation which plagued the nation, and certain
decision-making approaches were required to re-integrate a badly fractured
authority structure. Neither Major General Ironsi nor his subordinate
officers or their successors were prepared by training or experience for

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[4]Daily Times (18 January 1966), quoted in Robin Luckham, The New
Nigerian Military (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 260.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

political leadership.   Instead, they were forced to apply the values of
Sandhurst, or for example, emphasis on honor, achievement, and discipline,
to an environmental reality of corruption, ascriptive status orientations,
and social chaos.   When the civil war with Biafra finally broke out, it
was the result of political indecision and drift.[5]   Obviously, the lega-
cy of intervention in political affairs and the inept leadership provided
by the military had a profoundly negative impact on the military and the
political system.   Thus, military authority, once it is tied to the poli-
tical process suffers the same kind of misfortune.   The interesting aspect
of this situation is that the military was totally unable to deal with the
events leading up to the Biafran succession by political means and had to
resort to force.

An assessment of the intra-organizational dimension of current mili-
tary life in Nigeria suggests that some of the conditions of anti-
authoritarian mutiny probably continue to exist.   For example, the psycho-
logical impact of observing the difficulties of disabled soldiers in gain-
ing compensation for national service could well be unsettling for troop
morale.[6]   On the other hand, a more recent report indicates some concern

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[5]On the civil war in Nigeria and the leadership of General Gowon,
see David D. Laitin and Drew A. Harkes, "Military Rule and National Seces-
sion: Nigeria and Ethiopia," in Morris Janowitz, ed., Civil-Military Rela-
tions: Regional Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications), pp. 258-
287, especially p. 270.   See Uphoff, op. cit.

[6]"Disabled Soldiers Protest Over Non-Payment of Compensation," The
Punch (10 March 1978).   Article by Tayo Kehinde, Ikeja, "One soldier, Cor-
poral Aisibiose Aigbekan, Aged 53, a veteran of World War II, told of his
treatment.   'In 1967, Gowon said all ex-servicemen should reenlist, so I
complied and was posted to the war front where I sustained this ghastly
injury.   I have since been made impotent, and to aggravate the situation,
I don't have a kobo to live on right now.'   ...an officer said: "The pay-
ment of gratuity takes time, we cannot do anything about their case unless
we get all the necessary papers...   Meanwhile, the protesting ex-soldiers
have threatened to march to Dodan Barracks to state their case before the
Chief of Staff..."

by the federal government to ensure the welfare and continued education of
the families of those who lost their lives in the Kano disturbances.[7]

A tentative impression here is that the authority structure in the
Nigerian military is still very shaky. This assessment is based primarily
on the fact that the military regime, before the return of civilian rule
under Shagari, indicated an obvious concern for problems of morale and
indiscipline and paid deference to military concerns in the construction
of new barracks and other welfare schemes. Even a casual perusal of the
press suggests that while problems continue to exist for the military, in
particular for those veterans of the large army created to fight the civil
war, there is considerable political and media attention addressed to
military concerns.[8] One newspaper report included a candid statement of
concern, such as the comments by then Chief of Army staff designate,
Major-General Alani Akinrinade:

> The first duty of any government, he said, was to
> survive and the only instrument at the disposal of
> government to ensure survival was the efficient po-
> lice, good government and a loyal and efficient army.
> So long as we are ready to be loyal and do our
> duty, we have nothing to fear. We even shall be
> better off if you consider that the best armies in
> the world are under civilian administration.

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[7]Lagos NAN (11 November 1981), JPRS (3 December 1981). See also the
report that Air Force Commanders have been directed to establish welfare
funds to enable troops to get loans. "Air Force Administrative Seminar
Discusses Problems," Daily Times (12 September 1979), p. 2, JPRS 2163 (12
October 1979). This report included an interesting comment by Air
Vice-Marshall Yisa Doko that the level of drug addiction in the Air Force
has been reduced considerably, which suggests a continuing concern for
this problem by the military's leadership.

[8]New Nigerian (7 March 1980), p. 24, article by Mustapha Tor Waya.
Also see Daily Times (16 December 1979), p. 32, article by Kunle Odufuwa.
"President Shagari expressed his hope that in the very near future, the
difficulties confronting the Armed Forces will all but disappear, leaving
you free to concentrate on serious training aimed at making you capable of
fulfilling your traditional role." For a typical speech of the morale
building type by the military leadership, see New Nigerian (7 July 1979),
p. 12, JPRS-SAR, 2138 (1 August 1979).

> He said that with a loyal and efficient army, he
> could always make a case with the President for a
> better deal for soldiers.
> He noted that the first nine years of military
> rule witnessed large scale corruption in the Army
> but added the last vestiges of fraudulent practices
> have been effectively eliminated by the decision to
> pay soldiers salaries through the banks.[9]

Clearly, the Nigerian military recognized both the disadvantages of remaining in power and the problems with excessive use of repression. This situation caused the Nigerians to turn from both, as will be indicated in the next chapter.

5.3   Congo-Brazzaville

Although Congo-Brazzaville was the first Marxist-Leninist state in Africa, political events have been very much a function of military institutions.[10] Congo's armed forces originated in 1962 when a force of 700 men was established with indigenous troops from France's colonial forces. The armed forces in early 1970 numbered 3,400 men: The National People's Army (Armee Populaire Nationale-APN) of about 2,000 men with its small integral navy and air force, and the independent National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), which numbered about 1,400. Although lightly armed and equipped, the gendarmerie possessed a substantial para-military capability and played an important role in maintaining internal security." Indeed, a major consequence of military rule in the Congo was the control and containment of radical militants bent on the revolutionary transformation of state and society. In general, the relationship between

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[9]"New Army Chief of Staff Discusses Role of Military," _Daily Times_ (28 September 1979), p. 1.

[10]Decalo, op. cit., p. 123.

the military and radical militants has been a major dimension of political
and military development since the emergence of the MNR.

As the urban capital of the French empire in Africa, Brazzaville
developed a large economic infrastructure of laborers, artisans, crafts-
men, and numerous poor. Many of the young were disadvantaged and rootless
who had moved out of rural poverty with expectations for a better life.
Many of these joined radical labor unions and became influenced by the
ideology of "Scientific Socialism."

In the political crisis of August 1963, Fulbert Youlou was dislodged
from the Presidency after three days of strikes and demonstrations. The
army moved at this point to transfer power to Missemba-Debat, a school
teacher by vocation and a socialist--the choice of the Union. A major
impact of this regime was to introduce politics into the military and
other civil institutions. This had the effect of expanding the expecta-
tions and ambitions of a new bureaucratic group of youth and unionists.[11]

Because of the large numbers of unemployed and politicized youth,
roving bands of unruly "committees of vigilance" began to terrorize the
country in the name of revolution under the auspices of the MNR.[12] In
1966, when the MNR attempted to create a paramilitary organization from
the youth wing of the MNR, the JMNR, the military perceived it as a direct
threat and revolted. Thus, in this instance, the Congo army reacted to a
regime policy--with force, but it was not necessarily inclined in the ear-
ly stages to usurp political power.

The inclination of the regime to use force was clear in the events
leading up to the attempt to penetrate the army with political ideology,
cadres, and ultimately, to transform it into a people's force.[13] JMNR
radicals had been involved in coercive acts "on behalf of the revolution"

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[11] Ibid, p. 141.

[12] MNR refers to "Movement National de la Revolution"; JMNR is the
youth organization of MNR; "Jeunesse du."

[13] Ibid, p. 148.

since 1963, and their physical harrassment led to the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville.

Although the JMNR did not have close relations with the Massemba-Debat regime, it did constitute an increasingly important alternate source of force as the army grew increasingly autonomous and mutinous.[14]   Several times the size of the regular armed forces, with an elite special unit trained by Cubans (the Civil Defense Corps), the JMNR grew increasingly audacious.[15]

The gradual assumption of internal security functions by the JMNR directly affected the role and status of the gendarmerie and exasperated the army's officer corps, which was jealous of its position as defender of the state and revolution. However, as Decalo points out, the more conservative members of the officer corps were inclined to view the JMNR as radical hooligans who would prevent a move away from socialism.

In June 1966, the MNR announced that the army would be transformed into a "People's Army" with a political directorate and under a collegial command.

Although the army had been a source of some rumored and actual opposition to the regime, the clash with the MNR developed over a particular grievance: the demotion of Kouyou Captain Mariln Ngouabi. The reaction of his troops was to chase the Politburo and the cabinet of the MNR to the municipal sports stadium where the Cuban-led Civil Defense Corps protected them. After the restoration of Ngouabi's status, the incident ended, but Ngouabi was then established as a political force and a potential threat.

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[14]Ibid, p. 142.

[15]See Morris Janowitz, _Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations_ (Chicago and London, 1977), pp. 70-73. The author asserts that "available data indicate that in the developing nations there has been a dramatic increase in the size of agencies of internal coercion, especially the paramilitary units. This trend has been conspicuous from 1965 to 1975. There is every reason to believe that the increase in size has in general been accompanied by greater effectiveness of these coercive units," p. 70. The experience of Congo-Brazzaville doesn't indicate that greater size produces proportionately more coercive power. In this context, the ease with which Ngouabi's stalwarts in the army chased the JMNR towards the stadium is not impressive.

Although Ngouabi was appointed the Commander of Brazzaville's paracommando battalion, he was not content to acquiesce to total control of the army by politicians. When Massemba-Debat had him arrested by the gendarmarie in a purge of suspected plotters, his loyal supporters in the army freed him. Ngouabi, after a short interval in which Massemba-Debat returned to rule and, prior to the military defeat of the JMNR, shunned any formal office. By January 1969, however, he had become the head of state.

The immediate task of Ngouabi was to survive amidst the numerous plots hatched against his regime, and allegations and trials of senior military officers were carried out in 1969. The growing opposition, indiscipline, and low morale in the armed forces led to the integration of all para-military units into the Congolese National Army. According to Decalo, this had the effect of providing unfettered ideological access to the militants of the JMNR. In addition, the integration included the gendarmerie and the police, which were structurally subordinated to the army. The subordination of hari (southern clan) to non-Bakongo military officers created new morale problems which cost the regime support.

The inclination of the regime to use force to consolidate political power was manifest in the army intervention in the student strikes in November 1971. In the process of occupying the schools over twenty students were killed. This incident illustrates why it is helpful to view the action, i.e., the use of force, in the historical context. The military in this event was probably acting as the gendarmerie, because that organization had been formally integrated into army zones of organization and was undoubtedly alienated as a result of the status demotion.[16] But Ngouabi was not inclined to favor the paramilitary, and the creation of a people's militia to replace the gendarmerie was a setback for him.[17]

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[16]See the section on the police system in the Area Handbook for the Congo (Brazzaville), op. cit., pp. 210-12.

[17]Ibid, p. 213.

As a result of the student strike, Ngouabi launched a purge of the party with policy rationale such as "ideological deficiency," "witch-craft," and "degeneration." As Decalo notes:

> ...the dividing lines were not really on a left-right axis; rather this was Ngouabi's settling of accounts with his opposition.[18]

This is another illustration of Ngouabi's willingness to use the military to force politial action, although the violence involved in the confronta-tion with the students was clearly incidental.

On February 22, 1972, the regime underwent a brilliant coup attempt by Lieutenant Diawara that failed only because the Chief of Staff managed to narrowly avoid arrest and crush the rebellion. The attempt served to indicate to an exasperated Ngouabi that his hold over the military was still a precarious one. After another attempted coup, Ngouabi announced the dismantling of the police and the assimilation of police duties by the military. Throughout the early 70's the regime was compelled to make limited purges and arrests and to continually rotate command personnel in the armed forces to inhibit the formation of loyalty cliques and factions inimical to Ngouabi's position.[19] Because of the continuing presence of factionalism and threats to the regime, Ngouabi was unable to create a new political order or peace.[20]

In the context of the preceding discussion, an observation on the unsanctioned use of force is that once the fabric of authority is broken in an initial coup effort, the issue of legitimacy appears to fall quickly aside and power becomes the bone of contention. The impression is clear that the Major Kikanga's and the Lieutenant Diwara's are mainly concerned with grasping and holding power. This, if true, testifies to the frag-mented authority in the Congo military, and this process of fragmentation

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[18]Decalo, op. cit., p. 165.

[19]See "Army 'Purges' 23 Officers-Comerade Sassou N'Guesso This Morn-ing Signed a Decree Purging Some Officers from the Popular Naboval Army," AB271425, Brazzaville Domestic Service (French) 1245 GMT (27 October 1979).

[20]Decalo, op. cit., p. 168.

appears to occur after a bitter struggle for political authority in the coup.

In this context, the assassination of President Marien Ngouabi should be seen as part of the continuing struggle for authority between the party and the military, with the Party winning the latest round. According to the new President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, differences in the Military Committee of the Party (CMP) over the role of the party resulted in a restoration of the party's status and power in the revolution. It is clear that the army's role as the leading institution in Congo-Brazzaville was intimately linked to the career of former President Marien Ngouabi.[21]

5.4 Uganda

Uganda under Amin represents the height of savagery in a militarily controlled regime. The tragic scale of repression in Uganda illustrates the potential for a complete breakdown of the socio-political system as a consequence of military tyranny, for what occurred in Uganda was nothing less than the unleashing of the army on the society. It should be noted, however, that Amin did not begin the process of repression in Uganda. Rather, Amin built upon a process already established by his civilian predecessor, President Milton Obote (who eventually returned to rule Uganda after Amin was deposed).

When Milton Obote attempted to consolidate the power of the Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) in 1964 through the use of referendums, the fragile and anachronistic alliance with the traditional monarchists was broken.[22] This electoral threat to the balance of political power precipitated a crisis that involved an investigation of an alleged scandal implicating Obote, resulting in his crackdown on actual and perceived opposition to the regime. At this point Obote launched a program to transform

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[21]See _Africa Report_ (May-June 1980), p. 8.

[22]This account relies heavily on Samuel Decalo, _Coups and Army Rule in Africa_ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 195-201.

the UPC into a mass-based party that would not be linked to local and tribal interests.[23] Many of the politicians of the old order were brutally swept aside in the process of transformation, and pressures on the regime increased as former supporters swelled the ranks of opposition.

To deal with the increasing level of political pressure, Obote's regime moved consistently toward more coercive tactics.[24] The media and other focal points of dissent were subjected to repressive tactics in order to silence and harrass opponents of the regime. After an attempted assassination of Obote in 1969, the regime moved sharply to the political left, at least in terms of ideological orientations and Uganda appeared to be on the verge of revolutionary change.

Two elite units were then created by the Obote political leadership, the Special Forces and the general services, as paramilitary organizations designed to facilitate political control over dissident groups and to ensure sources of loyal support to Obote. The presence of these groups was clearly resented by the Ugandan Army under General Idi Amin, because they provided an extra-military source of force and indicated a tacit awareness of the military's potential lack of loyalty and the ambitions of it's leadership.[25] As the pressure on the regime mounted in conflicts between regional, ethnic, ideological, and personal interests, the willingness of Obote to ignore legal niceties increased drastically. When

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[23]Although James H. Mittleman refers to this move by Obote as an attempt to introduce socialism, others disagree. See James H. Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). Commenting on the Mittelman book, Professor F. V. Ravenhill of U.C. Berkeley regards it as merely an "ideology of mobilization," which implies a system of rhetoric. See the review in Journal of Modern African Studies, (1976), p. 726.

[24]The African scholar, Ali A. Mazrui does not appear to agree with the picture of Obote's regime. See Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Enthnocracy (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 17. However, the tone of Mazrui's argument suggests a possible problem of bias in favor of Obote. See also Decalo, op. cit., p. 197.

[25]This type of problem has already been discussed to some extent in Section 3.7.

several non-UPC parliamentarians were arrested in 1966, it seems in retrospect, that Obote was willing to risk the whole constitutional bases of his authority.

The legacy of Uganda's history of civil-military relations suggests that the miltary had become highly politicized since its beginning as a small group of indigenous veterans of the British Colonial Army. The actual coup itself was probably motivated by a complex of factors, not least of which was the personality of General Amin. But it should be emphasized that the nation-state of Uganda was continually weakened by a crisis of authority reflected in the Bugandian-legislative attempt to investigate the President, Milton Obote, the coercive nature of his suppression of the investigation, the subsequent military campaign against the Baganda power center, and the political measures the President enacted to revolutionize the country.[26] By January 1965, Amin had already consolidated enough personal power to become a threat:

> In certain circumstances, the army may begin itself
> to take on the cover of an impugning group, which is
> looking for the best bargain. Amin, when as deputy
> commander, led a party of the Uganda Army to aid the
> Congolese rebels in January 1965, had the support of
> an 'inner ring' of ministers and the faction in the
> army, without committing the state to war. The es-
> tablished procedures open for promotion and for
> maintaining discipline are transformed if this de-
> gree of politicization comes about.[27]

The politics of Idi Amin are summarized in terms of power, force, and violence, although it is fairly clear that for some of his followers, especially those from his ethnic background and military barracks, his charismatic authority was real. Furthermore, the giant field marshal had a playful and simple side that betrayed his rustic background. But Amin's

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[26]Ali A. Mazrui asserts that it became necessary at this point for the politicians to seek the support of the security forces, and that a reconciliation between military and civilian sectors had become critical, op. cit., p. 17.

[27]J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 73.

instincts for power and his inclination to use force are all too clear.
In spite of his idiosyncrasies, the fact remains that he supervised thou-
sands of deaths, whether at his own hands as in the case of a few, or by
the death squad units of the military or in the torture chamber of the
so-called State Research Bureau. Some of the horror of the complete
absence of civil order is reflected in reports of the time:

> The corpses of over 120 Ugandan soldiers killed in
> Uganda on the orders of Dictator Idi Amin and over-
> thrown into Tanzanian territory have been discovered
> in the area of Kakindu Hill, north of the Kagera
> River...[28]

Perhaps the severity of the Amin regime can never be known to those
who have not experienced a total breakdown of civil order and political
culture. Indeed, the paucity of civil order has still not been resolved
in Uganda:

> Nobody ever really feels safe in Uganda. The prob-
> lem is that a lot of the danger comes from the se-
> curity forces that the government is supposed to
> control. It is not just the soldiers who extort
> money from hapless travelers at roadblocks. Pitched
> battles occur between the army and the police in
> which mortars and recoilless rifles are used to pre-
> vent stolen vehicles from being returned to their
> rightful owners. There have also been massacres,
> some of which are known about, others hushed up.
> On October 18th, according to Red Cross workers, 162
> villagers were murdered by soldiers at Kasese in the
> Western region. The soldiers, from barracks in Fort
> Portal, went on the rampage, looting homes and kil-
> ling indiscriminately. The dead included women and
> children. There was never any question of this
> being an anti-guerrilla action. Reports reaching
> Kampala this week tell of more atrocities in the
> same general area. A Roman Catholic mission 50
> miles northwest of Kampala at Bukalammuli has given
> sanctuary to 3,000 villagers driven out of their
> homes by soldiers.[29]

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[28]"Uganda Soldiers Killed by Amin Found in Tanzania" Dar es Salaam
Domestic Service JPRS, (23 November 1978). Obviously, this report is sub-
ject to the charge of bias due to its Tanzanian origin. However, it
serves to exemplify the numerous charges of mass brutality against the
military as well as inflicted by them.

[29]The Economist (November 21, 1981), p. 42.

This quote serves to illustrate in vivid detail the fact that issues concerning internal security, the condition of political authority, and the inclination to use military force are essentially irrelevant or moot in the case of Uganda. It is clear that:

(1) The civil order of Uganda is nearly absent and will require concerted efforts by authorities, including the military and police, to re-establish it;

(2) The condition of political authority is similarly in need of new constitutional beginnings. However, the presence of a former leader, such as Milton Obote, could help to integrate the positive legacy of the past, i.e., at the very least the Obote regime made some reference to the need for mass participation.

On a psychological level, there may have been a certain commonality between the inclination of Amin to personally violate every norm of decent behavior and the lawlessness he seemed to invite and receive from his men toward every authority except his own. Indeed, Amin seemed to appreciate the need to allow soldiers the opportunity to act out their frustrations through violence, and his men appeared to understand implicitly that "Big Daddy" approved of their rampaging. But charisma is very vulnerable to humiliation and it was difficult for Amin to survive the challenges to the authority in civil conflict.

Amin's flagrant violation of the traditional norms of authority, both in terms of the destruction he unleashed on the remnants of the previous regime after the coup and in the political and arbitrary style of his military leadership, had the effect of threatening all but his most loyal followers. This intimidation and resentment was heightened as it became obvious that Amin intended to build up a personal fiefdom of an army of stalwart loyalists with similar ethnic ties. At the same time he established a palace guard of Palestinians, protectors and security police who could order the elimination of any potential threat by killing off suspected opposition.

Regardless of the murderous and repressive tactics imposed by the regime, the military suffered revolt. The Matire Mechanized Regiment led

of British generals because he overthrew a constitu-
tional authority by force of arms. It was painful,
therefore, to come to the conclusion that the coup
was necessary to save our country and our people.

The aim of the unconstitutional military action we
took is to...create the conditions and atmosphere in
which true democracy can thrive. This is our de-
fence.[2]

These attitudes are typical of those expressed by military officers
in both Ghana and Nigeria upon the occasion of their respective military
coups. The military action against civilian government is justified by
reference to the inability of civilian politicians to overcome a crisis
situation (in Ghana of a largely economic nature, and in Nigeria of a
political nature), and the purpose of military rule is defined as provi-
sion of proper management of certain basic problems so as to prepare the
way for effective civilian government.[3] Observing this phenomenon, one
authority has labeled the form of military rule experienced in Ghana and
Nigeria as "corrective government." He notes that the Nigerian "of-
ficers had a clear view of their role as trustees of the body politic,"
and that "there was a general civilian expectation that the military would
fulfill an ameliorative role of a limited duration for the sake of an im-
proved civilian polity."[4]

It is important to be clear about the significance of these atti-
tudes, or aspects of professional military ideology, in respect to the
behavior of the military as a governing authority, and particularly in
relation to the phenomenon of military withdrawal from power. It would be

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[2]Afrifa, op. cit., pp. 37 and 124.

[3]For a good example of this attitude, see remarks by Nigerian Major
General Garba as cited in New Nigerian (September 13, 1978), p. 3.

[4]M. J. Dent, "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective,"
in K. Panter-Brick, ed., Soldiers and Oil (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p.
101.

militaries, of seizing the governance role. Thus illuminating the pattern of these similarities can sensitize us to the circumstances under which a governing military is likely to withdraw from power, and can inform us about the consequences of military rule for the African militaries themselves. The withdrawal from power of Ghanaian and Nigerian militaries can be viewed as a consequence of four related, but distinguishable, factors.

6.1   Professional Ideology

The militaries of African countries are direct descendants of colonial rule. In anglophone countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, this means that their military organization was designed by the British; that many of the older officers served in the British colonial army; and that many of the younger and best members of the officer corp. received their officer training at military schools in the U.K., particularly at the elite Sandhurst Academy. Consequently, much of the values and norms that constitute the professional ideology of the British military have been transferred to African military organizations. One of the cardinal norms of that British military tradition and ideology is that the military ought to be politically neutral, and at all times subordinated to civilian political authority. The public statements and writings of military officers in anglophone African countries make abundantly clear that this norm of civilian supremacy became part of the ideology of the new African military organizations. These African officers believe that, although justified by extraordinary circumstances, the seizure and holding of political power by the military is unfortunate and abnormal. Thus, General A. A. Afrifa, one of the leaders of the 1966 coup that overthrew the government of Kwame Nkrumah and for a time head of the military council that ruled until 1969, writes in the following vein about the seizure of power by Ghana's military:

> I have always felt it painful to associate myself
> with a coup to overthrow a constitutional govern-
> ment, however perverted that constitution may be.
> Oliver Cromwell was a good general, but he did not
> take his rightful place in the glorious gallery

VI. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
RETURN OF CIVILIAN RULE

The vast majority of literature dealing with the armed forces and politics in general, and the African military politics in particular, is concerned with the phenomenon of military intervention in civilian rule. The removal of civilian politicians and the destruction of "constitution-ally" based government by that organized force in society with a preponderance of armed violence has been a major concern of observers of African society and politics.[1] Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa provides us with cases of this process in reverse, i.e., of military regimes voluntarily "returning to the barracks," having prepared the way for a civilian government through creation of a new constitution and organization of fair and open elections. Twice in Ghana (1969 and 1979) and once in Nigeria (1979), military governments voluntarily relinquished the reins of power to civilian regimes. In all three instances the transition to civilian rule involved a process of constitution writing, supervised by the military government, and the holding of competitive elections organized and implemented by the outgoing military authorities.

An explanation of these instances of military "withdrawal" from power is both interesting and important. It is interesting because the phenomenon represents an extraordinary anomaly. Why should a group whose control of armed force gives it the apparent ability to remain in control of government voluntarily relinquish that control and the social, economic, and psychological benefits that accrue from it? The exploration of the Ghanaian and Nigerian cases of military withdrawal is important because certain similarities reflected in all three instances reveal aspects of the nature of African militaries, as well as the consequences for those

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[1] The two most well known examples of this are First, op. cit.; and DeCalo, op. cit.

5.7   Summary

The above situations illustrate that there are a number of different ways by which the population can be controlled. Some of these ways make it all too clear that the military government considers maintaining itself in power as its first priority. Demoralizing its own ranks and brutally oppressing its own people are sometimes considered perfectly acceptable ways of meeting this goal. There are, however, situations in which the military is willing to turn from repression and in some cases even return power to civilian leadership. A discussion of this phenomenon will shed further light on the concept of military repression since the two options represent alternative ways of dealing with society. The conditions under which the military will return power to civilians is correspondingly examined in the next section.

may be, are making life hard for the people and com-
promising with the agents of subversion...[53]

It is patently obvious that Zaire is experiencing severe problems of
political consolidation and integration, and this appears to be a reflec-
tion of an underlying crisis of authority for the Mobutu regime. In the
army, the condition of command authority is probably dependent on the
status of the unit leadership vis-a-vis the regime as material rewards for
service appear to be increasingly victimized by corruption and internecine
rivalry. In addition, the development of the rebellion in Shaba province
and the proliferation of guerrilla insurgent and exile opposition groups
can be expected to further divide and demoralize the military as the
chances for fighting increase in civil war. The most recent instance of
mutiny involved disturbances at the military base at Kitwit in the Ban-
dungo Province where non-commissioned officers rebelled against poor pay,
miserable food, and what they regarded as the unjustified promotion of
officers from the Equatorial Province, Mobutu's home district.[54]

The use of force by the Mobutu regime is endemic to the political
military system he has established, and its proliferation is proportional
to the lack of political authority. There is no question that the state
of Zaire is one of the most repressive in Africa. Journalist reports are
replete with examples of the intimidation of the clergy, a brutal system
of political detention, and a military that is responsible for several
incidents of massacre against the civilian population.[55]

Indeed, the desperation with which Mobutu has confronted the politi-
cal and military threats to his regime is reflected in his willingness to
utilize foreign advisors to reorganize his army. Not surprisingly, the
task of reorganization will begin with the presidential brigade.

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[53]Elima (28 February 1979), pp. 1, 7.

[54]See Expresso (20 May 1978), p. 8, JPRS (3 April 1979), p. 93;
Special (15 February 1979), p. 19, JPRS (3 April 1979), p. 107.

[55]New Nigerian (15 March 1982), p. 5, JPRS (22 April 1982), p. 122;
Le Monde (14-15 March 1982), p. 4, (10 November 1979), p. 42; West Africa
(24 March 1980), p. 549, (17 December 1979), p. 2355.

Mobutu's military has itself been a particularly troublesome source of political instability, corruption, and civil disorder. There is no doubt that civil order in many areas is practically non-existent and that the political culture, i.e., the attitude of the population towards the regime and their concept of public participation in politics, is abysmally low. In addition, there is no question that the regime routinely employs the military for purposes of internal security. There is also little doubt that the situation gets out of control.

> The 4,000 soldiers in Kitona garrison on the low-
> er Congo River had waited 5 months for their pay.
> Finally their frustration boiled over. Mutinous
> soldiers went to their officer's quarters and broke
> their windows. The brigade commander and his staff
> escaped to the city. Two lieutenants and a sergeant
> caught by the mutinous were shot.
>   General Mobutu Sese Seko's armed forces have al-
> ways been known to be a sorry lot, but recently they
> have become a veritable scourge. The 40,000 man
> army acts like an occupation force in its own coun-
> try. Inasmuch as their pay seems to evaporate on
> the long road from the Defense Ministry to the bar-
> racks, the soldiers live off the civilian popula-
> tion. Zaire has not been this close to anarchy
> since the mid-1960's, when marauding troops plunged
> the giant Congolese empire into chaos.[51]

The relationship between the military, the police, and society are not clear, primarily because it is a sensitive political issue. However, signs of strain have appeared in the form of reorganizations of relevant bureaucratic structures, official communiques on corruption, and special extraordinary efforts to achieve more political control of the popula- tion.[52] The latter case refers to civil defense committees:

> ...permanent teams the role of which will be to in-
> form the authorities about life in the local neigh-
> borhoods, subcells, cells and zones of the capital
> and to report all those who, on whatever level they

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[51]Cited in _Tagesspiegel_ (17 February 1979), p. 3.

[52]Cited in _Elima_ (23-27 April 1980).

1964 and in 1966 delayed the reestablishment of civil order. A major improvement occurred in July 1966 with the enactment of laws that nationalized all existing police, standardized their equipment and organization, and centralized their control under the Ministry of the Interior.[48]

In August 1981, the National Security Council and the Supreme Defence Council of Zaire convened to discuss the security situation. As a result, for the first time since 1965, the Army assumed an alert status and occupied positions at sensitive locations around the capital city of Kinshasa.[49] Simultaneously, the government of Zaire came under severe attacks from the Roman Catholic Church, accusing authorities of "kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, settling of scores and even torture." The Archbishop of Kinshasa, Cardinal Malula, was reportedly arrested, and sermons were checked for political content by the youth section of the ruling Popular Movement for the Revolution (MPR). This pattern of severe internal threats to the regime, coupled with strong coercive measures against dissidence has continued to the present.

The regime of General Joseph Mobutu has been under heavy pressure from its inception. However, through political maneuverability of the elites, i.e., a circulation of elites by force, and an effective coercive security apparatus, the regime manages to survive.[50] Nevertheless, there is no question that the main political task of the regime is to simply survive. Indeed, the difficulty of merely surviving in a country that is wracked by constant social unrest is manifested in the conflicts inside the government, the military, and the police. Cabinets are constantly being reshuffled, the military is always in a state of unrest, if not mutiny, and the police are constantly investigating corruption-rampant bureaucracies.

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[48]Ibid, p. 486.

[49]West Africa, No. 3353 (2 November 1981), p. 2612.

[50]For an example of such promotional maneuvering, see Afrique Defense, No. 42 (September 1981), p. 21.

Publique, which combined the functions of a police force and an army and was historically responsible for opening up the country and maintaining control.[45]

In 1960, the ANC Congolese National Army (Armee Nationale Congolaise) was considered one of the best trained and disciplined armies in Central Africa. However, on July 6, 1960, a mutiny broke out among troops at Thysville that eventually involved the entire army. The issues concerned particular demands involving better pay, the indigenization of the officer corps, more liberal promotion policies, and assumption of command positions by former non-commissioned officers.[46]

This indiscipline and lack of control resulted in a fracturing of the ANC into regional and political units, and several secessionist movements developed as a consequence in Kasai, Orientale, and Katanga.[47] Although secessions in Kasai and Orientale were checked relatively soon, the Katanga conflict was not ended until UN troops were employed in January 1963. In mid-1966, the Katanganese gendarmeres mutinied over fair treatment and discrimination grievances. This outbreak resulted in a defeat for the Katanganese in September, but a mercenary-led group of Kataganese rebelled against the government in the northeast. They were forced eventually to withdraw to Rwanda.

Because of the stability imposed by the introduction of UN troops, the central government was able to gradually improve its security and military forces. Training, rehabilitation programs, and foreign technical aid facilitated the rebuilding effort. However, revolts and disorders in

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[45]Ibid, p. 502.

[47]A similiar breakdown occurred in the gendarmerie and the Territorial Police with the departure of the experienced Belgian officer corps. Discipline and control were lost, and the result was a general breakdown in security and order. Police personnel were recruited into the various armed groups organized by dissident regional leaders, and central government authority was almost completely nonexistent in many areas. Ibid, p. 485.

[46]Ibid, p. 504.

Congo had experienced years of civil conflict and institutional upheaval, including a secessionist movement in Katanga and the assassination of the first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. In 1964, Joseph Mobutu established a military regime to replace the government under President Kasavubu.

Following the assumption of authority by General Mobutu, Commander in Chief of the Congolese National Army, the government was consolidated around the office of the Presidency and the office of Prime Minister was eliminated.[43] In order to contain political factionalism, the President neutralized all political parties in 1965; and in April 1967, a single political party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (Movement Populaire de la Revolution-MPR), was created.[44] The portfolio for national defense and control of the security police was assumed by the President. At the same time, the mechanism of the executive decree was given the force of law, which effectively undercut the authority and status of Parliament.

Since late 1965, the Mobutu regime has been confronted by several political, military, and economic challenges to its authority. An attempted coup by former Congolese officials was suppressed in 1966. In mid-1967, a major rebellion erupted when units of the national army and mercenaries attempted unsuccessfully to force the fall of the national government. In 1966 the government nationalized the Belgian Mining Company of Upper Katanga (Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga-UMHK) because of company resistance to government demands. This dispute was finally settled in 1969 when an agreement on indemnification was reached.

The armed forces of Zaire constitute one of the largest military establishments in Sub-Saharan Africa, and, as in other parts of the region, important political functions of internal order are assigned to it. The development of the armed forces is largely a history of the Force

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[43]Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasha), 1971, (Washington, D.C.: American University, p. 224).

[44]Ibid.

interests (the coup-rebellion), then Doe's regime appears to be both. Although Doe is himself apparently somewhat of an ascetic and a soldier in the Spartan sense, his ruling clique is probably less nobly motivated. It is beyond argument, however, that Doe is politically ambitious. The point of relevance is not simply a theoretical "byproduct." If the attributes of mutiny/coups, i.e., whether they are motivated by greed, lust, or ideology can be identified, it might help to explain what tasks they will set for themselves in power and how they will behave in the process.

Liberia's mutiny-coup was at least generally motivated by the undercurrent of ethnic tension and the organizational strain caused by economic poverty, growing unemployment, and an army of the bored, malcontent, and adventurous. Regardless of whether the motives were particular at the moment of action, they are political now.

5.6   Zaire

Zaire, formerly known as the Belgian Congo, is the second largest of the Sub-Saharan nations. Since the military coup of 1965, Zaire has been ruled by Lt. Gen. Sese Seko Kubeu Ngbendu Wa Za Banga (Joseph Desire) Mobutu).

Zaire's economy is basically sound. It produces enough agriculture for exportation, and it enjoys great natural wealth in mineral resources. Zaire has the economic potential to dominate central Africa.[42]

In June 1960, President Joseph Kasavubu requested UN intervention to check factionalism, tribalism and to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. By the time of the withdrawal of the UN troops in 1964, the

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[42]See L'Union (24-27 December 1981) JPRS, p. 5. Also see Sub-Saharan African Report 2570 (16 February 1982), p. 77. Recent reports indicate that Zaire's economy is not in good shape. This is largely due to the fact of huge amounts of indebtedness to foreign banks. See reports that Zaire is on the verge of bankruptcy, The Middle East (July 1982), p. 13. See also the report that, circa 1979, Zaire could not afford to pay the interest on the national debt of $3.5 billion, Tagesspiegel (17 February 1979), p. 3 in JPRS, SSAR 2090 (17 April 1979), p. 87.

> ...the showing of half decomposed bodies and their
> public burial in a common grave, summary executions
> of dignitaries belonging to the old regime in the
> presence of a crowd that applauded and undoubtedly
> reassured itself.[39]

The military regime is inclined to share the responsibility of internal security. However, Sergeant Doe gives evidence that his trust in the loyalty of the police is not blind, and thus Doe indicated the need to cooperate with security services:

> Master Sergeant Doe expressed the importance of one-
> ness between the police and soldiers in this revolu-
> tion and pointed out that it is for this reason that
> he increased their salaries shortly after taking
> over the reigns of office.[40]

Doe's deference to police cooperation and welfare suggests that the police constitute a potential nexus of conflict. As mentioned above, conflict between and within organizations could constitute a permissive cause or a framework around which political opposition could coalesce. In the same vain, symptoms of corruption and other malfeasance could be be manifestations of pyschological and organizational strain.[41] The point here is not to explore all the conceivable or empirically possible causes of anti-authoritarian behavior. That task is probably impossible. Rather the idea here is to suggest implicitly that the authoritarian use of force, i.e., by threat or by violence, can have latent consequences, such as the establishment of a functional opposition: the creation in the bureaucracies under attack of professional opponents to other bureaucracies as well as the regime.

The Doe regime is itself an act of mutiny and coup d'etat. If one's definition of mutiny hangs on the degree of particularism versus political

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[39]Cited in _Le Monde_ (29 April 1980), p. 97.

[40]Cited in _The Redeemer_ (16 May 1980), p. 5.

[41]Ibid. See also "Army Neglected Police," _New Nigerian_ (26 August 1980), p. 9.

1,750.[36]   Reportedly some indiscipline existed among soldiers after the coup and one soldier was reprimanded for harrassing the public.   Four Liberians were executed for looting after the coup.[37]

Arrests after the coup included General Kelaka and seven senior officers, and trial was to commence on 6 July on charges of mutiny.   Typical of the instability and turbulence of the time, the chairman of the Tribunal was arrested before the trial began.   In an arbitrary and arrogant action, soldiers invaded the French Embassy and arrested the A.B. Tolbert, son of the deposed and deceased President.

It is clear from this summary that the Liberian revolutionary regime under Doe is inclined to use force to consolidate political power.   Although the level of political culture, as measured by attitudes toward political participation, is fairly low, it is likely to be rising with the expectations attendant to a revolutionary regime.   The level of civil order is not clear, primarily because the turmoil of the Sergeant's revolution does not appear to have lifted.   Doe's propensity to invoke strong coercive measures against crime will probably check the rapid growth of crime, but his equal tendency towards irresponsible political decisions could have dire results for the economy, (i.e., his promise of civil order and to double the wages of soldiers and civil servants after the coup).[38]

In an effort to restore law and order, Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo announced the freeing of sixty prisoners and listed the names of 130 people involved in crimes under the old regime.   At the People's Council of Redemption there was apparent concern for the looting, and public executions were meant to frighten:

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[36]Africa Contemporary Record, op. cit., p. B529.

[37]"Members of Military Anxious to Consolidate Power," West Africa (9 June 1980), pp. 1005-1009.

[38]On the other hand, Doe has appeared responsible in certain economic forums.   See West Africa (1 September 1980), p. 1639.   Interestingly, the report indicated parenthetically that Doe had made no reference to a return to civilian rule.   He also remonstrated against those soldiers who were, without authority, occupying private homes, p. 1640.

the ruling clique were executed after public trials. Unfortunately for
Liberia, the coercion did not end with the coup. When dock workers struck
against the mandatory purchase of government bonds, their leaders were
arrested and hundreds were threatened with dismissal. In addition, the
ruling elite has indicated a predeliction for capricious and punitive mea-
sures, such as locking students up for arguing and beating bodyguards who
would not obey an order to evict tenants.[33] In general terms, Doe's
administration of justice has recently assumed a dual role: simultaneous-
ly condemnatory and forgiving. Doe recently executed four ranking offi-
cers of the armed forces, convicted of waylaying a military pay team and
killing three other army officers.[34] On the other hand, Doe declared an
executive clemency for five students convicted of treason, who were sen-
tenced to be executed.[35] Although it is not entirely clear why Doe was
magnanimous in this instance, it is fairly obvious that the executions
would have unleashed a considerable social protest.

As he assumed power in 1971, President Tolbert abolished the repres-
sive tactics of the previous regime and emphasized the importance of free
speech. The Easter riots of 1979, in which 40 people lost their lives,
horrified the country and, significantly, the army refused to fire on the
people. The police did not. When Tolbert ordered the arrest of the lead-
ers of the political opposition (PPP), approximately 90 activists were
jailed for violating a ban on political meetings. A few days later the
coup commenced to initiate major changes in Liberia's political system.

In early 1980 Liberia had an army of 5,130 which was increased to
8,000 by the end of the year. All security and paramilitary forces (7,600
in 1979) were dissolved in April 1980 and replaced by a new paramilitary
force of police and immigration forces, which were merged and now number

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[33]The Economist (March 7, 1981).

[34]Africa, (March 1982), p. 32.

[35]Ibid.

by the Christian, Brigadier General Charles Arube, a former Chief of
Staff, was crushed by Nubian troops with 500 casualties. According to
Decalo this event tended to mark the end of Amin's ethnic support, with
Kakwa troops joining in the rebellion.[30]   By the time of the Tanzanian
invasion of Uganda, Amin had either eliminated, alienated, or oppressed
most of the nation and, indeed, his own bases of support.

5.5   Liberia

Originally established as a refuge for American slaves, Liberia was
dominated for years by a small Americo-Liberian elite. Most of the popu-
lation adhere to traditional customs and religions, and the people of Li-
beria come from 16 different tribes.

The Liberian economy is based on three primary products: iron ore,
rubber, and timber. Most of the population is involved in agricultural
efforts with rubber, coffee, cocoa, and timber playing economic roles.

Former President William Richard Tolbert, Jr., inherited two politi-
cal principles from his immediate predecessor, William V. S. Tubman: uni-
fication of the country by integrating Americo-Liberian and tribal groups
and opening the country to foreign economic investment.[31]   Former Presi-
dent Tolbert's True Whig Party was the only viable political party in pre-
sent day Liberia, and no organization was known to exist as of 1978. A
considerable degree of resentment existed toward the wealthy clique of
ruling families of Americo-Liberian descent for the privileges and power
they maintained as the dominant social force.

The assassination of President Tolbert, on the morning of April 12,
1980, and the subsequent seizure of power by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe
caused a stir throughout all of Africa.[32]   Approximately 25 members of

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[30]Decalo, op. cit., p. 218.

[31]The Economist (April 9, 1980), p. 37.

[32]The coup was led by 17 soldiers, mostly members of the Krahn
tribe, while another eleven soldiers were coopted for ethnic representa-
tion. The rank of the soldiers was: two enlisted, eight corporals, two
staff sergeants, and the ranking officer, Master Sergeant Samuel Kenyon
Doe. See also Africa Contemporary Record, op. cit., (1979-80 edition), p.
B527.

incorrect to view these attitudes as directly causing the military to re-
linquish power and return to the barracks. The many benefits, both per-
sonal and organizational, which accrue to those with power can be expected
to provide a heavy counterweight to norms of civilian supremacy in deter-
mining the actual behavior of soldiers holding political office. However,
those norms do provide an important source of legitimacy for individuals
and groups within the military who calculate the costs of continued mili-
tary rule as greater than the benefits. The definition, by military ide-
ology itself, of military rule as "abnormal" is an important asset to
those who seek a return to civilian rule. This holds as well for indivi-
duals and groups outside the military.

In anglophone African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, the norm
of civilian supremacy is as much a political norm within civilian politi-
cal culture as it is within the professional military ideology. Under
such circumstances, there is a ready basis for civilian criticism of the
continuation of military rule; criticism which finds a legitimacy base
within the military's own sense of professional norms and ethics. In this
light, a professional military ideology containing the norm of civilian
supremacy should be viewed as a conditioning or facilitative factor, al-
though not a causal factor, in understanding when and where military re-
gimes will voluntarily "return to the barracks."

It follows from the above that in a country whose military lacks a
professional ideology that incorporates a strong norm of civilian suprem-
acy, a voluntray military withdrawal from political power is less likely
to occur than in countries where it does. In African terms, this suggests
that francophone countries are much less prone to such military withdraw-
als than would be countries with an anglophone tradition. Likewise, the
content of prosessional norms may change over time within the military
organization of a single country.

This would appear to be the case in Ghana, where the commitment to
the norm of civilian supremacy seemed to be stronger within the officer
corps during the first decade of independence than it has recently.
Statements of their professional commitment to civilian supremacy were
more frequently and explicitly made by members of the NLC, Ghana's first

ruling military council (1966-69), than by members of the military group
that seized power in 1972 and held it until 1979. Ghana's most recent
military ruler, Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, does not seem to derive any of
his political orientation from the anglophone military tradition that was
so important to the officers like Col. A. A. Afrifa who overthrew Nkrumah
in 1966. Correspondingly, the NRC/SMC which ruled Ghana from 1972 through
1979 showed considerably greater reluctance to relinquish power in favor
of civilians than did its predecessor, the NLC. Jerry Rawlings has given
no indication of when, if, or how he intends to extricate the Ghanaian
military from political power. The case of Ghana suggests that repeated
experiences of military rule may reduce the significance of the norm of
civilian supremacy within the ideology of military officers, making less
likely instances of voluntary return to civilian rule under constitutional
auspices.

6.2   The Society's Political-Associational Infrastructure

Ghana and Nigeria stand out among the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa (the Republic of South Africa excepted) in the depth and richness
of associational life that characterize their societies. Organized at
national and local levels and around every conceivable type of economic
activity and social identity, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
associations which function to protect and furthe. the perceived interests
of their members.

The origin of these is found in the rise of modern political agita-
tion that followed the end of World War II, while many others have roots
much farther back in the colonial era. Having existed over decades, these
associations have become institutionalized and thus represent enduring
social networks and patterns of leadership. They are capable of autono-
mous action but also have far flung and long standing ties with each
other. This creates the basis for coordinated action among them. It also
ties the individual associations, or informal coalitions of them, to lea-
ders and factions within their country's political stratum. Thus, when
military rule bans formal political parties, as it inevitably does, there
remains in Ghana and Nigeria numerous associations--labor unions, student

organizations, profesional bodies of every conceivable variety (lawyers, doctors, engineers, accountants, surveyors), ethnic unions, associations of chiefs, market women, butchers, taxi drivers, etc.--who are capable of playing a quasi political role.

The existence of this rich associational life in Ghana and Nigeria during the period of military rule provides the civilian population with an already existent organizational base for articulating criticisms of military rule for demanding a return to civilian supremacy, and for bringing pressure to bear on the military rulers in order to force them "back to their barracks." The point, then, is that in both Ghana and Nigeria there has existed during periods of military rule an organized basis for political criticism and action, despite the efforts of military regimes to ban political parties and prohibit political activity. This is a consequence of the character of the societies contained within these two West African states.

The mere existence of social associations capable of taking on a political role does not mean that these associations will automatically act to oppose military rule. Although the existence of norms of civilian supremacy in Ghanaian and Nigerian political culture probably does create a predisposition to such opposition, there is considerable evidence that in the initial periods of military rule in both countries, civilian associations for the most part either received the new military rulers positively or adopted a posture of neutrality.

In both countries, the very negative evaluations of the performance of the civilian politicians displaced by the armed forces explains a good deal of the civilian receptivity to military rule. Likewise, the performance of the military, once in power, had a determining effect upon the civilian populations transition from receptivity to opposition. This brings us to the third explanatory factor.

6.3   Economic/Political Crises

In Ghana, the seizure of power by the military in 1966 and 1972 was a direct response to crises in the Ghanaian economy; 1960 through 1965 was characterized by economic stagnation, inflation, and shortages of both

consumer and production goods. In 1965, the international price for cocoa, upon which Ghana depended for over 60 percent of her export earnings fell by one-third. Simultaneously, the government engaged in a lavish expansion of imports as it pursued various domestic and foreign policy projects. The result was a massive balance of payments crisis (the trade balance went from equilibrium in 1964 to a negative 163 million cedis in 1965), which in turn fueled a 30 percent jump in the cost of living and a consequent drop in real earnings of 21 percent. Gross national product per capita, which had not grown at all between 1962 and 1964, fell by over two percent in 1965. The economy had slid from a standstill into reverse. It was in the midst of this economic crisis that the Ghanaian army moved against the Government of Kwame Nkrumah and established the National Liberation Council (NLC), which was to become the first of three Ghanaian military regimes.

The officers of the NLC blamed the performance of Ghana's economy on mismanagement and corruption within the Nkrumah regime, and by inference promised to turn matters around by improvement in both respects. The civilian population greeted the new NLC regime with considerable jubilation, indicating that it accepted the military's diagnosis of Ghana's economic/political problems as well as its promise of improved economic management and an end to corruption.

The second coup d'etat in Ghana, which established the regime of the National Redemption Council (NRC), occurred under remarkably similar circumstances. The civilian government of Prime Minister K. A. Busia had been unable to produce structural changes in Ghana's economy. The large state sector that was inherited from the Nkrumah years continued to perform poorly, and the import bill grew while the all-import export sector continued to rely on cocoa, whose production was stagnant. As in the last year of Nkrumah's regime, an economic crisis was precipitated when a government-induced import boom coincided with a rapid decline in the international price for cocoa. Pursuing a strategy of economic expansion, in combination with liberalization of import restrictions, the Busia government permitted Ghana's import bill to jump from 354 millian cedis in 1969 to 443 million cedis in 1971, an increase of 25 percent.

During the same period, the international price for Ghana's cocoa (controlling for inflation) declined by a factor of 51 percent. Once again, the result was a deteriorating balance of payments situation, increased inflation, and a decline in GNP per capita (five percent between 1971 and 1972). And once again, economic crisis created the context for the Ghanaian military to displace a civilian regime.

As was the case with the NLC in 1966, in 1972 the new military regime blamed Ghana's economic crisis on mismanagement and corruption by the civilian politicians that it had replaced. Although this second military regime was not met with the same widespread enthusiasm as the earlier NLC takeover, it did receive considerable support from among key sectors of the urban population; most notably trade union organized workers and university students.

In contrast to the military takeovers in Ghana, the installation of a military regime in Nigeria occurred in the context of political, rather than economic crises. From its very inception in 1959, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was beset with tribal and regionally based tension.[5] Tribally related political conflict grew steadily to a crescendo in 1966, resulting in a cataclysm of coup (January), rioting and pogroms against the Ibo people of Eastern Nigeria (May-June), countercoup (July), and Biafran secession (September). Although the coups of January and July had a strong ethnic motivation and contributed directly to the disintegration of the Federation, the Ibo seccession and the resulting war with Biafra brought a previously unknown cohesiveness to what remained of the Nigerian army and state.

The civil war in Nigeria came to an end on January 12, 1970, with the surrender of Biafra. The war had lasted thirty months. Nigeria's military regime, under the leadership of General Gowon turned to the task of post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. In October of 1970 Gowon announced to the nation a nine point program for his post-war military regime. It focused upon reorganization of the military and reform of the

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[5]See Ian Campbell, "Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal," in K. Panter Brick, ed., Soldiers and Oil, op. cit., pp. 58-99.

political system--both were intended to ensure "a period of lasting peace and political stability."[6]

Once established, each military regime--the Gowon regime in Nigeria and the NLC and NRC regimes in Ghana--enjoyed an initial "honeymoon" period. The performance of the military government in respect to the economic and political tasks they had set for themselves appeared satisfactory, and criticism of them and demands for a return to civilian rule were either non-existent or muted. In part, this was a consequence of the economic or political chaos that had immediately preceded the military takeover, and the resultant sense that any change could only represent an improvement. In part, this was a consequence of economic circumstances which, although not created by the military regimes, nonetheless resounded to their benefit.

In the case of the two Ghanaian regimes, the international cocoa market, whose poor performance had set the stage for both military coups, turned buoyant in the years immediately after the establishment of military regimes. Thus, the NLC benefited when the international price for cocoa, which had reached a twenty-year low in 1965, rebounded strongly in 1966 and 1967, with average prices for 1966 and 1967, representing an increase of 39 percent and 62 percent over 1965 levels, respectively. Similarly, the NRC, which assumed power after two years of sharply slumping international cocoa prices, found that the cocoa price in the first full year of its rule was up 84 percent. For both the NLC and NRC, improved cocoa prices reduced the pressure on the balance of payments, lessened the foreign exchange constraint on the economy, permitted an increase in imports, and thus improved the situation in respect to the politically sensitive areas of consumer goods shortages and inflation.

In Nigeria, the initial success of the post-1970 Gowon regime was immeasurably aided by the new found wealth from petroleum that made its appearance in the 1970-74 period. In 1970 oil production doubled, with output increasing from an average daily rate of 500,000 barrels in 1969 to

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[6]See Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p. 41.

1.08 million barrels in 1970. Over the next four years, oil output more than doubled again, with production reaching an average daily rate of 2.25 million barrels in 1974.

At the same time, the international price structure for petroleum was undergoing a revolution. Priced at $2.17 per barrel in 1969, oil had more than doubled by 1973 ($4.80), and then climbed by more than 300 percent in a single year. In 1974, the average per barrel price of petroleum stood at $14.69. The effect on the Nigerian economy was a boom unimaginable by the standards of the previous decade. For the military regime, it provided the resources necessary to finance a massive post-war reconstruction program which, in turn, eased the task of reconciliation between the previously warring ethnic groups. As one observer observed, "Nigeria in the early 1970's entered one of those periods of calm when no crisis obtruded."[7]

The honeymoon period experienced by the Ghanaian and Nigerian military regimes turned out to be just that--a short period in which unusual circumstances hid underlying realities. An examination of each military regime indicates that after an initial period of rule, the fundamental problems that had undermined the predecessor civilian governments resurfaced, and that the military rulers turned out to be little better at solving them.

The Ghanaian officers that overthrew Nkrumah found that while they were able to stem the economic slide that his regime had produced (aided by increased international prices for cocoa) real changes in the economy that would improve efficiency and productivity, increase employment, and generate sustained economic growth alluded them. Between 1966 and 1968, GNP per capita was completely stagnant, unemployment increased, inflation continued to creep upward, and the real minimum wage was essentially stagnant.[8]

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[7]Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p. 5

[8]See Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action (London: Heinemann, 1978), pp. 84-88; and Ghana, Economic Survey, 1969-1971 (Accra: Government Printers, 1976).

At the same time, the military spent lavishly on its own organiza-
tion. The budgetary allocation for defense in 1968-69 represented a 41
percent increase over the last Nkrumah budget, and at the same time allo-
cations for industry and agriculture were being slashed by 77.5 percent
and 28.3 percent, respectively. Middle class professionals, including
military officers, found their salaries substantially increased by the new
military government, and their access to imported luxury consumer goods
was enhanced. Charges of corruption, which represented a major point of
attack against the Nkrumah regime and had been used by the military to
justify its coup d'etat, were now leveled against the new military
rulers. In 1969, General Ankrah, the Head of the Ruling Military Council,
resigned after it was disclosed he had accepted money from a group of
businessmen.

The continuation of economic stagnation, of inequality and privi-
lege, and of corruption, produced widespread popular cynicism toward the
NLC regime. This mood was nicely captured in the title of a popular
record released in 1968 entitled: "The Cars are the Same, Only the Drivers
Have Changed." While the populace manifested a quiet cynicism, the intel-
lectuals and erstwhile politicians, now chafing to return to political
activity and perhaps power, missed few opportunities to criticize the
military regime for its ineffectiveness, inconsistence, drift, and stagna-
tion. Tension between the military rulers and the intellectuals (espe-
cially those associated with the influential option journal, Legon Obser-
ver, published at the University of Ghana) grew, as the latter tested the
former's limit of toleration.

The experience of the NLC was repeated, except in much more extreme
form, by the NRC. There are few observers who would not characterize eco-
nomic management and performance during the NRC period as simply an un-
mitigated disaster. All of the problems that had been endemic to Ghana
since the early 1960's continued to make their presence felt, and indeed
had become much worse. Production in all sectors declined; a continuous
balance of payments crisis manifested itself in a permanent foreign ex-
change shortage; the latter meant shortages of imported consumer goods,
not all of which were luxuries, as well as disasterous shortages of raw

materials and spare parts, upon which all sectors of production depended; and the government compensated for shortfalls in revenue by simply print- ing money, which, in the face of stagnant production, created unpreceden- ted levels of inflation. The performance of the economy, as measured by GNP per capita, was abysmal--declines of 7.8 percent and 8.5 percent were recorded in 1975 and 1976; in 1977 the decline was 1.8 percent; and in 1978-79 per capita GNP was simply stagnant.

Unwilling or unable to impose fiscal discipline on the economy, the military regime paid for its ever-expanding domestic bills with an expan- sionary monetary policy. The result was hyperinflation. The inflation rate, which stood at 10 percent when the NRC seized power in 1972, had climbed to 30 percent in 1975, to 53 percent in 1976, and an astonishing 116 percent in 1977. In order to stem the inflationary spiral, the regime resorted to various administrative means of controlling prices. None worked in keeping down the cost of living. Instead, these administrative means of commodity distribution and price control merely spawned a huge and thriving parallel, or "black market." Significantly, it was the mili- tary personnel who were given responsibility for the distribution of es- sential commodities that were major actors in, and beneficiaries of, this parallel market. As the economy ran down, corruption, which had been an endemic part of the Ghanian political system since independence, became more extreme and pervasive. The large number of military officers who had, since 1972, come to occupy governmental posts were perceived to be at the very center of this burgeoning corruption.[9]

The NRC's political decline paralleled the decline of the Ghanaian economy. In the initial period of its rule, the military council had been able to generate some popular support and to mute its critics with poli- cies that combined economic nationalism (repudiation of some foreign debts, nationalization of foreign owned corporations), with direct

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[9]Partly because of the NRC's lack of trust in civil servants, they allowed over one-third of the officer corps to become involved in govern- ment; see Jon Kraus "The Decline of Ghana's Military Government," Current History (December 1977), pp. 215-216 for details.

material payoffs to certain key groups (urban workers were granted increased wages, secondary and university students had their fees reduced). By 1975, however, when the Ghanaian economy virtually collapsed, whatever support the NRC had initially received from the civilian population evaporated.[10] A variety of prominent individuals began a drumbeat of criticism and, through the network of associations and organizaions that characterized Ghanaian society, articulated and pressed demands for an end to military rule.

In the fall of 1976, the Ghana Bar Association demanded that the military regime return power to civilians in two years. A more radical demand for the immediate return to civilian rule was made ten months later by the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB), a group made up of representatives of Ghana's doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, planners, surveyors, pharmacists, accountants, and veterinarians. This demand for an immediate end to the military regime was followed by an extraordinary 19-day strike in which lawyers, doctors, engineers, accountants, and technicians withdrew their services.

During this period, the capital city of Accra was bedeviled by water shortages and power outages as government-employed technicians and engineers joined other professionals in bringing pressure to bear on the military regime. At one point, all six turbines at the hydroelectric power station at Akosombo on the Volta river were shut down, causing extensive damage to the Valco aluminum smelter. Responding to this pressure, General Acheampong, Chairman of the NRC, promised a return to civilian rule within two years. Although this brought the strike action to a halt, it did not end the active and forceful civilian opposition to a continuation of military rule.

Throughout 1978 and 1979, professional groups and prominent middle-class individuals spearheaded the opposition to Acheampong's Union Government notion, an idea that would have created a joint civilian-military

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[10]See Naomi Chazan and Victor LeVine, "Politics in a Non-Political System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana," African Studies Review (April 1979).

regime. Although harassed by the government and prohibited from holding
meetings, they managed nonetheless to communicate their anti-UNICOV ideas
widely. During the course of a year and a half, hundreds of government
opponents were arrested, including prominent lawyers and businessmen,
while many others sought a safe haven abroad from which to conduct their
campaign against military rule in Ghana.

Like its counterparts in Ghana, the Nigerian military rulers found
that the problems of governance can be intractable. After an initial
period of calm that followed the end to the civil war, the Nigerian regime
found itself facing cumulative problems of a political, social, and econo-
mic nature. It had been a primary objective of the Gowon regime to build
a basis for unity in Nigeria. As a foundation for accomplishing this ob-
jective, the regime sought during 1973 to conduct a census that could be
the basis for drawing administrative and constituency boundaries, and
could provide accurate data for government resource allocations. As was
the case in an earlier (1962-63) census exercise, this attempt to get an
accurate count of Nigeria's population became highly politicized. Ethnic
and regional fears led every group to seek to inflate the size of its
population. As a result, the final figures contained obvious exaggera-
tions, they stimulated tribal competition and fear, and they threatened to
let loose such animosity that the regime simply set aside its own census
exercise. "Ominously," wrote one knowledgeable observer,

> the identical vocabulary of 'fraud' and 'ethnic
> domination' and 'perpetual political subjugation'
> was used in the response of the nation's non-
> military leaders to the new census, as had charac-
> terized the political parties' stormy reaction to
> the 'preposterous' and 'artifically inflated'
> figures of the previous one.[11]

The Gowon regime had set out to build the basis for future unity and in
the process discovered that it had instead revealed the enduring political
cleavages that were rooted in Nigeria's etho-cultural heterogeneity.

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[11]Kirk-Green, op. cit., p. 6.

The furor over the census represented, in a sense, the resurrection
of an old problem. By 1974, however, the Nigerian military regime found
that the oil generated economic boom which had facilitated an era of poli-
tical calm in the early 1970's was bringing new problems in its wake. The
benefits of the oil boom were not spread evenly. The large number of new
urban migrants, drawn to the cities by the ambitious 1970-74 Development
Plan found that their standard of living had improved little as a result
of Nigeria's oil wealth, while, at the same time, a small but visible
strata of new millionaires was ostentatiously displaying its recently ac-
quired fortunes. The problem of increasing income inequality was
exacerbated by the inflationary pressures created by the spending explo-
sion that accompanied the 1970-74 Development Plan and the inflow of
petro-dollars. The consumer price index climbed 89 percent between 1970
and 1975, and jumped an additional 72 percent by 1978.

The combination of oil boom, inequality, and inflation generated a
seemingly continuous series of labor strikes, demonstrations, and vio-
lence, as workers in different sectors and industries sought what they
considered their "fair" share of Nigeria's oil wealth. The Gowon regime
seemed powerless to stem the tide of labor unrest and granted most wage
demands. The government incomes "policy" that resulted fed inflation and
indirectly spurred later labor strife as workers in both public and pri-
vate sectors sought to recoup what had been lost through rises in the cost
of living.

The task of dealing with the enduring political problems of ethnic
divisions, and the new problems of social aand economic inequality, was
made more difficult by an unforeseen constriction of the economy after
1974. The post-1970 oil boom had brought with it certain problems, but it
had also brought with it the economic resources to deflect the political
consequences of these problems. In 1974, the expansionary phase of
Nigeria's post-civil war, oil-driven economy came abruptly to a halt. Oil
production fell by 21 percent in 1975, increased by 16 percent in 1976,
remained at about the same level in 1977, and dropped again (by 9 percent)
in 1978.

During this period, international prices for petroleum dropped some-
what as well. Obviously, petroleum was still generating enormous reve-
nues for the Nigerian economy and government. Neither government nor pri-
vate individuals, however, had anticipated an end to the expansion in such
revenues. Both had made lavish commitments in respect to spending and
importing; commitments that could not now be met by oil-generated reve-
nues. As a result, Nigeria began running balance of trade deficits in
1976 and was forced to borrow on international capital marketts to pay its
import bill. In an extraordinary reversal of the atmosphere between 1970
and 1774, the years 1977 and 1978 were ones in which the military govern-
ment was forced to try and impose austerity and economic contraction.

Although the OPEC-engineered price rises of 1979-80 turned the
Nigerian situation around, introducing another phase of economic boom,
that was not something the military rulers of Nigeria did or could have
anticipated. Between 1974 and 1978 they confronted an apparently dire
situation--the economy was seriously out of control and political and
social unrest seethed under the surface, breaking out periodically. To
make matters worse, major scandals involving mismanagement and corrpution
were emerging, tarnishing the image of the military and undermining the
credibility of its claim to power. Like the Ghanaian military regimes,
the Nigerian military regime faced a seemingly insoluble crisis.

Faced with serious economic problems whose solution appeared neither
easy nor even known, and confronting an increasingly restive civilian
population whose alienation from military rule was being driven by the
military regime's apparent inability to manage the economy, the military
rulers in Ghana and Nigeria found themselves at what was, in effect, a
crossroad. They had only two options in respect to their situations.
First, they could recommit themselves to the maintenance of military rule
by substantially increasing the quantitative and qualitative level of re-
pression against its opponents. Alternatively, they could choose a grace-
ful "return to the barracks." In essence, the seemingly insoluble econo-
mic and political problems could be turned over to civilian politicians;
and a controlled and smooth transition to civilian rule could be used to
preserve some protection, prerequisites, and self-respect for the military
organization and its personnel.

The first of the above options should not be seen as without its attractions. Whatever the problems attendant upon rulership, the prerequisites of power—economic, social, and psychological—were great. Although civilians might be clamoring for change, in neither Ghana nor Nigeria did they possess the means to dislodge the military by force. And, while military rule was not democratic, and on occasion repression was indeed utilized (most notably by the Acheampong regime in Ghana after 1977), the level of that repression was by comparative standards mild. Many military regimes in the contemporary world have used repression to a far greater extent, and in a much more systematic manner, in order to keep themselves in power. Nevertheless, the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria eschewed the repression option, and instead chose to relinquish the privileges of power in favor of civilian politicians. Comprehending why this choice was made requires some understanding of the Ghanaian and Nigerian militry organizations, at the time that the decision to return to the barracks was taken.

6.4   The Military's Repressive Capability

For a military organization to be used for large-scale repression against its own society, it must possess sufficient internal cohesion and esprit de corps (i.e., integration and corporate identity) so as to differentiate itself from that society; only then will it be able to act with autonomy and unity. The militaries of Ghana and Nigeria lacked such organizational cohesion and autonomy. This was in part a consequence of the long standing penetration into the military organization of the many social cleavages within the new African states, and especially the ethnic cleavage.

This aspect of organizational fragmentation has been dealt with extensively elsewhere in this report, but a lack of organizational cohesion was also a consequence of tensions and divisions within the military, brought on by military rule itself. The experience of military rule can be seen to create at least four types of new fissures within the military organization:

(1)   competition between senior officers for lucrative political patronage plums;

(2)   jealousy and envy between those officers who remain in command positions and those who are given government positions;

(3)   disruption in the chain of command and in the overall hierarchical structure of authority when coups are made by junior officers (and especially when they are made against the opposition of senior officers); and

(4)   hostility of junior officers and "other ranks" to the privileges that rulership bestows upon more senior officers.

The experience of successive coups and countercoups in Nigeria and Ghana indicate clearly that the armed forces of these two countries are deeply affected by both the old and new types of cleavage. Under these circumstances, the military could not be used as an agent of widespread repression, for the simple reason that important elements within the military would always be identified with the individuals and groups who were the subject of repression. Moreover, the evidence from both Ghana and Nigeria shows that elements within the armed forces viewed the continuation of military rule as a threat to the cohesion of the military itself, and were prepared to act to preserve what was left of professional integrity and military organization.

In 1975, Nigerian officers moved against General Gowon who appeared to be backing away from a previous commitment to return political power to civilians. Likewise, in Ghana in 1978, General Akuffo and his colleagues on the ruling military council removed their chairman, General Acheampong, when the latter was perceived as seeking to delay the return to civilian rule.[12] Akuffo was overthrown in a coup-cum-mutiny when very junior

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[12]Acheampong had responded to claims the military should not rule indefinitely by suggesting that soldiers were "better trained than politicians for administering with competence the affairs of the nation." Kraus, op. cit., p. 216.

level officers and members of the "other ranks" rebelled against what they
saw as efforts by senior officers to preserve their privileges and escape
punishment for their crimes.[13]

Given the cleavages and division within the ranks of the armed
forces, the military rulers of Ghana and Nigeria could not maintain mili-
tary rule through repression. The exercise of the repressive option was
simply too dangerous; the repressive apparatus, mobilized against civilian
opponents, could too easily be turned instead against the military rulers
themselves. They really had no other viable option but to voluntarily
withdraw from the political arena, and they took it.[14]

In conclusion, the experience of Ghana and Nigeria suggests how we
can account for the anomaly of military withdrawal from political power.
The three cases of return to civilian rule exhibited by these two West
African countries reveal a common pattern, indicating that military rulers
will relinquish power in favor of a civilian regime under a conjunction of
unusual circumstances:

(a) when the military regime encounters severe economic
and/or political problems;

(b) when the organization and politicization of society
facilitates sustained civilian opposition to the
continuatin of military rule;

(c) when the military organization is internally frag-
mented and factions of the army are allied with
civilian opponents of military rule; and

(d) when military ideology itself defines military rule
as an "abnormal" or illegitimate condition.

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[13]For an interview with coup leader, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawl-
ings, in which the young officer explains his reaction to overseas pres-
sures for ending executions in Ghana, see West Africa (July 9, 1979), p.
315.

[14]President Nyerere of Tanzania told Nigerian head of state, General
Obasanjo, that in his opinion "no military government has worked (as hard
as Nigeria) to get itself out of power. Cited in Jean Herskovits "Demo-
cracy in Nigeria," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1979/80), p. 315.

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

Sources which proved particularly relevant are noted in the bibliography which has, within the limits of space, reflected the references of this report.

African publications tend to arrive at major libraries by surface mail, causing considerable difficulty to scholars interested in real-time analysis. An additional problem stems from the fact that most African periodicals are expensive to obtain and, therefore, found in only limited numbers outside of the libraries of universities with major African studies programs (e.g., UCLA).

Since literacy presents a problem in Africa, it is not surprising that almost all major Sub-Saharan African puplications are in European languages. This can expand their appeal beyond various tribal and national limitations. It is also useful for scholars who are unfamiliar with various local languages. The fact that one of the authors is a native speaker of Amharic with fluency in Kiswahili was, therefore, not as useful as an outside observer might expect due to the structural limitations of the African media. In practice the authors found the most useful publications to be in English and French. Portuguese materials were not relied upon due to the fact that Angola and Mozambique were only of secondary importance to this study. Likewise, Arabic publications were found to be of only limited utility because the focus of this project excluded Arab Africa.

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AFRICAN PERIODICALS

(Note that many African periodicals are sent to the libraries in the Uni-
ted States by surface mail. This can lead to delays of up to nine months
in obtaining copies.)

The Citizen (South Africa)

Daily Graphic (Ghana)

Daily Mail (Sierra Leone)

Daily Mail (Zambia)

Daily Nation (Kenya)

Daily News (Botswana)

Daily News (Tanzania)

Daily Times (Nigeria)

Ehuzu (Benin)

The Ethiopian Herald (Ethiopia)

Ghanaian Times (Ghana)

The Herald (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe)

Legon Observer (Ghana)

Liberian Age (Liberia)

L'Union (Gabon)

New Liberian (Liberia)

New Nigerian (Nigeria)

Rand Daily Mail (South Africa)

Sowetan (South Africa)

The Standard (Kenya)

The Star (South Africa)

Times of Zambia (Zambia)

Uganda Times (Uganda)

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